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DISARMAMENT IN PERSPECTIVE:

An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919-1939

VOLUME II

DEMILITARIZATION OF FRONTIERS, ISLANDS AND STRAITS

ACDA/RS-55

PREPARED FOR

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

PREPARED BY

DDC
NOV 24 1969

CALIFORNIA STATE COLLEGE AT LOS ANGELES FOUNDATION

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Prepared By
CALIFORNIA STATE COLLEGE AT LOS ANGELES FOUNDATION

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Chapter 8

THE RUSSO-FINNISH TREATY OF OCTOBER, 1920

On October 14, 1920, after four months of protracted negotiations, Finland and Soviet Russia signed a peace treaty in the old Estonian university town of Tartu (Dorpat). Among other things, this pact provided for the demilitarization of three strategic zones.¹ The first of these demilitarized zones was located in the waters opposite Pechenga (Petsamo). Under the terms of the treaty, Soviet Russia agreed to cede a fairly large strip of territory on the Arctic coast to Finland in the Pechenga area and in return Finland agreed to limit her naval forces in the Arctic waters. The second demilitarized zone was in the Gulf of Finland. Under the treaty, Finland agreed to "militarily neutralize" a number of islands in the Gulf which were located strategically off the Soviet coast in the area of Petrograd (Leningrad). The third zone was Lake Ladoga. As the Russo-Finnish frontier was drawn to pass through Lake Ladoga, the two signatories agreed to a mutual renunciation of offensive weapons on the lake, its shores and the rivers and canals running into the lake.

The Treaty of Tartu and the negotiations leading up to its signature appear significant in several respects. First, although the treaty imposed a one-sided demilitarization of Finnish territory, with little corresponding obligation on the Soviet Republic, the treaty was negotiated on a voluntary basis with Finland more courted than pressured. Second, the demilitarization provisions were part of a larger peace settlement and, in that settlement, demilitarization played a relatively insignificant role. Third, in the negotiations leading up to the peace talks, neither demilitarization nor disarmament was advanced as a policy objective by either side; whenever demilitarization was advocated it represented a low priority policy alternative. Fourth, during the negotiations demilitarization was not proposed by either Soviet Russia or Finland as a means to achieve or maintain peace; rather the demilitarization provisions (with the exception of the terms relating to Lake

Ladoga) served as a convenient compromise for settling rival territorial claims. Fifth, although demilitarization was not widely advocated prior to the negotiations at Tartu, the final terms of the treaty relating to demilitarization were broadly accepted and supported. There was not, at least, any vocal opposition to the military terms on either side. Sixth, the demilitarization arrangements provided for in the treaty were, in general, upheld throughout the interwar period. While there were frequent complaints of treaty violation in respect to other provisions of the treaty, in particular with regard to the status of East Karelia, there were no complaints of violations of the demilitarization sections of the treaty.

Soviet-Finnish Relations: 1917-1920

While war was never officially declared between Finland and Soviet Russia, relations between the two countries became bitterly contentious during 1917-1920. Not only did armed clashes occur at various points along the undefined frontier, but organized military campaigns were launched as each side sought to consolidate its military position as a prelude to diplomatic discussions.

Aside from the vestiges of Finnish opposition to the russification policies inaugurated by the Tsars in the late 1800's, there were three basic sources of conflict between Finland and Soviet Russia that affected relations during 1917-1920. The first stemmed from Finland's declaration of independence in 1917 and the policies pursued to maintain that independence. The second source of tension was based on Bolshevik intervention in the Finnish civil war which broke out in early 1918. The third and most important basis of conflict arose over rival Finnish and Soviet territorial claims.

Taking advantage of the Russian revolutions of 1917, the Finns, after a series of hesitant steps² finally declared their independence from Russia in December 1917, thus³ breaking a bond that had existed for over a hundred years. The foreign policy of the new state immediately focused on one issue--the preservation of independence--which required, as its first and most important prerequisite, the recognition of independence from outside powers. However, under wartime conditions, Finnish independence had military and strategic implications which affected all sides.

The Allies hoped to reopen the eastern front following the withdrawal from the war by the Bolsheviks. While there were differences over which of the various White Russian factions the Allies should support and, at times, even whether a return of the White Russians to power in Russia was the best way to reopen the eastern front, the Western powers were reluctant to alienate past and possibly future allies. The White Russians, in turn, were vehemently opposed to Finnish independence, holding to the indivisibility of the Russian empire. The Germans supported Finnish independence both as an immediate obstacle to the reopening of an eastern front and as a possible zone of future political influence.

In their endeavor to find outside support for their independence, the Finns were confronted with a delicate policy choice--if they turned to the Allies, they might be asked to help return to power the forces which were opposed to Finnish independence; if they turned to the Central powers, they might find their independence in jeopardy should Germany win and in greater jeopardy should the Allies win. There was a third alternative, which seemed to many Finns an ideal compromise, though there were dangers involved. That was to pursue a policy of neutrality, emulating the Scandinavian stance, so that Finnish independence would be rewarded by whomever won the war. That such a policy was not without its risks the White Russians never permitted the Finns to forget, for if Finland refused to intervene against the Bolsheviks or at least aid the White Russians in their intervention, the White Russians promised to remember this (and to act accordingly) should they succeed in again coming to power.

The newly declared Finnish Republic, under a government headed by P. E. Svinhufvud, initially chose that policy of least resistance--neutrality. But civil war, which broke out less than two months after independence was declared, shifted Finnish foreign policy toward a pro-German orientation, an orientation which lasted until the end of the war. It was during this period that the Finnish government began to flirt with the idea of an armed intervention against the Bolsheviks.⁴ Later, following the collapse of Germany and the resignation of the pro-German government under Svinhufvud in November, 1918, the idea of intervention returned periodically in the policy calculations of the governments formed during 1919 and 1920. To win Allied support, the Finns occasionally expressed a cautious willingness to intervene against the Bolsheviks under certain conditions. The intervention had to have Allied support (and not be merely a White Russian campaign) and the White Russians had to pledge

that they would recognize Finnish independence. As neither of these conditions was fulfilled, according to the Finns, no direct assistance was given to White Russian campaigns. Of course, Finnish willingness to intervene was not conducive to friendly relations with Soviet Russia.

The second source of tension between Finland and Soviet Russia arose as a reaction to Bolshevik assistance to Finnish revolutionaries in the civil war of 1918. During the latter part of 1917 the national struggle for independence was transformed into a class struggle for political power. This struggle culminated in a bloody civil war, from January to April 1918, which split the country not only ideologically but territorially. The Finnish Red Guards gained control of the southern, industrial regions of the country, including the capital, Helsinki, and the government, with headquarters in Vaasa, controlled the northern half of the country.

During the early stages of the civil war, the Russians played a decisive role in the conflict. An estimated 40,000 Russian soldiers were stationed in Finland in early 1918 and this force spearheaded the initial campaigns against the government. With the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty in early March 1918, however, the Russians were required to withdraw their troops from Finland. The call for volunteers--who would remain behind to help the Finnish Red Guards--was disappointing and Russian military assistance dwindled down to no more than a thousand by the end of March.⁵

While the Russians were being forced to withdraw, the Germans were being asked to intervene. The beleaguered Vaasa government had asked for German assistance during the first weeks of the civil war, but it was not until early April that a large contingent of German troops arrived. Within a month the Finnish Red Guards were routed and southern Finland re-occupied. The civil war was over by the end of April; there remained only the reprisals, which passed into history under the ignominious title of the "White Terror."

Whatever the responsibility of the Russians for the civil war, a subject of continuing historical speculation, the conflict led to a fierce anti-Bolshevik reaction among influential and conservative segments of the Finnish population. This reaction led first to the abandonment of the idea of a Republic and the appointment of a one-man Regency, and second, to the abandonment of the neutralist stance for a pro-German orientation, both of which remained until the collapse of Germany and the end of the war in November 1918.

Although a pro-Allied government, under Marshal Mannerheim, was formed in late 1918, relations with Russia did not improve. In part this was due to the personal anti-Bolshevik views of Mannerheim and, in part, it was the result of the inability of the Allies, after whom the Finns patterned their policy, to decide on a consistent policy toward Soviet Russia. But the most important source of tension between Finland and Russia was the rivalry which arose during 1919 and 1920 over conflicting territorial claims.

During this period there were four important disputed areas, with each side demanding territory in two of the areas. Finland sought additional territory in East Karelia and demanded control over the port of Pechenga on the Arctic Ocean. The Soviet Union demanded additional territory on the Karelian isthmus for the defense of Petrograd and control over certain islands in the Gulf of Finland which commanded the access routes to Petrograd and which, in some cases, were within artillery range of the Russian mainland.

East Karelia. Under the Tsars, the boundaries of East Karelia had never been defined. In general, the area stretched from Lake Ladoga in the south to the Arctic Ocean in the north, where it extended from the Norwegian border in the west to the Kola Peninsula in the east. While its general contours were easily recognizable, the precise location of the long north-south frontier dividing Finland and Soviet Russia became the source of rival claims. The area itself was largely uninhabited, with a widely scattered population of little more than 200,000. Administered by the Russian government up to World War I, neither the Finns nor the Tsars showed great interest in the area prior to around 1890. But with the decision to build the Murmansk railway from Petrograd in the south to the ice free port in the north, the area took on a new and strategic importance, for the railway would pass through the entire length of East Karelia. With the possibilities of opening up a vast virgin territory, the Tsarist government encouraged Russians to emigrate there, but the distribution of population stood at about 60% Finnish Karelians to 40% Russians as late as 1920. While the Russians expressed only a belated interest in the area, the Finns revealed no great attachment to the area throughout most of the 1800's. Although the Karelians were racially and linguistically related to Finland, it was only during the latter part of the century that the Finns began to look on East Karelia as an irridenta. With independence, concern manifested itself over the strategic vulnerability of the long frontier with Russia and the fact that the Murmansk railroad would permit the Russians to launch

an attack at any point along the unprotected frontier. Whether merely a convenient argument to justify purely expansionist designs (as charged by the Finnish socialists) or whether the territorial claim represented a sincere attempt to establish more defensible frontiers, all of the governments, whether pro-German under Svinhufvud or pro-Allied under Mannerheim, Vennola, Erich, and Castren had annexationist designs on East Karelia and most of the governments were willing to engage in armed intervention to achieve these objectives.

Pechenga. Pechenga (Petsamo), an ice free port on the Arctic Ocean, had long been coveted by the Finns. The claim was based on a promise by Tsar Alexander II in 1864 to provide Finland with an exit on the Arctic through Russian territory in return for some Finnish territory elsewhere. While the promise was never fulfilled, nor the promised exit identified, the Finns assumed that the area was Pechenga. Consequently, over the years Pechenga came to be considered by many Finns as Finnish territory, de jure if not de facto. While the Bolsheviks ceded Pechenga to the rebel Socialist Workers Republic, the agreement was presumably nullified with the overthrow of the Finnish Reds in April 1918.

One month later, the Protective Corps in northern Finland invaded East Karelia and occupied Pechenga. Coming at a time when the Allies were landing in the northern provinces of East Karelia, first at Murmansk and later at Archangel, the Finnish campaign, following German intervention in the civil war, appeared to be part of a German plot to extend Finnish territory to the Arctic in order to establish submarine bases which would threaten the shipping lanes to Murmansk and Archangel. Therefore, the Allies sent several hundred troops to force the Finns to evacuate the port.

Though the Finns retreated in 1918, they returned in late 1919, following the withdrawal of the British expeditionary force in October. Four months later, however, in February and March 1920, the Bolsheviks threatened the Finnish forward positions. Having defeated the White Russians in the north, the Bolsheviks occupied Murmansk and Archangel, and then moved east to the outskirts of Pechenga. At this point, with the Finns in Pechenga and the Russians threatening from the east, negotiations began on an armistice. Thus when peace talks opened in June 1920, Pechenga became the second important territorial dispute dividing the two countries.

The Karelian Isthmus. When Peter the Great transferred the Russian capital to St. Petersburg in 1703, he not only acquired a window on the West, he also created a strategic problem which plagued Russian leaders, whether Tsarist or Soviet, for two hundred years. Located on the eastern shores of the Gulf of Finland, within twenty miles of the Finnish frontier, the city was exposed militarily from two directions--from the north, by way of the Karelian isthmus and by sea, through the Gulf of Finland. As Finland controlled the major part of the Karelian isthmus and a large portion of the islands in the Gulf of Finland, the fate of Finland determined the vulnerability of St. Petersburg, a fact which contributed to the absorption of Finland in the Russian empire in 1809.

Although the Finns retained a good deal of autonomy throughout the 1800's, Finnish national interests were fundamentally in conflict with Russian strategic interests. Therefore, when Finnish nationalism arose during the latter part of the 1800's the Russian government inaugurated a Russification policy which was as oppressive as it was self-defeating. Having alienated the Finnish population, the Russians found their policy alternatives critically limited when the war broke out in 1914. The hostile political climate in Finland and the vulnerability of St. Petersburg (Petrograd) forced the Russian government to intensify controls over the country and, indeed, to establish a military occupation. Extensive Russian ground forces were stationed throughout Finland to guard against a German attack on the capital from the north.

While the Karelian isthmus never became an actual route of invasion against Russia, it did represent a perennial danger--a danger which became more acute with the independence of Finland. Consequently, when peace talks between Finland and Soviet Russia began in June 1920, one of the demands made by the Bolsheviks was for a territorial adjustment on the Karelian isthmus in order to insure the security of Petrograd.

The Gulf of Finland. As Petrograd was vulnerable not only from the north but from the sea through the Baltic and the Gulf of Finland, the fate of the city was to a large extent dependent on the security arrangements in the Gulf of Finland. While Russia possessed several islands in the Gulf, the most strategically placed, like Ino and Puumala, both within artillery range of Petrograd, were controlled by Finland. As long as Finland remained in the Russian empire, of course, defensive arrangements could be made--and were made--by the Tsarist governments. Both Ino and Puumala, for example, were heavily fortified, as

were to a lesser extent Someri, Nervi, Seiskari and about a half dozen other islands. When Finland became independent, however, the security of Petrograd was vitally affected, prompting the Bolsheviks to raise the issue of the islands as their second major demand for territorial adjustment at the peace talks.

The Decision to Negotiate

The Finnish decision to enter into peace talks with Soviet Russia was based on four main factors which converged during late 1919 and early 1920. There were, first of all, strong pressures to make peace from the other Baltic states, especially from Estonia, where the military situation had become desperate by the end of 1919. Second, Allied policy toward Soviet Russia, which Finland sought to emulate and anticipate, underwent a significant change in late 1919 and early 1920, with the abandonment of the policy of intervention and the shift to a policy of trade and accommodation. Third, Bolshevik successes against the White Russians in the Baltic area and advancing Red Army threatened to transform the local skirmishes carried out by the Finns in East Karelia into a serious and bloody military confrontation. Fourth, the political situation within Finland shifted during late 1919 and early 1920, which was characterized by increasing discontent with the ultra-nationalistic White Russians and mounting pressures--especially from the socialists--for an accommodation with the Soviets.

Pressures from the Baltic States. Having waged unofficial war against the Bolsheviks for the better part of two years, the Baltic states were confronted in the autumn of 1919 with the ominous prospects of an advancing Red Army at the very moment the White forces were disintegrating and the Allies were reconsidering their commitment to the policy of intervention. In Estonia this ominous prospect became an impending crisis in early August when the Bolsheviks, taking advantage of a struggle between Generals Yudinich and Rodzianko for control of the White Russian Northern Corps, launched an attack and advanced to the Estonian frontier. There the Bolsheviks astutely offered peace and, implicitly, a recognition of independence. As neither the Allies nor the White Russians had offered to recognize the independence of the Baltic states, nor were they at this point even receptive to the idea, the Soviet offer, as intended, split the anti-Bolshevik front. Despite British pressures to continue fighting, and even some last minute pressures on the White Russians to grant independence to the Baltic states, the Estonians provisionally accepted the offer to negotiate. The main condition

advanced by the Estonians was that peace talks be carried on simultaneously with all the Baltic states. The Bolsheviks agreed and forwarded peace offers to Latvia, Lithuania and Finland in mid-September 1919.

In order to coordinate their policy responses to the Bolshevik peace overtures, representatives of the four Baltic states convened at Tallin, the Estonian capitol, on September 12 for the first of four Baltic conferences. At the Tallin conference, the delegates were exposed for the first time to a demand for regional demilitarization. This policy recommendation was made by the Finnish representatives, Premier Vennola and Foreign Minister Holsti, as part of their "conditions" for negotiating peace with the Soviet Republic. The Finns indicated that they would take part in negotiations only if the Bolsheviks agreed to the establishment of a neutral and demilitarized zone which would be created between the Baltic states and Soviet Russia.⁶

Apparently the Finns found little support for their idea of a demilitarized zone, for the concept was not raised again in any of the three following conferences in September, November and January 1920. At the last conference, held in Helsinki on January 24, the Baltic states did agree to take into consideration the future neutralization of the Baltic Sea and to submit the issue to a later conference, but nothing ever came of the idea. Indeed, despite the frequent demands for coordinated action among the Baltic states, they failed not only to establish a military alliance, as Estonia proposed, they also were unable to agree on procedures for carrying on joint negotiations with Russia, as Finland advocated. A Baltic military alliance foundered on the Polish-Lithuanian dispute over Vilna and Finland's reluctance to undertake military obligations on behalf of the weak and vulnerable border states. The proposal for joint peace negotiations failed because of the different levels of urgency felt in the various Baltic capitals. While the Finns and Lithuanians felt no imminent danger--at least during the latter part of 1919--the Red Army was exerting intense military pressures on the Estonian border and threatening to advance on Latvia momentarily. With the failure of all attempts at coordinating Baltic policy the Estonians entered into peace talks with the Bolsheviks and on February 12, 1920, signed a surprisingly advantageous peace treaty with the Soviet government. Latvia, the day before, had signed an armistice agreement with the Soviets and negotiations on a peace treaty began immediately, though it was not signed until August 11. The Lithuanians also began negotiations on a peace treaty in early 1920,

which was signed a month prior to the Latvian treaty, on July 12, 1920.⁸

With the failure of its Baltic policy and its increasing diplomatic isolation, Finland more than ever became dependent on Allied support. Indeed, Finnish foreign policy during late 1919 and early 1920 was devoted almost entirely to the task of trying to find out precisely what Allied policy toward Soviet Russia was so as to determine how best to adjust to its demands. Given the uncertainty of Allied policy at the time, the task was hardly enviable.

Allied Policy Toward Soviet Russia. Throughout most of 1919, Allied policy was based upon the assumption of a White Russian victory over the Bolsheviks and the re-establishment of a "legal government" in Russia. The policy implications of this assumption not only included material support for the White forces, but the avoidance of any commitments to recognize the independence of the Baltic states, with the possible exception of Finland, which had an historic identity lacking in the other three succession states.

When, therefore, the Baltic states began to press the Allies on their future intentions so as to be better able to respond to the Soviet offers of peace, the initial Allied response was that their policy remained "unchanged", a response hardly edifying to the various foreign officers of the Baltic powers. When the Finnish foreign minister, Holsti, persisted and wrote the Allies in mid-September 1919 asking pointedly for their views on the possibility of negotiating peace with Soviet Russia, the Allied response was, as might have been expected, negative. The Finnish representative to Great Britain telegraphed from London that Finland's participation in peace negotiations with the Soviet Union would make such a "bad impression" that Finland would lose whatever sympathy she had in London.⁹ The French were even less receptive to the idea of peace negotiations. The Finnish representative in Paris telegraphed that the French government was obligated to Kolchak and would never change its policy toward the Bolsheviks, nor would it favor the participation of any of the Baltic states in peace talks with the Soviet government.

On September 25, 1919, however, less than a week after the foregoing replies had been received to Finland's first tentative suggestion for peace talks, Allied policy began to shift. The first sign of this shift was a long note sent by Lord Curzon to Finland and the Baltic states on September 25 in which the

British government reversed its previous position. The note acknowledged the right of each of the governments to determine its own best interests and to determine equally how best to achieve them. While not making any commitment toward recognizing the independence of Latvia, Lithuania or Estonia, Curzon did acknowledge the "autonomous existence" of the border territories, adding that the final decision on their status would be determined by the Paris Peace Conference or by the League of Nations.¹⁰ The Curzon note of September 25, while by no means entirely clear, implied that the British would no longer demand Baltic support for the White Russians or oppose a decision by the succession states to negotiate a separate peace with the Bolsheviks.

While the change in Allied policy took place gradually and uncertainly (and at times even inconsistently), by early 1920 the old interventionist policy had clearly been abandoned. The September 25 note was followed in October by the complete withdrawal of British forces from the Murmansk front. On December 1, the Finnish minister in Washington reported that the American government no longer opposed peace negotiations between the Baltic states and the Bolsheviks.¹¹ Late in December the Supreme Allied Council announced that the Allied governments would undertake no further commitments to the White Russian armies and that they would assist the succession states only in case of direct Bolshevik attack.¹² During January 1920, the British government under Lloyd George began to emphasize the desirability of reestablishing trade with Soviet Russia. This new policy was underscored on January 20 with the announcement that the Allied blockade of Russia would be immediately lifted. Implicitly if not explicitly the Allies were announcing, resignedly or reluctantly, the abandonment of the policy of intervention and their efforts to overthrow the Bolsheviks. This shift in policy did not go unnoticed in Finland.

Military Pressures. While the Baltic states, especially Estonia, were exerting pressures to negotiate a settlement with the Bolsheviks and the Allies were in the process of abandoning their policy of intervention, the military situation along the Finnish-Soviet border added yet another inducement to enter into peace negotiations. Following the withdrawal of the Allied expeditionary forces from northern Russia in September and October 1919 a three way conflict broke out between the Finns, the White Russians and the Bolsheviks over control of East Karelia. By February 1920, however, the Bolsheviks had completely routed the White Russians, in part due to military successes, in part due to revolutionary agitation behind the White

Russian lines and in part due to the mutinies of White Russian forces. Had the White army held out longer it might have given the Finns time to consolidate their hold over East Karelia. As it was, by the end of February 1920, the Bolsheviks were in Archangel and Murmansk and were extending their control over the entire length of the Murmansk railway. Only the severe winter prevented the Bolsheviks from continuing their counter-offensive against the Finnish positions west of the railway and in Pechenga. As spring approached, however, a bloody military confrontation between the Red Army and the Finns over East Karelia appeared imminent. Not unexpectedly, the prospects of a war with Russia had a profound effect on Finnish domestic politics.

In late May, after procrastinating for four months in an unsuccessful attempt to gain outside diplomatic support, the Finnish government announced its readiness to begin peace negotiations with the Soviet Republic. President Stahlberg appointed a parliamentary committee to work out the terms which Finland would present to the peace conference. With all political parties represented, the committee immediately split over Finnish territorial objectives. On disarmament and demilitarization there was no dispute nor apparently was there any serious discussion. None of the parties advocated disarmament and demilitarization was proposed only as a convenient gambit to mask another objective which could not be openly put forward for political reasons.

The main conflict within the drafting committee revolved around the territorial issue: what territories should be demanded of Soviet Russia and how should these demands be presented. While all parties agreed that Finland should be ceded Pechenga, serious differences arose over East Karelia. Most of the representatives of the bourgeois parties wanted to annex East Karelia, but there were several obstacles to the presentation of an outright demand for annexation. First, local representative assemblies in East Karelia had demanded independence from Russia, not Finnish annexation. Following independence, the East Karelians planned to set up a provisional government which would, after a given period of time, hold a plebiscite to determine whether the country would unite with Finland as an autonomous territory or remain an independent state.¹³

An additional factor counseling against a demand for outright annexation was the anticipated negative reaction this might provoke in the Soviet delegation. Therefore, it was decided to seek annexation not by an overt demand but by a covert strategy: to propose that temporary provisional governments be set up in all the Karelian areas in which the population wanted to secede from the Soviet Republic. These provisional governments would hold a plebiscite after one year which would be supervised by an international commission to determine whether the people wished to become independent, join Finland or remain a part of Russia. Until the plebiscite was completed no boundaries would be established.

It was in the context of this formula that demilitarization was first proposed by the Finnish delegation. The drafting committee suggested that the areas in which a future plebiscite was to be held be formed into a neutral and demilitarized zone. Demilitarization was neither analyzed or presented, therefore, as a means to maintain peace and security. Rather, a loose demilitarized zone was seen as a convenient gambit, the only purpose of which was to postpone the definition of boundaries in the plebiscite zone. In essence, then, demilitarization was proposed as a means to facilitate the ultimate annexation of East Karelia (or parts of East Karelia) where a demand for outright annexation was seen to be inappropriate.

In contrast to the demand for Pechenga over which there was unanimous agreement, this section of the draft program found much less support among the various parties. Members of the conservative Swedish Party were especially apprehensive over pressing the claim to East Karelia. They feared that if Finland obtained East Karelia, the Allies would turn the principle of self-determination against Finland in the contentious Aland Island dispute. Inhabited by a Swedish speaking population, the Aland islanders, though long administered by Finland, had conducted several plebiscites which overwhelmingly endorsed their becoming a part of Sweden. The Swedish Party, favoring the retention of the Aland Islands as a part of Finland, were not in favor of pressing claims against East Karelia if it meant the possible loss of the islands.¹⁴ The Social Democrats were even more opposed to the inclusion of a demand to East Karelia in the draft program, basing their opposition on a doctrinal rejection of territorial expansion.

The Foreign Minister, however, supported the territorial claim to East Karelia, as did most representatives of the center and conservative parties. According to what Foreign Minister Holsti referred to as "most trustworthy information," the

Soviets were expected to be receptive to the idea of a plebiscite. He reasoned that the Soviets could not easily refuse to support the principle of self-determination in East Karelia when they had already accepted the principle for Estonia, a territory which was far more important economically and strategically to the Bolsheviks than East Karelia.¹⁵

The third territorial claim in the Finnish draft program was to the parishes of Repola and Porajärvi, located in East Karelia. Here the Finns, already in occupation of the areas, were less reticent about stating their objectives clearly and overtly. Bypassing the strategy of a future plebiscite, the draft terms included a demand for the outright annexation of the two East Karelian parishes. While at no time a part of the historic territory of Finland, the claim was based upon the fact that representatives of Repola and Porajärvi had officially indicated their desire to become a part of Finland.¹⁶ Although of little economic or strategic importance, with a combined population of no more than 4,500, the Finnish government had become strongly committed to the two parishes. During the summers of 1918 and 1919, representatives of the two parishes had invited the Finnish government to send in government troops to defend the area against the Bolsheviks. Finnish volunteers had been sent into the area in the summer of 1918 and in July 1919, the Finnish government decided to send regular troops to occupy the parishes and take over officially their administration.¹⁷ While the government felt strongly committed to the two parishes, their direct annexation was not uniformly supported by all parties within the Finnish committee. The Social Democrats, for example, argued that the two parishes should be used as the basis for a territorial exchange, suggesting that the government offer Repola and Porajärvi in exchange for Pechenga.¹⁸

In the final draft, the committee, while not unanimous, recommended the following territorial conditions. Pechenga was to be ceded directly to Finland as were the parishes of Repola and Porajärvi. In East Karelia, those provinces which desired to withdraw from Russia would be combined in a neutral, demilitarized zone for a period of one year, after which a plebiscite would be held to determine whether they would become permanently independent, remain a part of Russia or become a part of Finland. In return for these territorial concessions, the Finns were prepared to cede to Russia some of the islands in the Gulf of Finland.

In the context of the present analysis, it is notable that in the formulation of peace plans demilitarization was not a high ranking policy objective for the Finns. Not only was the alternative not recommended for Pechenga, or the islands in the Gulf of Finland, it was not recommended for any zone along the

extended frontier which would have to be established between the two countries. Where demilitarization was recommended the alternative seems clearly to have been conceived less as a means of preserving peace or reducing tensions between two neighbors than as a means to annex additional territory.

Finnish-Soviet Negotiations

Following the completion of the Finnish draft of peace terms by the all-party committee, President Stahlberg made the logical but fateful decision to appoint the full committee as the peace delegation. J. K. Paasikivi, director of the largest private bank in Finland, former premier (in 1918 under Svinhufvud) and leader of the conservative National Coalition Party, was named chairman of the delegation. The Coalition Party was also represented by General Walden, a former defense minister and one of Finland's leading industrialists. Dr. Alexander Frey, banker and lawyer, represented the conservative Swedish Party and the moderate center Party Agrarian sent one of their leading intellectuals, M. V. Kivilinna. The middle class Progressive Party was represented by former premier Vennola, and Vaino Tanner and Prof. Voionmaa were the Social Democratic delegates.¹⁹

The Soviet delegation was headed by Jaan Antonovitch Berzin, described later by the socialist delegate Tanner, the only delegate to publish an extensive review of the negotiations, as calm, friendly and educated, but somewhat shy. Second ranking representative on the Soviet delegation was Planton Mihailovich Kershentiev, who, according to Tanner's account, dressed rather sloppily like a bohemian, but was quick witted and always ready to argue.²⁰

The peace talks were characterized by intransigence and procrastinations as well as concession and compromise. Neither side, however, could make an undisputed claim to cooperativeness. The Finns, of course, suffered from greater internal disunity within the peace delegation, which was aggravated by the differences that arose between the peace delegation in Tartu and the government in Helsinki. As was natural, both sides sought to capitalize on international events to promote their positions. In this regard, the most important event affecting negotiations was the Polish-Russian war, which started in April 1920 and continued through the first half of the Finnish-Soviet deliberations. The negotiations themselves went through six fairly distinct phases--each reflecting a different approach to a settlement.

The first phase of the negotiations was predictably and characteristically a period of intransigence and each side put forward its maximum territorial claims while admitting of no basis for compromise. In both plenary session and in the Territorial Commission formed to examine the various proposals and counter-proposals, the Finns demanded the cession of Pechenga, Repola and Porajarvi, and a plebiscite in East Karelia. Contrary to Holsti's earlier expectation, the Soviets, however, were not receptive to the idea of a plebiscite. Indeed, Berzin claimed that the fate of East Karelia was not to be considered by the conference. Russia, he said, did not demand independence of West Karelia, which it considered an internal Finnish problem. By the same token, the Soviet delegation considered the final arrangement of East Karelia to be strictly an internal problem of Russia.²¹ As for granting self-determination to East Karelia, the Soviets noted that this had already been carried out by the creation of an autonomous Karelian Workers' Commune.

This latter action by the Soviet government was a clever strategem for it completely outmaneuvered the Finnish delegation.²² On June 8, while the peace delegations were en route to Tartu, the Soviet government announced the establishment of an autonomous Karelian Workers' Commune, with Eduard Gylling, a fugitive Finnish communist, as local leader. Thus, whenever the Finns raised the issue of self-determination for East Karelia at the peace conference, the Soviets could respond not only by stating that it was an internal problem, but that self-determination had already been carried out. By applying the principle of self-determination in this way, the Soviet government effectively if not convincingly undermined the Finnish argument.

The Finns, of course, did not accept the June 8 decree as a fulfillment of self-determination and continued to demand an international plebiscite. The Soviet delegation avoided the issue until July 1, when it announced rather nonchalantly that a plebiscite had just been taken in East Karelia which had confirmed Soviet rule.²³ While the Finns would return to the idea of an international plebiscite and the creation of a temporary neutral, demilitarized zone in East Karelia, for all the lamentations and denunciations on the part of the Finns, the issue was settled. East Karelia would remain a part of the Soviet Republic and would be neither neutral or demilitarized.

While the question of East Karelia was settled in this fashion, the delegates continued to exchange proposals and counter-proposals over other territorial demands during the first month with no sign of a break or a concession. The Finnish

claim to the two parishes of Repola and Porajarvi was rejected by the Soviet delegation with the argument that the parishes were vital to the security of the Murmansk railway. The Finnish claim to Pechenga was also rejected with the argument that the area was essential to the Soviet Republic for both economic and strategic reasons.²⁴ The Soviet claims to four islands in the Gulf of Finland and to a slice of the Karelian isthmus, in turn, were rejected by the Finns.

By mid-July a stalemate had been reached on all points, ending the first phase of negotiations--the period of intransigence. On July 14 a two week recess was called, introducing the second phase of the negotiations--the period of reappraisal. During this period there were increasing pressures within the Finnish delegation and within the government for a revision of peace terms. Indeed, tension was beginning to develop between the delegation and Helsinki over the government's rigidity, with the Socialist and Swedish delegates the most outspoken critics of the governments inflexibility and its refusal to acknowledge Soviet control over East Karelia. Other delegates were becoming restive over the restraints imposed by the government on the delegation's freedom to negotiate. The conservative Paasikivi and the socialist Tanner--an incongruous team to be sure--argued, for example, that Soviet military successes against Poland necessitated a modification of Finnish territorial demands. As the Soviets would be less inclined to negotiate, they suggested that the delegation should be authorized to abandon claims to Karelia, Repola and Porajarvi, as these territories had never been a part of Finland, and use the concession to obtain Pechenga, the most important of Finnish objectives.²⁵ Tanner underscored the argument with the announcement that unless the government authorized the presentation of a new minimum program, the Social Democratic members would resign from the delegation.

As a result of these pressures the Finnish government reluctantly agreed to reduce its territorial claims. The new minimum program, to be held in reserve in event the Soviets continued to resist Finland's maximum demands, accepted the withdrawal of claims to Repola and Porajarvi and a Karelian plebiscite; in addition, the delegation was authorized to offer new concessions in the Gulf of Finland.

With the Finnish government's acceptance of a new minimum program, the second phases of the negotiation--the period of reappraisal--ended. The third phase opened with the reconvening of the peace conference on July 28 and lasted two weeks. It was a period of procrastination, for the Finnish Foreign Minister,

hopeful of transferring the peace discussion to a London Conference which had been proposed earlier by the British, issued last minute instruction to the delegation not to make any territorial concessions until the fate of the London conference was finally settled. These new instructions naturally aggravated relations between the delegation and Helsinki, for the delegation, appointed to negotiate a peace treaty, was now deprived of all authority to negotiate. When the Foreign Minister failed to send new instructions following the collapse of the proposed London Conference two weeks later, relations between the delegation and the government reached the breaking point. On August 11, the delegation unanimously, with only Vennola abstaining, sent the government a demand for "sufficient authority" to carry on negotiations. Complaining that the submission of every question to Helsinki paralyzed their work too much, the note was an open defiance. "We must try to get peace here" they insisted and demanded that the delegation be given "full authority to decide all questions" except those relating to Pechenga, whose claim, the delegation insisted, would not be abandoned.²⁶

While Holsti did not give the delegation the power it demanded, insisting, contrary to the recently accepted minimum program, on the retention of Repola and Porajarvi as well as Pechenga, he did authorize the abandonment of the claim to East Karelia. With that, the Finnish delegation was able to make the first concession of the conference which broke the two month impasse. On August 12 the delegation agreed to an armistice based on the existing military line, thus accepting Soviet control over East Karelia. The period of procrastination had passed. And the armistice agreement of August 12 opened the fourth stage in the negotiations--the period of compromise--which lasted for the next three weeks. During this period agreement was reached on nearly all conditions. The concessions did not come easily to either side. Indeed, it appeared that after the Soviet delegates presented their first concession--that they would exchange Pechenga for territory on the Karelian isthmus, the islands in the Gulf of Finland, the return of Repola and Porajarvi and wood concessions--the conference would reach another stalemate. Holsti, while accepting Pechenga, rather unexpectedly opposed giving up any territorial claim in exchange, contrary to the "minimum program" of July which authorized withdrawal of claims to Repola and Porajarvi and concessions in the Gulf. Finally, however, President Stahlberg intervened with a compromise. While rejecting Soviet claims to territory on the Karelian isthmus and to cession of islands in the Gulf, he authorized Paasikivi to offer the two parishes for Pechenga--on condition that the Soviet delegation would give guarantees of political and cultural

autonomy to the people of the areas.

Though compromises had been made the positions of the two countries were still wide apart. The Soviets had agreed to cede Pechenga to Finland, but the price, territory on the Karelian isthmus and islands in the Gulf of Finland, was more than the Finnish government would pay. With the breakup of the conference imminent, informal negotiation succeeded where formal diplomacy failed. On September 3, the Socialist delegate, Tanner, held the first of several private meetings with Kershentiev to work out a final compromise. After a long discussion, the Soviet delegate finally agreed (unofficially) to drop his demands for territory on the Karelian isthmus and for the islands in the Gulf of Finland on the condition that the Finns neutralize and demilitarize the islands. This represented a substantial and important concession on the part of the Soviet delegation--if approved in Moscow. The following day Kershentiev reported that he had received authorization to present the agreement made with Tanner as the final Soviet offer--they would cede part of Pechenga, excluding the northern portion of Fisher's peninsula, in exchange for Repola and Porajarvi and the demilitarization of the islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Soviet delegation thereby dropped its claim to territory on the Karelian isthmus, but demanded in turn that the question of the right of self-determination would not be mentioned in the treaty.²⁹

As seen in the context of the Tanner-Kershentiev agreement, the demilitarization of the islands in the Gulf of Finland was not articulated in the framework of promoting peace or reducing tensions so much as within the framework of a compromise over territorial demands. While undoubtedly conceived by the Soviet delegates as a means of promoting the security of Petrograd, demilitarization was not the original objective, which was outright Soviet annexation. It would appear in retrospect that neither side considered demilitarization a high ranking policy objective. Were it not for the rival territorial claims, demilitarization would probably not have been suggested or approved as a solution to the status of the islands in the Gulf of Finland.

The final Soviet offer passed the initiative back to Helsinki, where, in spite of the conformity of the offer to the earlier minimum program, pressures against the treaty were building up. The defeat of the Bolsheviks in the Russo-Polish War in mid-August 1920, while undoubtedly contributing to Soviet concessions, led Holsti to reconsider the advisability of

lowering Finnish territorial demands. In addition, French officials were quietly urging the Finns to stall the negotiations on the assumption that General Wrangel's military success in the Crimea would soon bring about the downfall of the Bolshevik regime.²⁸ Therefore, when the news that Finland had abandoned the two parishes was made public and the domestic opposition began to mount, the Foreign Minister, bolstered by new public support, reneged on the government's previous bid and upped the ante. The fourth phase of the negotiations--the period of compromise--gave way to the fifth phase--the period of retreat.

The period of retreat was prompted not only by Holsti's appraisal of recent Bolshevik military defeats, but by his assumptions regarding Soviet reactions to the increasing anti-Bolshevik agitation in East Karelia. The Foreign Minister assumed that as the local populations of Repola and Porajärvi were so obviously hostile to the Bolsheviks, the Soviet government would be willing to cede a part of the parishes to Finland. Therefore, on the evening of September 13 he wired instructions to the peace delegation to demand the western parts of the two parishes, offering in exchange some economic concessions.

Though angered by the government's undiplomatic about-face, the delegation faithfully presented the new demands. When, however, the Soviet representatives rejected the claim outright a new stalemate ensued. At this point, the peace delegation rebelled. The Socialist delegates, Tanner and Voionmaa threatened to resign and this threat was followed by Paasikivi's announcement that he too would resign unless the government decided to conclude a peace treaty.²⁹ On September 28, after two weeks of vacillation, Holsti wired Tartu that the government agreed to withdraw all claims to Repola and Porajärvi.³⁰ The temporary retreat was over. With these last instructions the conference entered its last phase--the period of settlement.

Having belatedly accepted the Soviet offer to exchange Pechenga for Repola and Porajärvi and the demilitarization of the islands in the Gulf of Finland, there remained only the more technical questions of establishing the boundaries of the Pechenga cession and the details of the demilitarization provisions for the islands. Somewhat unexpectedly, however, negotiations reached an impasse over the Pechenga boundary issue. The Soviet delegates refused to cede the north cape of Fisher's peninsula, an area which they considered strategically important for its command over the Arctic approaches to Murmansk and Archangel.

At this point Tanner held another private meeting with Kershentiev and together they worked out another compromise: Finland could have the northern cape on condition that the Pechenga area and the Arctic waters opposite the port be demilitarized. Tanner agreed that no warships over 400 tons be permitted in Pechenga. This agreement was later refined to limit the number of Finnish warships in the Arctic Ocean in the 100-400 ton class to fifteen, and to prohibit the stationing of any submarines or military aircraft in the area. Port facilities for naval purposes were also limited.³¹

Demilitarization, for a second time, became the basis for settling a territorial dispute. Again, demilitarization did not represent a policy objective of either side, but was introduced only as a result of an impasse over rival territorial claims.

With the Pechenga compromise, a final settlement was reached and on October 5 the draft treaty was submitted to each delegation. The final draft contained one additional provision for demilitarization--that of Lake Ladoga. As the frontier agreed upon at the conference passed directly through the lake, it was agreed to prohibit all offensive "military establishments or armaments" on the lake, its shores and rivers and canals running into the lake. While all warships over one hundred tons was to be forbidden, the treaty did permit the unlimited access of warships below that figure, as long as they did not carry guns larger than 47 mm.³²

The demilitarization of Lake Ladoga never became the subject of negotiations at the peace conference, essentially because it never became a contentious issue. In this respect, demilitarization was an objective of both parties and not merely a basis for compromising rival territorial claims. The demilitarization of Lake Ladoga, therefore, represented an attempt to keep peace rather than simply a means to resolve a diplomatic stalemate.

What is remarkable about the treaty is not the fact that three zones were demilitarized, but that more zones were not. With the abandonment of East Karelia, Finland lost its best strategic frontier vis-a-vis Soviet Russia. Instead of a frontier of 200 miles, the final treaty established a line 600 miles long with few natural barriers against attack. Neither side, however, apparently considered demilitarizing this frontier. Nor did either side advocate the demilitarization of that line dividing the two countries on the Karelian isthmus. The Soviet

delegates had initially demanded that the frontier be shifted north to provide greater security for Petrograd. But when this request was rejected by the Finns and ultimately abandoned by the Soviets, no one apparently suggested demilitarizing this strategic and potentially contentious zone.

Whatever the motivation of the various demilitarization sections of the treaty, in the debate first over its signature and then over its ratification, no opposition to the demilitarization provisions arose from any of the Finnish parties. There was, to be sure, serious and quite vocal opposition to other sections of the treaty--especially over the provisions dealing with East Karelia in general and Repola and Porajarvi in particular, both of which were abandoned in the treaty. Indeed, the debate in the Diet lasted a month and a half. Finally on December 1, the treaty was approved by a vote of 163 to 27, and went into force on January 1, 1921.³³

In conformity with the demilitarization provisions of the treaty, fortifications on the various islands in the Gulf of Finland were razed without incident. And while claims of treaty violation were immediately made by both sides, the protests concerned the implementation of the treaty in East Karelia and not demilitarization. The Soviet government was the first to protest that the Finns were obstructing the transfer of Repola and Porajarvi to Soviet administration. Later, it was the Finns' turn to protest that the Soviets were not permitting cultural and political autonomy in Repola and Porajarvi. The protests continued throughout 1921, creating a war scare as both sides persisted in diplomatic brinkmanship. Indeed, though the matter was referred to the League for settlement, the conflict was settled militarily rather than diplomatically with the crushing of a Finnish supported rebellion in February 1922.

While the conflict would have lingering implications on Finnish domestic politics, by the spring of 1922 the Karelian question had ceased to be an active foreign policy dispute. Neither during this tense period or during the next 18 years was a public protest raised over the demilitarization provisions of the treaty. There were some misgivings relating to the provisions, for example, by Foreign Minister Holsti, but no complaints of treaty violation.³⁴

Though Soviet Russia made territorial concessions in 1920, the claims raised at Tartu were not forgotten. In October 1939, the Soviet Union demanded that the security of Petrograd (now renamed Leningrad) be improved by the cession of additional

territory on the Karelian isthmus, the granting of a Russian naval base on the southern coast of Finland and the cession of some islands in the Gulf of Finland. With little diplomatic support from abroad, Finland resisted and war broke out on November 30, 1939. The war lasted 100 days and in the end the Russians, not without embarrassment and serious military setbacks, got their naval base and a great deal more territory than originally demanded.³⁵ What the Bolsheviks had abandoned in 1920 in exchange for limited demilitarization was not, therefore, a "final solution." For the Soviets, outright annexation was felt to offer greater security than territorial demilitarization.

Chapter 8 - Footnotes

¹ The Treaty of Tartu (Dorpat) can be found in Soviet Treaty Series, edited by Leonard Shapiro (1950) I, 69-75.

² C. Jay Smith, Finland and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1920 (1958), pp. 8-29.

³ A province of Sweden prior to the 19th century, Finland was awarded to Russia by the Treaty of Fredrikshamm in 1809. The early relations between Russia and the Grand Duchy of Finland are reviewed in J. Hampden Jackson, Finland (1940); Melbone W. Graham, The Diplomatic Recognition of Border States. Part I: Finland (1936); Melbone W. Graham, New Governments of Eastern Europe (1927); Anatole Ruhl, New Masters of the Baltic (1921).

⁴ Kalevi Jacque Holsti, "The Origins of Finnish Foreign Policy, 1918-1922; Rudolf Holsti's Role in the Formulation of Policy," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Stanford University, 1961), p. 83ff.

⁵ Smith, Finland and the Russian Revolution, pp. 39-91; Holsti, "Origins of Finnish Foreign Policy," Chapter II.

⁶ The Finnish delegates advanced three additional "conditions": first, that all the Baltic states, including Poland, would negotiate as a bloc; second, that the Soviets would give a guarantee to stop agitation and propaganda activities in the Baltic states; and third, that the Allies would support the negotiations and guarantee the terms. Foreign Minister's Report #40/614, Sept. 20, 1920, Finnish Foreign Ministry Archives, quoted in Holsti, "Origins of Finnish Foreign Policy," pp. 192-93.

⁷ Smith, Finland and the Russian Revolution, pp. 173-74.

⁸ Soviet Treaty Series, I, 34-38, 50-58.

⁹ Holsti, "Origins of Finnish Foreign Policy," p. 195.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 194-97; D.B.F.P., 1st Ser., III, pp. 569-70.

¹¹ Foreign Ministry Political Report #54/623, Jan. 1, 1920, Finnish Foreign Ministry Archives, in Holsti, "Origins of Finnish Foreign Policy," p. 207.

12 Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic, pp. 508-09; Holsti, "Origins of Finnish Foreign Policy," pp. 207-08.

13 See Holsti for original sources, "Origins of Finnish Foreign Policy," p. 225.

14 Ibid., p. 226.

15 Ibid., p. 227.

16 The resolution of the parish of Porajarvi to unite with Finland, June, 1919, is in Delegation Carelienne, Livre Vert, p. 22, quoted in Ibid., p. 227.

17 See Holsti, "Origins of Finnish Foreign Policy," p. 160; Smith, Finland and the Russian Revolution, p. 153.

18 Holsti, "Origins of Finnish Foreign Policy," p. 228.

19 Ibid., p. 229.

20 Tanner, Tarton Rauha quoted in Ibid., pp. 44, 209, 210-11, 232.

21 Smith, Finland and the Russian Revolution, p. 181.

22 See appraisal of Holsti, in "Origins of Finnish Foreign Policy," p. 234.

23 Ibid., p. 235.

24 Ibid., p. 235.

25 Ibid., p. 240.

26 Ibid., p. 245.

27 Ibid., p. 251

28 Ibid., p. 253.

29 Tanner, Tarton Rauha, pp. 166-69, quoted in Ibid., p. 257.

30 Tanner, Tarton Rauha, pp. 169-72, quoted in Ibid., p. 258.

31 The final section of the draft of the treaty read:
 "VI. 1. Finland guarantees that she will not maintain, in the waters contiguous to her seaboard in the Arctic Ocean, warships or other armed vessels, other than armed vessels of less than one hundred tons displacement, which Finland may keep in these waters in any number, and a maximum number of fifteen warships and other armed vessels, each with a maximum displacement of four hundred tons.

Finland also guarantees that she will not maintain, in the above-mentioned waters, submarines or armed airplanes.

2. Finland also guarantees that she will not establish on the coast in question naval ports, bases or repairing stations of greater size than are necessary for the vessels mentioned in the preceding paragraph and for their armament."

32 This section of the treaty reads:
 XVI. 1. The contracting powers mutually undertake to maintain no military establishments or armaments designed for the purpose of offense upon Ladoga, its banks, the rivers and canals running into Ladoga, nor upon the Neva as far as the Ivanovski rapids. In the above waters it shall, however, be permissible to station warships with a maximum displacement of one hundred tons, and provided with guns of a maximum calibre of forty-seven millimeters, and, furthermore, to establish military and naval bases conforming to these restrictions." Soviet Treaty Series, I, 72.

33 Tanner, Tarton Rauha, p. 226, quoted in Holsti, "Origins of Finnish Foreign Policy," p. 265.

34 This conclusion is based on a survey of available documents, monographs, and, especially, The Times (London) and the New York Times for the interwar years.

35 Max Jakobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War (1961); Count Eric Mannerheim, The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim (1953).

Chapter 9

INSULAR ARMS CONTROL:Spitsbergen and the Aland Islands

In the immediate postwar period, arms control restrictions were included in the territorial settlements of two groups of islands whose sovereign status had become the subject of dispute following the termination of hostilities--the archipelago of Spitsbergen and the Aland Islands. The Spitsbergen Treaty, signed on February 9, 1920, resolved the dispute which had broken out between Norway, Sweden, Holland and England over possession of the Arctic island by awarding them to Norway on the condition that they be permanently defortified. A year and a half later, on October 20, 1921, an international conference reached agreement on a settlement to the more threatening conflict between Sweden and Finland over the Aland Islands, a settlement which provided for Finnish possession and the permanent demilitarization of the area.

The conflict over Spitsbergen arose largely over the undefined status of the islands. For centuries the islands were considered a "no man's land", an arrangement which had caused increasing difficulties following the discovery of coal and iron on the islands in the early 1900's. While several attempts had been made to set up a permanent administration on the islands, no definite agreement had been reached by the time hostilities broke out in 1914. With the issue still unresolved following the war, the question was turned over to the Paris Peace Conference and there provoked a minor conflict between those countries favoring rule by the League of Nations under the mandate system, rule by a single country in sole possession of the islands, and rule by the international community through some form of consortium. After a brief and only mildly contentious examination of the problem by a Commission of the Peace Conference, it was agreed to transfer sovereignty over the islands to Norway--

provided that other countries be given an equal right to economic activities in the area and that Norway not use the islands for military purposes.

Prior to the war the Aland Islands had belonged to Russia, but under an arrangement which left their administration to the Duchy of Finland. With the collapse of the Tsarist regime and Finland's subsequent independence in 1917, the question of the status of the Aland Islands naturally arose: did Russia retain possession of the islands, did they become part of the new Finnish state or was their status open to renegotiation among the "interested" powers? Finland contended that its long administration of the islands, dating back to when Finland had been part of Sweden, established its right to the archipelago. Sweden, however, contested that argument as an "interested" power and pressed instead for self-determination. Given the population distribution on the islands, this demand amounted to a rather blatant bid for outright Swedish possession. Ultimately, the conflict was turned over to the League, which decided after careful examination of the issue, to award the islands to Finland on the condition that they be both demilitarized and neutralized.

Although the treaties were negotiated under different circumstances and contained widely contrasting terms, they were alike in several respects. Perhaps the most important similarity was the fact that both treaties were negotiated rather than imposed. While both territorial disputes were submitted to the Paris Peace Conference for settlement, in each case the negotiations were carried on between "friendly" states and not between victor and vanquished. The Spitsbergen treaty was worked out in a territorial Commission of the Supreme Council and the "Aland Islands question" was resolved at a special ten-nation conference called by the League in 1921.

The treaties--and the negotiations leading up to the final agreements--also reflected a similar orientation towards arms control. As the main issue in the disputes was over possession of the islands, demilitarization was viewed in each case more as a means to settle rival claims to the islands than as a general policy which would be extended elsewhere. In both cases, demilitarization was advanced mainly as a convenient device for assuaging the fears and anxieties of those particular countries whose bid for possession was denied. Demilitarization, thus, served merely

as a basis for compromise in these specific disputes and as such was not perceived as a desirable or worthwhile end in itself.

The main differences between the treaties involved the extent of arms control restrictions and the impact of the disputes on domestic politics. In the case of Spitsbergen, the arms control provisions were limited to defortification; in the Aland Island Convention the arms control measures went far beyond defortification and established a fairly complete system of demilitarization and neutralization. And whereas the Spitsbergen dispute provoked little controversy between or within any of the countries involved in the settlement, the Aland Island question led to a bitter conflict between Sweden and Finland and gave rise to intense partisan rivalry within Sweden.

The Spitsbergen Treaty

The postwar rivalry over Spitsbergen presented a unique international controversy. Devoid of an indigenous population, the archipelago was for several centuries considered a terra nullius, where all countries had equal commercial and economic rights but no country had exclusive sovereign control. Unsited for permanent habitation because of the weather, the islands had nonetheless been the source of international rivalry from their discovery in the late 16th century. Originally, the islands offered rich opportunities in whaling, fishing and hunting which lured Russians, Norwegians, Swedes and Danes. At the turn of the 20th century, large deposits of coal and iron were discovered, which brought in American, English and Norwegian entrepreneurs.¹

Aside from economic resources, Spitsbergen claimed the interest of several countries--particularly Germany, Russia and the Scandinavian countries--for its strategic importance. Located 360 miles north of Norway and Sweden, between Greenland on the west and Franz Josef Land to the east, the archipelago is made up of one large island of about 15,000 square miles (West Spitsbergen) and three smaller islands of between 1,000 and 4,000 square miles (Edge Island, Barents Island and Northeast Land) plus a number of islets and atolls. Total land area is a little less than 25,000 square miles or about the size of West Virginia.

Although no military activities took place in the area during the First World War, after the termination of hostilities the islands began to be considered as a potential location for a naval base, particularly for submarines. Unlike the rest of the Arctic region, the main island, West Spitsbergen, is ice free for three months out of the year and because a branch of the Gulf Stream touches the west coast of the island it can be reached through thin ice for another three months. This makes Spitsbergen--or at least the western part of the archipelago--the most navigable area in the Arctic.

Because of the availability of coal on the islands and its relatively easy access, Spitsbergen has played an important role in the strategic calculations of several states over the years. During the Second World War, Germany attempted to set up a naval base in the islands and in the post-World War II period the Russians have been suspiciously active on the islands with their "economic" missions and "commercial" endeavors.² As one writer has noted, Spitsbergen "is of commanding importance to Russia's northern sea route, which extends from Archangel to the Bering Straits".³ In addition, the location of the archipelago offers a strategic advantage to the possessor for naval operations in the north Atlantic and Norwegian Sea.

The Spitsbergen treaty, and the deliberations leading up to its defortification, stand out in several respects. First, while the islands' strategic importance was recognized prior to the war, the only policy advanced to promote peace in the area was through neutralization. In none of the prewar conferences on Spitsbergen was arms control endorsed or even proposed. Second, arms control restrictions were not suggested until late in the postwar negotiations; even then they were not viewed by the contestants as a fundamental part of the settlement. Far more important in the deliberations was the determination of ultimate sovereign status and economic rights. Third, arms control restrictions, once proposed, never became a contentious issue in the Spitsbergen Commission of the Peace Conference or in any of the countries affected by the treaty. Fourth, the restrictions introduced in the treaty were rather limited, imposing prohibitions only on the establishment of naval bases and permanent fortifications. No attempt was made to demilitarize the islands by restricting the maintenance of troops or prohibiting the stockpiling of weapons and ammunition; no proposal was made to prohibit warships from

entering the waters and no restrictions were placed on the right to construct and maintain military air bases. Fifth, the terms of the treaty contained no provisions for inspection, supervision or control. Implicit in the agreement was the assumption that the terms were to be self-enforcing with external control limited to the more traditional devices. Sixth, in spite of the absence of control and supervisory machinery, the defortification provisions appear to have been faithfully observed throughout the interwar period.

Prewar Policy Recommendations. Over the years many proposals had been made to formalize the status of Spitsbergen. Not until the discovery of coal and iron in the early 1900's, however, was the absence of a permanent administrative arrangement found to be inconvenient. Although widespread agreement was reached that the terra nullius arrangement ought to be revised, there was little agreement over the terms of that revision. Consequently, it was not until 1910 that a preliminary conference could be convened.⁴

Attended by delegates from Norway, Sweden and Russia, the 1910 Oslo Conference reached agreement on a draft convention which was circulated to the other interested Powers for approval. But the agreement--establishing a Norwegian-Swedish-Russian condominium--met with such criticism that a second conference had to be called by the sponsoring Powers in early 1912.⁵ This second Oslo Conference incorporated the more important proposals made by the other Powers and agreed on a detailed Protocol.⁶ This Protocol, again circulated to the interested Powers, served as the basis for a third conference in 1914.

The 1914 conference met from June 16 to July 30 and was attended by representatives of Norway, Sweden, Russia, England, France, Denmark, Germany, Holland and the United States. But the conference reflected the differences which had divided Europe into two hostile camps and thus was unable to reach an agreement. Germany claimed that its interests in the islands were being sacrificed by the conference while the Entente Powers maintained that Germany was seeking more influence in the administration of Spitsbergen than could be historically justified.⁷ The outbreak of hostilities a few weeks later foreclosed further attempts to reach an international agreement and the islands remained through the war a terra nullius.

During these negotiations--extending over almost seven years--no proposal for arms control was formally proposed or publicly mentioned. While the strategic importance of the islands was increasingly recognized, the only policy advanced to assure the islands' security was that of neutrality. This policy was proposed by the Russians during the 1910 negotiations and was accepted, apparently without opposition;⁸ while the 1910 draft was subjected to considerable criticism, there was no objection to the neutralizing of the islands. Therefore, the policy was included in the Protocol adopted two years later. Article 3 of the 1912 Protocol read: "In case of war, Spitsbergen will always be considered neutral territory. Any act contrary to neutrality will be forbidden there." This policy went unchallenged in the abortive 1914 conference.

Initiation of Arms Control. During the war economic activity on Spitsbergen declined, due mainly to the shortages of parts and labor. From the standpoint of later claims, the most significant events which took place were the purchase by Norway of almost all of the American-owned mines and the total withdrawal of the Russians. This left Norway with the greatest investment on the islands, though both the Swedes and the English maintained their economic interests.

Following the termination of hostilities, the search for a permanent administrative arrangement for Spitsbergen focused on three main alternatives: mandate under the League of Nations, rule by a single country, retention of the terra nullius status but with administrative responsibility given to an international consortium. The British and the Dutch, for example, launched a half hearted campaign in 1919 to obtain possession of the islands, but soon abandoned that in favor of transferring the islands to Norway as a mandate. The Norwegians, cautious to the point of apathy, finally made a bid for the islands, but only on condition that they be given sovereignty. While the Swedes wished to retain the status of terra nullius, the Americans favored an outright transfer of the islands to Norway. The Danes, less interested in Spitsbergen than Greenland, hoped to exchange their support of Norway's claims to Spitsbergen for Norwegian support of Denmark's claims to Greenland.⁹

Although the Norwegian government was reluctant to claim the islands or ask the Peace Conference to take up the issue, Norway's Minister to Paris, Frederik Jarlsberg,

displayed no such hesitancy. Convinced that Norway should obtain possession of Spitsbergen, he waged a relentless campaign--which became almost a personal obsession--to induce his government to turn the matter over to the Peace Conference where his close contacts with Allied diplomats could be used to advantage.¹⁰

While Jarlsberg was successful in getting his government to submit the Spitsbergen question to the Paris Conference, nothing was immediately done on the matter either in Paris or Oslo. The Allies were preoccupied with the German settlement and the Norwegian government assumed that the Allies would first agree on the principles which they thought should apply to Spitsbergen and then ask Norway--along with other interested Powers--for their specific recommendations. Therefore, the Norwegian government made no preparations while it waited for instructions from Paris.¹¹

On July 7, six weeks after the completion of the German terms, the Supreme Council took up the question of Spitsbergen. It established a committee to examine the various claims to the islands and to make a recommendation on their final disposition. Composed of the representatives of the United States, England, France and Italy, the committee immediately asked the Norwegian government for its proposals. As the Norwegians had no specific plans and as the committee was pressed for time, it appeared that Norway's claims would not be considered. Faced with this prospect, Minister Jarlsberg, acting on his own, asked the legal adviser to the French Foreign Ministry, Henri Fromogeot, to work out a draft treaty for the Norwegian delegation.¹²

Fromogeot's draft stipulated, inter alia, that Norway, if given possession of the islands, would guarantee that the islands would not be used as a base for warlike preparations, especially for submarines.¹³ This was the first hint at arms control, though it did not at this stage go beyond the specific prohibition on submarine bases. But Jarlsberg, working with the legal staff of the French Foreign Ministry, extended that restriction to prohibit all types of naval bases and permanent fortifications.

The completed Jarlsberg-Fromogeot draft was submitted to the Spitsbergen Committee of the peace conference and after a short but thorough examination most of its proposals, including the provisions on arms control, were

accepted. On August 28, 1919, the Committee reported to the Supreme Council with its recommendations of Norwegian sovereignty, equal access to all countries for economic and commercial activities and defortification.¹⁴

While the Norwegian government learned of the draft treaty only after it had already been submitted to the Spitsbergen Committee, the government found little objection in the arms control restrictions. Indeed, they were accepted without question, which could not be said of the economic and commercial provisions.¹⁵ These latter provisions, considered far more important by Norway and the Spitsbergen Committee, were the main sources of disagreement between Paris and Oslo. The arms control restrictions were not considered substantively important. They did not reflect a change in any governments' approach to the problem of security, nor did they introduce a new strategic concept into the settlement of territorial conflicts. Rather, arms control was advanced as a convenient device for resolving this particular dispute. No effort was made to transform arms control into a policy of universal application, nor to commit the countries to arms control in principle.

Implementation of the Terms. The Spitsbergen Treaty was signed in Paris on February 9, 1920 and included one clause relating to arms control. This clause, Article 9, read:

Subject to the rights and duties resulting from the admission of Norway to the League of Nations, Norway undertakes not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base in the territories specified in Article 1 and not to construct any fortification in said territories, which may never be used for warlike purpose.¹⁶

As noted above, the arms control provisions of the Spitsbergen Treaty were limited to defortification and did not introduce demilitarization. Given the absence of specific prohibitions, it was implicitly accepted that a wide variety of military activities would be permitted on the islands, such as the maintenance of troops and the stockpiling of weapons and ammunition. While naval bases were prohibited, it was implicitly agreed that army and air force bases could be established if the Norwegian government felt this to be expedient. The treaty also did not deprive warships of the right to enter the territorial waters of the islands, as did the more restrictive demilitarization treaties. Presumably even submarines could

operate in the area, as long as no permanent bases were established.

The most conspicuous gap in the treaty was in the area of supervision and control. In the final treaty no provision was made for an agency which would guarantee the faithful execution of the terms. Nor was there any means for handling treaty violations. Presumably, it would be up to Norway to decide when and if a violation of the treaty had taken place and the counter-measures to be adopted. In essence, the treaty was to be self-executing and self-enforcing.

In spite of the absence of international supervisory machinery, the arms control provisions were apparently upheld throughout the interwar period. No official complaint of treaty violation was ever submitted and the press reported no contravention of the arms control restrictions. As one recent study has noted: "For a quarter of a century Norway has scrupulously honored the treaty. No fortifications have been built in Svalbard /Spitsbergen/."17

The Aland Islands Convention

On October 20, 1921, after a little over a week of negotiations, the Aland Islands Convention was signed, bringing to a close a dispute which had strained relations between Sweden and Finland for nearly four years. During these four years two basic issues had emerged, one contentious and the other technical. The contentious issue--which led Sweden and Finland to the brink of war--was over possession of the Aland Islands. The technical issue--over which there was little disagreement--involved the demilitarization of the Aland Islands. At issue throughout the conflict was not whether the islands were to be demilitarized, but rather which country should be responsible for the demilitarization.

While the factors involved in the dispute were fairly clear, the basis for an acceptable solution--whether in terms of legal right, historical precedent, or strategic importance--were uncertain and even contradictory. For about five centuries the Aland Islands had belonged to Sweden, but following defeat by Russia in 1808-9, the islands were ceded, along with Finland, to the Tsar. Throughout most of this period dating from the 1300's, a

point of historical speculation and political dispute, the islands were administered by the Duchy of Finland. This administrative continuity, going back several hundred years and unchallenged both under Swedish and Russian rule, gave legal and historical support to Finnish claims. The Swedes in turn raised a powerful political argument: the inhabitants of the islands, numbering about 20,000, were Swedish-speaking and manifested a strong desire to be reunited with Sweden. The principle of national self-determination appeared to give the Swedes a strong political and moral claim to the islands. The security implications, on the other hand, were less clear-cut and the rival claims tended to balance out. Located as they were at the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia, about equal distance between Finland and Sweden, it could be--and repeatedly was--claimed by each side that possession of the islands by a foreign power would pose a threat to its national security.

As long as the islands remained under Russian control the issue of sovereignty never arose. But with the collapse of the Tsarist regime in 1917 and Finland's successful campaign to achieve independence--under the slogan of national self-determination--the Aland Islanders, with the encouragement of Sweden, turned the same slogan on the Finns and demanded their right to self-determination. The Finnish government, however, in administrative control of the islands, refused the pleas of the Alanders and insisted that Sweden was interfering in the internal affairs of the new Finnish State.

The controversy passed through several stages of increasing militancy and neither the traditional instruments of diplomacy nor the Paris Peace Conference succeeded in heading off the crisis. When the dispute reached the point of official withdrawal of ministers and unofficial demands in Sweden for direct action, Britain brought the matter before the Council of the League of Nations in mid-1920. Following a series of investigations by special commissions, the League eventually awarded the islands to Finland, on the condition that they be demilitarized and neutralized. This decision was implemented in an October, 1921 conference of ten nations, which formulated the specific provisions for the demilitarization and neutralization of the Aland Islands, provisions which are still in effect.

The terms of the 1921 Aland Islands Convention were unique in several respects. Unlike the imposed demilitari-

zation clauses included in the peace settlement with Germany, the arms control provisions in the Aland Islands Convention were to be binding on all parties instead of imposed unilaterally. And unlike many prewar negotiated demilitarization agreements, the Aland Convention was not limited to restrictions on permanent installations and fortifications. Far more comprehensive than most of the earlier attempts at demilitarization, the 1921 agreement prohibited not only the establishment of all military, naval and air installations, but also the stationing of any troops on the islands. Only in cases of emergency could Finland send in troops and these had to be withdrawn as soon as order had been restored. The Convention also restricted the production and trade of military equipment in the zone. Article 4 of the Convention prohibited the "manufacture, importation, transit or re-export of all arms and war material." Even military overflights were restricted. Only Finland was given the right to fly over the islands with military craft for purposes of surveying the islands; but even Finnish military aircraft were not permitted to land except in cases of force majeure. Restrictions on the right of naval visitation were also introduced. Only Finland was given the right to enter the waters of the islands with naval craft, but this right was carefully limited in terms of time and size of craft permitted. Finland, thus, could not permanently station any warships in the waters of the islands, their right of visitation being authorized only "from time to time". The right was further restricted by limiting the number of naval craft allowed to visit the islands to no more than two light surface ships. In cases of emergency, Finland was authorized to send in an additional naval force on a temporary basis, but under no circumstances could this force exceed a total of 6,000 tons.

The Convention also differed from earlier arms control agreements in that demilitarization was combined with neutralization. Article 6 of the Convention provided that in time of war the Aland Islands were to be considered as "a neutral zone" and were not "either directly or indirectly" to become involved in any military operation. The only exception to this provision was that Finland was given the right, in case of a war involving the Baltic Sea, to lay mines in the waters of the zone on a temporary basis and then only if it were seen that the neutrality of the islands was threatened.

The Aland Convention was unique in one final respect:

it was to be guaranteed by an international organization and not simply by the signatories to the Convention. Article 7 of the Convention stated that in case of any violation of the agreement the Council of the League of Nations would decide on counter-measures. This committed the League--and implicitly all members of the League--to become an instrument of treaty enforcement.

Not only did the Convention commit non-signatories to enforcement of the treaty terms, it also revised slightly the voting procedures in the League Council for decisions affecting the islands. In event that unanimity could not be reached in the Council, the Convention provided that League members would be "authorized" to take whatever action the Council decided upon by a two-thirds vote, with the votes of the contending parties not counted. This was an innovation in the voting procedures of the Council, for the Covenant provided only for obligatory action by unanimous agreement. This decision authorizing permissive action by a two-thirds vote was the most important and contentious issue at the Conference. Far more time and study went into this issue than that of the main subjects of the Conference--demilitarization and neutralization.

In the negotiations and discussions leading up to the final agreement on demilitarization and neutralization, several points stand out. First, demilitarization of the Aland Islands was not an innovation. The islands had been demilitarized earlier and it was apparently assumed by all parties that they would be so in the future. Thus, there was no disagreement over the principle of demilitarization, although there existed some uncertainty over the degree to which the principle should be applied.

Second, while demilitarization was widely accepted, the policy was assessed quite differently by the political parties and interest groups involved in the decision-making process. This conflicting assessment was particularly evident in Sweden during the initial phases of the dispute; though a consensus emerged over the issue of possession, partisan differences persisted over the value of demilitarization in general and as a specific feature of the Aland settlement. In general, the conservative and nationalist groups in Sweden considered demilitarization of the Aland Islands an insufficient means of guaranteeing national security and pressed instead for possession. The liberal and social democratic forces resisted the demands for possession,

holding that demilitarization was adequate.

Third, with the failure of direct negotiations between Finland and Sweden to settle the rival claims to the islands, the conflict was brought before the League where it became the first important case to be considered by that organization. In the League deliberations, the main issue involved the determination of the sovereign status of the islands. Demilitarization was neither a contentious issue nor a policy alternative; it was assumed that the islands were to be demilitarized and neutralized. Indeed, these policies were written into the mandate given the international conference; the delegates, therefore, were not to decide whether demilitarization was to be included in the settlement, but merely to the extent of arms control restrictions.

Fourth, at the 1921 Conference the decisions on demilitarization were characterized more by uncertainty than disagreement. Thus, the article defining the policy implications of demilitarization was the last article of the Convention to be completed. Yet when it was ultimately presented to the Conference for a vote, it was accepted without debate.

Fifth, the demilitarization terms were, aside from their comprehensiveness, remarkable in one important respect: they contained no provisions for supervision or control. Not only was supervision and control machinery absent from the final draft, it had not been proposed at the Conference. It was implicitly accepted, therefore, that the traditional procedures of verification--through intelligence services and military attachés--would be sufficient to assure compliance.

Sixth, the demilitarization provisions appear to have been upheld faithfully throughout the interwar period. No complaint of violation was ever officially advanced or unofficially reported. There was a move to revise the 1921 Convention in the late thirties which gained increasing momentum in both Finland and Sweden as the League's capacity to meet international challenges declined. But in spite of the growing opposition to demilitarization in both Finland and Sweden, no effort was made to circumvent the restrictions or to refortify the islands either unilaterally or clandestinely.

Historical Precedents. Postwar recommendations that the Aland Islands be demilitarized were not unique. The 1856 Peace of Paris concluding the Crimean War included a separate demilitarization convention stipulating that Russia was not to erect any fortifications or military installations on the islands.¹⁸ Though the Russians persistently sought to gain international acceptance of their right to refortify the islands, they were consistently blocked in their efforts, mainly by the British, who saw in the fortification a threat to free access to the Baltic Sea. In spite of the fact that Russia perceived the demilitarization of the islands as a threat to their national security, the 1856 agreement appears to have been upheld until the outbreak of the war in 1914.¹⁹ Once hostilities had begun, however, Russia unilaterally broke the 1856 Convention--with British acquiescence--and refortified the Aland Islands. During the war, the islands served as a submarine base for the Russians and later for the British Navy as well. But throughout the war the Allies continued to oppose the permanent abrogation of the 1856 Convention. Thus, the wartime fortifications were considered officially as only temporary expedients.

Following the Russian revolutions of 1917, the Aland Islands suffered a mixed fate. In anticipation of a Swedish move to occupy the islands, the Bolsheviks sent in a military force in late 1917. According to most accounts, varying degrees of "outrages" were committed against the local population, which encouraged the Swedes to land a "temporary" military force in February 1918.²⁰ The Swedish occupation forced the Russians to evacuate the islands, but the Finns, apprehensive over Swedish designs, invited a German occupation in the spring of 1918. Having lost their reason for being on the islands, the Swedes evacuated, leaving the islands under the jurisdiction of Finland but occupied by the Germans.

The islands came up briefly in the negotiations between Russia and Germany over the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, where it was agreed that the fortifications in the archipelago were to be demolished. It was also stipulated that a special agreement was to be signed by Germany, Russia, Finland and Sweden providing for the permanent demilitarization of the islands. This policy objective was also included in the Finnish-German agreement of March 7, 1918.²¹ Thus, in all the official prewar and wartime agreements affecting the Aland Islands, demilitarization (or at least defortification)

was accepted as a basis for a permanent settlement.

Domestic Reactions. Partisan differences over Aland arose in Sweden for the first time in 1915 in response to the Russian refortification of the islands. The Swedish Right, represented by the Conservative Party, emphasized the dangers of a fortified Aland and suggested that this was part of a broader Russian strategy directed against Sweden. Implied was the notion that Sweden might find it necessary to abandon her neutrality in the war and seek German protection against Russian expansionist designs. Both parties on the Left, the Liberals and the Social Democrats, agreed that the refortification of Aland posed a potential threat to Sweden but suspected the Conservatives were trying to use the incident to drag Sweden into the war on Germany's side. Thus, the Left tended to respond less defiantly to the Russian moves and counselled restraint in the government's countermeasures.²²

The subject of the refortification of Aland was taken up in the Swedish parliament in May, 1916 where the government sought to assuage both the Right and the Left. To the Conservatives, the government gave assurances that it considered the Aland question of vital importance to Sweden's security and pledged to do all in its power to ensure the preservation of Swedish rights and interests. To the Left, the government gave its assurance that the neutrality of Sweden would be maintained.²³

The parliamentary debate succeeded in temporizing partisan differences, but in the autumn of 1917 the issue entered a new phase. In August 1917, the Aland municipal representatives passed a resolution calling the Swedish Government's attention to the fact that "the people of Aland earnestly desire the reunion of their Islands with the Kingdom of Sweden".²⁴ Four months later, in December 1917, a petition was addressed to the King of Sweden expressing "the firm determination of the Aland Islanders to achieve the incorporation of their Islands in the Kingdom of Sweden".²⁵ The petition was signed by over 7,000 persons and represented an overwhelming endorsement of the policy of reunion.

The petition of the Aland Islanders reactivated domestic dissension in Sweden, as the Conservatives pressed for the acceptance of the Alanders request for reunion while the Left reasoned that this was but another attempt on the part

of the Right to advance their pro-German bias and force Sweden into the war against the Allies. As the Aland Islands were being used by the Allies as a submarine base, the incorporation of the islands into Sweden would not only have thwarted Finnish claims but would have challenged Allied interests. Indeed, it was generally assumed that the only way Sweden could have acceded to the wishes of the Aland Islanders during the war was through German acquiescence and perhaps German military assistance.²⁶

Having reached the conclusion that the only "solution" to the Aland question lay in the reunification of the islands with Sweden, the Conservatives tended to play down the role of demilitarization as an adequate means of resolving the issue. Their analysis was based principally on strategic grounds: Aland in the possession of a foreign power, it was argued, might serve as a base for an attack on Sweden. Stockholm was considered particularly vulnerable, as it was opposite the Aland Islands, and possession by a foreign power might cut sea communications between southern and northern Sweden. Aland was, in the Conservative interpretation, "a pistol pointed at the heart of Sweden."²⁷

Even after Sweden's recognition of Finnish independence on January 4, 1918, a recognition which implied the acceptance of Finnish sovereignty over the Aland Islands, the Conservatives continued to press for possession. In the parliamentary debates in early 1918, the Conservative leader, Trygger, made an impassioned plea for reunion, arguing that the 1856 restrictions on fortifications had always been an imperfect means of ensuring Swedish security. Russia's refortification of the islands at the outbreak of the war proved, he maintained, that international agreement on demilitarization was of little value. It was clear, therefore, that "only the occupation of Aland can give us the necessary security."²⁸

While the Liberals and the Social Democrats on the Left were not opposed to reunion, they rejected the policy of unilateral Swedish action and challenged the Conservative assessment of the strategic importance of the Aland Islands. The Social Democratic leader, Branting, for example, wrote in mid-January 1918, that Swedish security interests did not require possession of the islands. Geographically, the existing Swedish frontier would be easier to defend than a line drawn further eastward; the Aland Islands, he reasoned, would become "an exposed outpost" requiring a great increase

in armament expenditures. Thus, while he agreed that Sweden's security interest required that Aland should not become a military threat, this goal could be achieved, he concluded, just as easily through treaty agreements with Finland than by a Swedish take-over of the islands.²⁹

The end of the war eliminated many of the fears of the Left that reunification was merely a ploy to promote Swedish military intervention. The increasing popularity of the idea of national self-determination--an idea eagerly championed by the Left--produced an abrupt about-face among the Liberals and Social Democrats over Aland. With the end of the war, the Left began to support the notion of Aland self-determination and the idea of possible reunification. At the same time, the Conservatives shifted their argument from emphasizing strategic considerations to one emphasizing the "justice" of reunification.

While the consensus that emerged in 1919 between Left and Right over possession of the islands tended to obscure their differences, a sharp distinction remained in their assessment of demilitarization. The Conservatives stressed the ineffectiveness of demilitarization and the Left tended to uphold it.³⁰ These partisan differences over arms control, however, tended to fade as the conflict shifted to the League of Nations and opinion focused exclusively on the question of ultimate possession.

Opinion in Finland seems to have been less divided over Aland than it was in Sweden. In spite of the 1918 civil war which pitted the Whites against the Reds, few differences emerged over Aland during the postwar period. The two groups which Sweden undoubtedly counted on to support the principle of Aland self-determination--the Finnish Socialists and the Finnish Swedes--refused to challenge the governmental position rejecting the Alanders demands for reunion with Sweden. The Finnish Swedes even went so far as to publish an appeal in Swedish newspapers urging the Swedish government to refrain from supporting the Aland Islanders' demands. They noted that the severance of Aland from Finland would weaken the position of Swedish minority already in Finland.³¹

Not only was there general agreement in Finland that the Aland Islands ought to remain in Finnish possession, no partisan differences apparently existed over demilitarization. While the subject appears not to have been widely

discussed in the public media, demilitarization was never challenged by any responsible organ in the state.³² In contrast, then, to Sweden, the question of demilitarization never became in Finland either a partisan or a divisive issue internally.

League Intervention. The Swedish campaign for Aland passed through two phases from mid-1918 to mid-1920. The campaign was carried on first through negotiations with Finland: when these negotiations reached an impasse the Swedish government turned to the Paris Peace Conference for support of its claims. Although supported by the Aland Islanders, the Swedish claims were never sanctioned by the Peace Conference. A Baltic Commission was appointed at the Conference in May 1919 to look into the Aland issue along with other problems. But while recommending that the islands be neutralized under a League guarantee, the Commission was unable (or unwilling) to resolve the issue of sovereignty. Thus, the Peace Conference ended without any action being taken on the Swedish demands.³³

By the spring of 1920, the issue had reached an impasse. Both negotiations with Finland and representations before the Peace Conference had failed. Confronted with a stalemate, the Aland Islanders--apparently encouraged by the Swedes--decided to force the issue. Although still citizens of Finland, a deputation of high ranking Alanders went to Sweden on May 31 where they personally asked the King to intervene on their behalf. These delegates were received, as Tingsten points out, in such a manner as to arouse considerable comment both in Sweden and abroad. The King informed the delegates that he favored reunion and urged them not to despair. The Prime Minister, speaking on behalf of the government, was equally reassuring.³⁴

The Finns, not unreasonably, took issue with the actions of the Aland Islanders and the Swedish government. On June 4, 1920, the Finnish government protested against the Swedish action and on June 5 it arrested two of the Aland leaders on charges of high treason. This was followed by the dispatch of troops to the islands.³⁵

Swedish reactions to the Finnish moves were extremely hostile and provocative. The press responded with particular vehemence and a number of Conservative papers suggested that Sweden ought to take military countermeasures on behalf of the Aland Islanders. Even the Social Democratic

press spoke of the Finnish action as "madness" and described the measures as "an open and arrogant challenge".³⁶ The Swedish government noted that the arrests were "calculated to produce an atmosphere in Sweden which may have the most far reaching and unfortunate effects on the relations between our two countries."³⁷ The Finnish government responded, on June 12, that Sweden was interfering in an internal Finnish affair and that Finnish law did not recognize "any right for the country's nationals to negotiate with a foreign power on measures directed against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own State."³⁸ In reply, the Swedish government recalled its Minister in Helsinki for "consultations" and when Finland reciprocated all diplomatic relations were severed between the two countries--not to be restored until the crisis was settled a year later.³⁹

With the crisis approaching an armed showdown, British Foreign Secretary Curzon interceded. On June 19, 1920, he wrote the League Council drawing attention to Article II of the Covenant which established that it was "the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstances whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."⁴⁰

The League Council acceded to Curzon's request to consider the Aland crisis, but it had to determine whether the League was legally competent to deal with the matter. Finland claimed that the issue was an internal dispute and, if this were true, the League could do little about it. Thus, the League had to resolve the question of jurisdiction: did the League have a right to intervene in the Aland dispute or was it a matter of domestic jurisdiction? To clarify this issue, the Council appointed on July 12, 1920, an international Legal Commission composed of three renowned jurists. Almost as an afterthought the Commission was also charged with determining whether the 1856 demilitarization provisions were still in effect.

The Commission of Jurists reported back two months later, on September 5, that in its view the League was competent to deal with the matter and that the 1856 Convention was legally still in force. Until replaced by a new convention, the terms of the 1856 Convention could be invoked by any interested power.⁴¹

Having resolved the legal issue, the Council next had to deal with the more complex political questions, the most important of which was the problem of sovereignty. Also it had to be decided whether to merely reaffirm the 1856 Convention on defortification or establish new provisions.

To examine these issues the Council appointed a second commission of three on September 20--a Commission of Rap-
 porteurs--which made an exhaustive inquiry into the problem. When its recommendations were submitted, on April 16, 1921, they proved a great disappointment to Sweden.⁴² On the question of sovereignty, the Commissioners concluded that Finland's claim was legally incontestable and politically indisputable. The islands had been administered by the Finns both under Swedish and Russian rule, forming a political entity of several hundred years duration. The Aland Islanders had not been maltreated by the Finns and there was no prospect that they would be in the future. To Swedish arguments that the principle of self-determination justified reunion, the Commission responded with ill-disguised impatience. The right of self-determination was neither a rule of international law nor was it incorporated into the Covenant of the League of Nations. To grant the Alanders request for separation from Finland would be, the Commission felt, to establish precedent which would undermine international peace and stability.

To Swedish arguments that its security interests would be threatened if the islands were not returned, the Commission responded that they were of equal importance to both countries. There was no reason why Finnish interests should be sacrificed and those of Sweden given precedence. The islands, the Commissioners felt, were a menace to neither country unless they fell to a foreign power.

While the Commissioners agreed that the 1856 defortification provisions were still legally in effect, they found them politically inadequate. They had been easily broken by Russia when war broke out and were therefore either incomplete or impractical. They recommended that an international guarantee of neutrality be included along with the provision for the defortification of the islands. To effectuate this the Commission proposed the drafting of a treaty in which not only Finland and Sweden should join, but all Baltic and other interested parties, including Denmark, Germany, Poland, France, Great Britain and Italy. A place should be reserved for Russia, it was added, for a time when

its government was recognized.⁴³

The League Council took up the report of the Commission of Rapporteurs in June 1921 and, though objections were raised by the Swedish representatives, its recommendations were approved without qualification. On June 24, the Council recognized Finnish sovereignty over the Aland Islands and proposed a conference to draft a treaty providing for their defortification and neutralization. The June 24 resolution set the terms of reference for the conference:

An international agreement in respect to the non-fortification and the neutralization of the Archipelago should guarantee to the Swedish people and to all the countries concerned that the Aland Islands will never become a source of danger from the military point of view. With this object the Convention of 1856 should be replaced by a broader agreement, placed under the guarantee of all the powers concerned, including Sweden.⁴⁴

After adding Estonia and Latvia to the countries having an "interest" in the Baltic area, a conference of ten convened in Geneva in October 1921 to work out the specific provisions of the League resolution.

The Aland Conference. The Conference on the Non-Fortification and Neutralization of the Aland Islands opened on October 10, 1921 attended by the representatives of ten countries: Finland, Sweden, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Denmark, Estonia and Latvia. It took the delegates only five sessions to complete the treaty, which was signed on October 20.

It was a quiet, colorless but highly productive conference. The delegates were, for the most part, career diplomats, which gave the deliberations an air of civility, graciousness and decorum. The discussions were closed to the press and--whether for this reason or some other--were singularly lacking in verbosity and platitudes. Debate was pointed, relevant, and preoccupied with the technical aspects of the issue. Even when they entered the more controversial areas of substantive policy decisions, their approach emphasized the technical and the practical side of the question. Indeed, it often appeared that the delegates were unaware that they were, on frequent occasions, making important political decisions.

While the deliberations were marked by a high degree of cordiality and conciliation, there were strong currents of disagreement under the surface. These disagreements, particularly between Sweden and Finland, were fairly subtle--often, in fact, incomprehensible to many of the delegates. In resolving these differences, agreement was reached more by persuasion than by provocation. None of the delegates employed threats of withdrawal or non-compliance; none adopted a stance of obstruction. While it would not be fair to say that compromise was the decision-making formula, decisions were reached by accommodation rather than by imposition and by unanimous agreement rather than majority vote.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Conference was that it went beyond the mandate in the Council's June 24 Resolution calling for the nonfortification of the Aland Islands. In the final terms, the islands were not only defortified, they were also demilitarized.

Demilitarization had not been imposed in 1856 and had not been proposed in the League deliberations. At the Conference it was decided not only to prohibit the construction of fortifications and military bases on the islands, but also to forbid access to troops and to prohibit the manufacture, importation, export and transit of all war material. Additional restrictions were placed on the right of warships to enter the waters and on the right of military overflight. Thus, all military activities--other than those necessary to maintain law and order or to resist violation of the treaty--were forbidden.

Following the opening ceremonies on October 10, the Conference was immediately confronted with one of its more important problems: which of the rival draft conventions should serve as the basis of discussion? The Swedes had prepared a draft five months earlier in June, when they assumed that a plebiscite would be held to resolve the question of sovereignty. They had drafted a second project a few weeks later on the same assumption, but which added several modifications to the original draft.⁴⁵ At the opening session of the Conference, the Swedish delegation announced that it had yet a third draft and the Finnish delegation announced that it had one of its own.

The decision to be made on the drafts was not an idle exercise, for the various projects included widely contrasting restrictions and political implications. There was one

ironic point in this controversy: while the Finns accepted the original Swedish draft--and patterned their project almost word for word after it--the Swedes were forced to reject their own recommendations and to make an abrupt about-face on the demilitarization provisions. The reason for this shift was obvious. Prior to the final report of the Commission of Rapporteurs, the Swedes thought that they would ultimately gain possession of the islands. Consequently, in their first two drafts, the Swedes provided for only limited arms control of the islands; but when the award went to Finland, the Swedes advocated much stronger restrictions while the Finns took the less restrictive original drafts of Sweden as their model.

In presenting their rival drafts to the first session of the Conference, interest was focused on four main areas of disagreement. First, in determining the level of defortification, the Conference had to decide whether to adopt the partial controls included in the Finnish formula or the broader restrictions proposed in the final Swedish draft. Second, the delegates had to decide whether to limit the Convention to defortification, as in the Finnish draft, or include some measures of demilitarization as in the final Swedish draft. Third, in defining the restrictions relating to the right of warships to enter the territorial waters of Aland, the Conference had to decide whether to accept complete prohibition advocated by Sweden or the proposal for unilateral access as recommended by Finland. Fourth, in determining how violations to the treaty were to be met, the Conference had to decide whether to adopt the vague formula proposed by Finland or the more detailed plan advocated by Sweden.

Confronted with the presentation of rival drafts at the first session of the Conference, the delegates sought to resolve the issue in a manner which was to typify the Conference's approach to decision making: they decided to combine the draft terms and appointed for that purpose a three man committee consisting of the delegates from Britain, France and Italy.⁴⁶

The committee reported back to the Conference three days later, on October 14, with a draft Convention consisting of six articles. The committee's draft reflected the members' inability to combine the Swedish and Finnish proposed terms and their subsequent decision to adopt the Swedish version for most of the contentious issues. Thus, the committee's

draft included restrictions not only on the construction and maintenance of military and army air force bases, but also on naval ports and naval air bases.⁴⁷ Indeed, the draft prohibited the establishment of any installation which might be used for military purposes. The draft also accepted the Swedish plan to prohibit all warships from entering the islands territorial waters and to forbid the stationing of troops in the area. Believing that the restrictions should include demilitarization as well as defortification, the committee added restrictions which had not been included in either the Finnish or the Swedish drafts. These prohibited "the importation, export, transit or manufacture of arms and munitions of war" and military overflights of the islands.

Aside from the decision to make the League, and not just the signatory Powers responsible for the faithful execution of the treaty, the enforcement article contained one controversial feature: the League Council was to be deprived of a large measure of its decision-making authority. According to the original wording if any signatory Power brought a complaint of treaty violation before the League, the Council could decide what countermeasures to take, but not whether to take them. This was implied in the wording which stated that in case of violation or threat of violation, the signatory Powers could individually or collectively bring the matter to the attention of the League Council, "which will decide on the measures to take" for assuring the faithful execution of the treaty.

The first reading of the committee's draft raised more technical than substantive issues and provoked little opposition from the Finnish delegate in spite of the rejection of most of his proposals. He accepted without challenge the inclusion of naval facilities among the items prohibited in the defortification article, the prohibitions on the stationing of troops on the islands, and the restrictions on the right of warships to enter the waters. He raised a few objections to the neutralization of the islands, but did not insist on any change.

The most difficult article was that establishing the guarantee and enforcement procedures. But before the discussion could get underway the delegates from France, Britain and Italy acknowledged that the article had been drafted in haste and urged that the discussion be postponed until they re-examined it. As they were endeavoring to commit the League to a new obligation, they would have to sound

out the representatives of the Secretary-General before they could present a final draft.

Although no formal votes had been taken during this first reading, it was assumed that agreement had been reached on those clauses affecting defortification, neutralization, and the territorial boundaries of the Archipelago. Only the demilitarization and enforcement provisions remained unsolved; but it was the enforcement article which caused the greatest difficulty at the Conference.

The attempt to include a League guarantee in the enforcement provisions led the representatives of the Secretary-General, M. Anzilotti and G. Kaekenbeeck, to outline the legal difficulties implicit in the original wording of the draft.⁴⁸ The most important of these difficulties was that the article in question would unilaterally revise the terms of the Covenant without giving the League members the opportunity to challenge the terms although they conceivably could be affected by them. To what degree, it was asked, could a minority of the League members--those represented at the Conference--rewrite the commitments for all the League members? In particular, could a minority of the League commit all members to enforcement measures beyond those spelled out in the Covenant?

There were difficulties, the League representatives pointed out, not only in the enforcement obligations, but in the method of informing the Council of treaty violations. In the Committee's first draft, any signatory could bring a charge of treaty violation before the League Council. As several of the signatories were not members of the League--including Finland and Germany--the Convention would in effect modify those provisions of the Covenant affecting the rights of non-members.

A more important difficulty, the League representatives noted, involved the effects of the Convention on the decision making authority of the League Council. The original wording of the article stated that after receiving a complaint of treaty violation, the Council "will decide" what action to take--not "may decide". Stated in this fashion the article implied a mandatory obligation rather than discretionary authority. As this would revise the duties of the Council, as defined in the Covenant, Anzilotti and Kaekenbeeck, recommended that the article be reworded to conform to the existing regulations.

The drafting committee had received the Anzilotti-Kaekenbeeck memorandum following the first reading and, in revising the terms for resubmission to the Conference, the Committee--somewhat surprisingly--decided to ignore most of the recommendations presented. Thus, the second draft, which was taken up at the fourth session held on October 17, retained the provision obligating all League members to take part in enforcement measures and the notion that any signatory to the Convention--whether League member or not--could bring a complaint of treaty violation before the League Council. More important, it retained the wording establishing compulsory action; the Council, the article repeated, "will decide" on the measures to take in event of complaint.

Not only did the Committee retain in the second draft all of those provisions challenged by the League representatives, but it included several new clauses which revised substantially the voting procedure of the Council when deciding on enforcement measures relating to the Aland Convention. Aside from establishing the logical rule that the vote of the party accused of violating the Convention would not be counted in the Council's decision on enforcement, the second draft took into account the possibility that unanimity might not be reached in the Council and provided for a decision based on majority vote. Under the prevailing terms of the Covenant, if unanimity could not be reached no decision--at least no decision relating to sanctions--could be taken. The second draft did not challenge the notion that substantive decisions required unanimous approval, but added the provision--later introduced in the U.N. Charter--that the Council could recommend, if not obligate, enforcement action on the basis of a majority vote--in this particular case, by a two-thirds majority.

Receipt of the Committee's second draft prompted the League representatives, Anzilotti and Kaekenbeeck, to write a second memorandum protesting the fact that the revised draft had not met several of the legal difficulties earlier identified.⁴⁹ By this time, however, it had been established that some of their anxiety had been ill-founded and that it was possible to have the League act as the guarantee agency for the Convention and to give non-members the right to bring complaints of treaty violation before the Council. But the League representatives persisted in their opposition to committing the Council in advance to sanctions while depriving it of the right to reject the charge that a treaty violation had in fact taken place. To overcome this difficulty,

they suggested changing the wording from the Council "will decide" on the measures to take to the Council "may decide".

During the discussion of the enforcement article at the second reading of the draft, the French delegate announced his willingness to accept the wording suggested by the League representatives but the Italian delegate demurred. While acknowledging that the words "will decide" were perhaps too imperative, he felt that the words "may decide" were too permissive. As a compromise--which would meet the intent of the Committee without overcommitting the Council--he suggested that the words "in order to decide" be adopted. It was an ingenious compromise and the delegates quickly settled on the few remaining articles; the session came to an end with only the demilitarization clauses unresolved.

The revised article establishing the terms of demilitarization led to a spirited discussion, but it was a discussion prompted more by the ambiguity of a clause than by any disagreement over the actual provisions. There was no opposition to the exclusion of all troops from the islands, except in cases of emergency, and no objection to the restrictions which were to be placed on the manufacture, import, export and transit of arms and munitions. Nor was there any challenge to the clause authorizing Finland to send a small naval force to the islands "from time to time"--a provision which amended the Committee's first draft prohibiting all warships from entering the territorial waters. No one objected to the Committee's decision to give Finland the right to fly over the demilitarized zone with military and naval aircraft--a right which had been denied in the Committee's first draft. Indeed, no one questioned another fundamental concession to Finland--giving it the right to grant access to the demilitarized zone to one warship from a foreign power, although the vagueness of the original wording gave rise to a lengthy discussion. Once the clause was reworded, limiting Finland's discretionary power to the authorization of no more than one warship from each power at a time, agreement was quickly reached and the demilitarization article was accepted without further discussion.⁵⁰

With the approval of the demilitarized provisions, the text of the Convention was completed. The following day, October 20, after just ten days of negotiations, the Convention was formally signed, although it did not enter into force until its official ratification on April 6, 1922.

What appears significant in these negotiations is the fact that neither inspection or supervision was proposed by any delegate. Whether this reflected faith that Finland would not violate the terms or confidence in the traditional methods of intelligence is not clear. Certainly supervision and inspection was known to the delegates, having been included in the arms control terms of the peace treaties with Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. But as external control machinery had not been established either by historical precedent nor by political acceptance for negotiated treaties it was perhaps inevitable that the policy did not arise during the deliberations over Aland.

The Terms of the Convention. In its final form, the Aland Islands Convention consisted of ten articles. Article I stated that Finland agreed to assume the obligations undertaken by Russia in the Convention of 1856; in particular she agreed "not to fortify the part of the archipelago called the 'Aland Islands'". Article II defined the geographical boundaries of the Aland Islands and Article III provided for the "defortification" of the zone. According to this article, "no military or naval base or establishment, no military air base or establishment, nor any other installation utilized for war purposes" was to be created or maintained in the zone.

Article IV provided for "demilitarization" and consisted of one general clause and three specific exceptions. As a general rule, "no military, naval or air force of any Power could enter or remain in the zone" and "the production, importation, transit and re-export of arms and war material" was to be strictly forbidden. The first exception to this rule gave Finland the right to keep a regular police force on the islands to maintain order and to send additional armed forces there on a temporary basis in event of emergency. The second exception provided that Finland would have the right "to visit the islands, from time to time, with one or two of its light surface warships" and that these ships would have the right to anchor "temporarily" in the waters. In addition, "if particularly important circumstances require it," Finland would have the right to send in other warships on a temporary basis, but in no case could this force be greater than 6,000 tons. Further, the right of entry into the archipelago could be given by the Finnish government to only one foreign warship. The third exception provided that Finland would have the right to fly over the islands with military or naval aircraft, but would not be

allowed to land except under conditions of force majeure.

Article V established the principle that the warships of all countries had the right of innocent passage through the archipelago while Article VI stipulated that in time of war the territory was to be considered neutral and was not to be "either directly or indirectly used for any purpose connected with military operations". However, in wars affecting the Baltic area, Finland was authorized to lay mines temporarily in the waters as a means of protecting the neutrality of the area after having duly notified the Council of the League.

Article VII set forth the guarantee and enforcement provisions. In paragraph 1 the signatory powers were authorized, either individually or jointly, to bring a matter affecting the treaty before the Council of the League in order for it to decide what measures to take. In the vote on these measures, which would be decided upon unanimously, the vote of the Powers accused of violating the treaty would not be counted. If unanimity could not be attained, each of the signatory Powers would be authorized to take those measures which the Council recommended by a two-thirds majority, the votes of the Powers accused of violating the treaty not counting. Paragraph 2 of the article stipulated that in a case where the neutrality of the islands was imperiled by a sudden attack either against the archipelago or against Finland by way of the islands, Finland could take all "necessary measures" to contain and repulse the aggressor until the signatory Powers were able to intervene to enforce the neutrality. Finland was to inform the Council of the League of her actions immediately.

Article VIII established the principle that the provisions of the Convention would remain in force despite any changes in the status quo of the Baltic Sea. Article IX authorized the adhesion of other Powers to the Convention and Article X set forth the procedures for ratification.

Reactions to the Convention. Public reaction to the Aland Convention differed markedly in Finland and Sweden. In Finland the agreement was regarded with widespread misgiving and suspicion from the start, while opinion in Sweden was overwhelmingly in favor of the new arrangement. Opposition did arise in Sweden but it surfaced relatively late, appearing first in 1930, and even then was desultory up to the beginning of 1938. Whereas criticism in Finland

cut across partisan lines, in Sweden opposition was advanced --at least for the first six or seven years--solely by members of the Nationalist Right, with occasional support given by isolated spokesmen of the Conservative Party. Thus, in 1930, a nationalist inspired pamphlet, "Either-Or", appeared in Sweden which argued that the demilitarization of the Aland Islands was far more dangerous to Sweden than a refortified Aland. And in 1932 a Conservative paper, Svensk Tidskraft, repeated the same argument. It was not until 1936, however, that opposition was translated into an actual policy recommendation. In that year, the National group introduced a motion in connection with the 1936 Defense Bill which demanded that steps be taken for the abolition of the defortification arrangements and that plans be undertaken with Finland for the joint defense of the Aland Islands.⁵¹ None of the Center-Left parties supported these proposals and the Swedish Government refused to support any campaign for treaty revision. Thus, up to early 1938 both the Swedish Government and most of Swedish public opinion, at least that represented by the major political parties and national communication media, supported the continuation of demilitarization for Aland.

Criticism of the Convention in Finland was both more extensive and more official. There were, according to Tingssten, frequent suggestions that the Convention ought to be revised and direct proposals for the fortification of the islands were made by both Finnish military and political leaders.⁵² These proposals became more insistent during the mid-1930's as the League lost its ability to come to the defense of Aland's neutrality. Field Marshal Mannerheim, for example, stated in July 1934 that the Convention undermined Scandinavian security, as it left the sea passage between Sweden and Finland undefended; to secure this area he proposed that the islands be refortified.⁵³ This suggestion was followed with proposals to the Swedish Government for a joint campaign to seek treaty revision. But until early 1938 the Swedish Government refused to act on these proposals.

Toward the end of 1937 and early 1938, discussion on the Aland question broke out in Sweden with the urgency of a sudden crisis. Within a few months the Swedish Government reversed its previous position and entered into secret negotiations with Finland for a revision of the 1921 Convention. These negotiations eventually culminated in an agreement which, granted the approval of the other signatories

to the Convention and interested parties, would have led to the refortification and remilitarization of the Aland Islands. But while both the Swedish and Finnish Governments reached agreement on the remilitarization of the islands during 1938, no attempt was made to circumvent the terms of the Convention either secretly or openly. Both countries accepted the premise that remilitarization would be carried out only through treaty revision and that treaty revision would be possible only with the concurrence of the other eight signatories and the League Council.⁵⁴

Pressures for Treaty Revision. While the origins of the campaign to refortify the Aland Islands in Sweden can be traced to the agitation of ultranationalist groups, the government's decision to press for revision was due more to external events. The rearmament of Germany--and its increasing interest in Aland--posed a new threat to the islands; and the collapse of the system of collective security, particularly evident in the case of Ethiopia, made it increasingly doubtful that the League would be able (or willing) to honor its commitment to defend the islands in case of attack. Lacking effective international enforcement, it was argued that the countries most directly concerned, Sweden and Finland, would have to undertake a joint defense of the islands. In this context, a refortification of Aland would be a means--and perhaps the only means--whereby the neutrality of the islands could be preserved.

The argument for the refortification of the islands was based on one essential premise, which though seldom examined, greatly complicated the analysis and caused considerable uneasiness even among those who could see the logic of refortification--that was that the refortification of the islands would contribute to Swedish security only if Finland preserved its own neutrality in event of a war. Or put in another way, the refortification of the islands would increase the danger to Sweden rather than decrease it if Finland entered into an alliance with a belligerent or potential belligerent, like Germany. In this contingency, the fortifications installed on the islands with defensive intentions could be turned against Sweden for aggressive purposes. As one writer put it rather graphically, it would be like committing suicide for fear of being murdered.⁵⁵

The charge that Finland was hoping to remilitarize the Aland Islands for expansionist purposes reopened discussions over the islands in Sweden. In December 1937, the Communist

press began a series of articles "exposing" an alleged Finnish-German plan to refortify the Aland Islands. The charge, logical, if not empirically proven, was that Germany wanted Aland fortified as a protection for its Baltic iron ore transports.⁵⁶ As this plan could be effective only if Finland maintained a friendly neutrality or joined in an alliance, it was argued that Finnish demands for refortification were motivated by the desire for future territorial gains which would be given them in event of a German-Russian war. The refortification of the Aland Islands was seen in this analysis as a German plot against Russia.

While public debate raged over whether Sweden ought to join Finland in seeking a revision to the 1921 Convention, the Government, representing a Center-Left coalition, took the initiative and opened secret negotiations with the Finns with that end in view. Beginning in April 1938, and extending to November, these negotiations culminated in the so-called Stockholm Plan, which proposed two major changes in the Convention. First, the Plan called for the exclusion of certain sections in the southern part of the islands from the demilitarized restrictions. In this southern zone, Finland would be permitted to erect any kind of military installation that it thought appropriate or necessary. Second, on the remainder of the islands, Finland could set up military installations of a defensive nature for a period of ten years. This included authorization to maintain troops on the islands, anti-aircraft defenses and coastal artillery, but excluding permanent fortifications. The Plan also provided that in event of war or threat of war, Sweden would join Finland in the military defense of the islands.⁵⁷

It was not until September 8, six months after the negotiations opened, that the two governments acknowledged that discussions over Aland were underway. And before opposition could effectively organize agreement was reached. In November 1938, the Stockholm Plan was accepted by both governments, though it was not completed in all its details until January 1939.

As both Sweden and Finland agreed that any revision of the 1921 Convention would have to be approved by the other signatories and the League Council, formal requests for the proposed changes were sent out to the other eight signatories in January 1939 and the League Council was notified of the actions taken. By the end of February, favorable replies had been received from six of the eight signatories--

Denmark, Estonia, France, Great Britain, Latvia and Poland--though both the British and French stated that their approval was conditional on the acceptance of the changes by all "interested parties". Germany and Italy did not reply until the beginning of May, but they too gave their approval for a revision in the Convention.⁵⁸

Having received the affirmative replies from all the signatories, Sweden and Finland requested the League Council in late May for authorization to go ahead with the fortifications. The Soviet delegate, Maisky, however, as a representative of an "interested party"--though not a signatory--requested a delay in order to obtain more information about the goals and implications of the proposed changes. He indicated that he wanted some assurance that the proposed re-fortifications would not be used by an aggressive power against Russia.⁵⁹

Soviet concern over the proposed changes raised a new and challenging issue. From a strictly legal point of view it appeared that Soviet approval was not needed. But this was complicated by the fact that both the French and the British had stated that their approval hinged on the acceptance of the changes by other "interested parties", presumably meaning Soviet Russia. From a practical point of view, would it be expedient to go ahead with the remilitarization of the islands if Russia felt that such action would be a direct threat to her security?

When Foreign Minister Molotov, in a speech delivered on May 31, 1939 formally announced his government's opposition to the remilitarization of the islands, the issue had to be officially faced. The immediate reaction of the Swedish Government was to withdraw its bill seeking parliamentary approval for the proposed changes.

Although this did not close the matter--the Swedish Government began to reconsider its stand during the summer--the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 resolved the issue. As the German-Russian neutrality agreement ended--at least temporarily--the threat of war between the two powers, it precluded the "race" for the Aland Islands which presumably would have taken place in a Russo-German war. And though hostilities broke out a year and a half later between Germany and Russia, the campaign to remilitarize the Aland Islands remained dormant in Sweden. As it turned out, the neutrality of the islands was honored during the war, whether in spite of, or because of their demilitarization is impossible to ascertain.

Chapter 9 - Footnotes

¹ For early development of Spitsbergen see Trygve Mathisen, Svalbard in International Politics: The Solution of a Unique International Problem (1948) pp. 1-74. Louis H. Gray, Spitsbergen & Bear Island (1919) pp. 1-25. Historical Section of the Foreign Office, "Spitsbergen", Handbook No. 36 (1919) pp. 1-38, (hereafter referred to as Brit. Handbook No. 36). See also, Baron Lagev Stael-Holstein, Norway in Articum, From Spitsbergen to--Greenland? (1932). And V. Romanovsky, Le Spitsberg et La Siberie du Nord (1943), chapters I-IX. Charles Rabot, A Qui Doit Appartenir Le Spitsberg? (1920).

² For an account of Russian post-World War II activities on the Islands see John J. Teal, Jr., "Europe's Northernmost Frontier", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 29, pp. 263-75. Soviet policy toward the Arctic, in general, is reviewed in T.A. Taracouzio, Soviets in the Arctic (1938).

³ Teal, "Europe's Northernmost Frontier", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 29, pp. 263-64.

⁴ Negotiations leading up to the 1910 Oslo Conference are reviewed in Mathison, Svalbard in International Politics: The Solution of a Unique International Problem (1948), pp. 75-81. See also Gray, Spitsbergen & Bear Island, pp. 23-25, and Brit. Handbook No. 36, pp. 34-35.

⁵ See Mathisen, Svalbard in International Politics: The Solution of a Unique International Problem (1948), pp. 81-88.

⁶ The Protocol is included in Brit. Handbook No. 36, pp. 64-82. It is extensively summarized in Gray, Spitsbergen & Bear Island, pp. 26-38.

⁷ For the 1914 Oslo Conference see Mathisen, Svalbard in International Politics: The Solution of a Unique international Problem., pp. 91-100, and Gray, Spitsbergen & Bear Island, p. 20. British Handbook, No. 36, p.35.

⁸ Mathisen notes that "as far as declaring the Archipelago a neutral no-man's-land was concerned, there was, in fact, agreement in advance. In this matter the Russian wording, with a few minor alterations, was chosen." Svalbard

in International Politics: The Solution of a Unique International Problem. p. 77.

- ⁹ Ibid., pp. 101-15.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 115-19.
- ¹¹ Ibid., pp. 128-136.
- ¹² Ibid., p. 136.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 136-141.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 143-150
- ¹⁶ Great Britain Foreign Office, Treaty Series, 1924, No. 18.
- ¹⁷ Teal, "Europe's Northernmost Frontier", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 29, p. 263.
- ¹⁸ See J. O. Soderhjelm, Demilitarization et Neutralization des Iles d' Aland (1928). Appendix I for the 1856 Convention. See also John H. Wuorinen, A History of Finland (1965) p. 294; Herbert Tingsten, The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden, 1918-1939, (1949), p. 83; "The Fortification of the Aland Islands", American Journal of International Law, Vol. II (1908).
- ¹⁹ See Wuorinen, A History of Finland, p. 294.
- ²⁰ See Eric Cyril Bellquist, "Some Aspects of Recent Foreign Policy of Sweden", U. of California International Relations Publications, Vol. I, No. 3, (1929, pp. 289-90; and Tingsten, Foreign Policy of Sweden, p. 94.
- ²¹ Bellquist, Recent Policy of Sweden, pp. 289-90.
- ²² Tingsten, Foreign Policy of Sweden, p. 83.
- ²³ Ibid., p. 84.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Ibid., p. 85.

- 26 Ibid., pp. 85-87.
- 27 Ibid., pp. 87-88.
- 28 Ibid., p. 90.
- 29 Ibid., p. 92.
- 30 Ibid., p. 109.
- 31 Ibid., p. 112.
- 32 For review of Finnish public opinion on Aland controversy, Ibid., pp. 112-13.
- 33 Ibid., pp. 99-100; Bellquist, Recent Policy of Sweden, pp. 291-93.
- 34 Tingsten, Foreign Policy of Sweden, p. 100.
- 35 Bellquist, Recent Policy of Sweden, pp. 291-293.
- 36 See Tingsten, Foreign Policy of Sweden, p. 122.
- 37 Ibid., p. 101.
- 38 Ibid., p. 101.
- 39 Bellquist, Recent Policy of Sweden, p. 294.
- 40 Ibid., p. 294; Tingsten, Foreign Policy of Sweden, p. 101; C. N. Gregory, "The Neutralization of the Aland Islands", American Journal of International Law (1923), p. 63.
- 41 See J. O. Soderhjelm, chapter IX for an exhaustive summary of the legal issues. Also Tingsten, Foreign Policy of Sweden, p. 102, Bellquist, Recent Policy of Sweden, pp. 294-296.
- 42 See Tingsten, Foreign Policy of Sweden, pp. 103-104; Gregory, "The Neutralization of the Aland Islands", p. 63; Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, I, No. 2, p. 18ff.
- 43 Bellquist, Recent Policy of Sweden, pp. 297-299; Gregory, "The Neutralization of the Aland Islands", pp. 69-70; Tingsten, Foreign Policy of Sweden, pp. 104-106; League of Nations, Aland Islands Commission Report of the Commission

of Rapportures for the Aland Islands Question.

44 Quoted in Bellquist, Recent Policy of Sweden, p. 301.

45 These drafts are printed in Conférence relative à la non-fortification et à la neutralisation des Iles d' Aland. Actes de la Conference. (League of Nations, 1921), pp. 16-27; hereafter cited as Conférence.

46 Conférence, pp. 11-13.

47 The Committee's first draft is in Conférence, pp. 34-35.

48 The memorandum is in Conférence , pp. 51-53.

49 The second memorandum is in Conférence, pp. 53-54.

50 Conférence, pp. 62-64.

51 See Tingsten, Foreign Policy of Sweden, pp. 242-44.

52 Ibid., p. 243.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., pp. 246-51.

55 Dahlgren as quoted in Ibid., p. 271.

56 Ibid., pp. 243-44.

57 Ibid., pp. 249-251.

58 Ibid., p. 250.

59 Ibid., pp. 266-67.

Chapter 10

THE LAUSANNE CONVENTION:Demilitarization of the Thracian Frontier
and Aegean Islands

The Treaty of Peace with Turkey, negotiated (with one extended interruption) from November 20, 1922 to July 24, 1923, contained two types of arms control measures as part of its general settlement. The first provided for the demilitarization of three areas affecting the territories of Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. These areas were: (1) the Thracian frontier which separated Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria; (2) a zone in the Aegean Sea comprising several Turkish and Greek islands located near the mouth of the Dardanelles; (3) the Straits zone, an area which was defined to include both sides of the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmora as well as most of the islands in these waters. The second arms control measure provided for restrictions on the number and size of warships which could pass through the Straits in peace and war. The present chapter will review the negotiations establishing the demilitarized zones along the Thracian frontier and in the Aegean, while the following chapter will analyze the arms control measures provided for the Straits.

This was not the first time that arms control measures had been established in the general area. In 1812 and 1829 Russia, following wars with Turkey, sought to demilitarize the Danube frontier. And in 1856, at the conclusion of the Crimean War, Russia was obliged to accept the neutralization of the Black Sea and the demilitarization of the Black Sea coastal areas. In all three cases, the demilitarization agreements were one-sided attempts to gain a military advantage over an adversary rather than reciprocal efforts to reduce the sources of conflict. In all three cases, the agreements were such ex parte arrangements that they created

rather than reduced tensions.¹

In contrast to these earlier examples, the Lausanne agreements stand out in several respects. Most important--from a procedural standpoint--was that they were negotiated on the basis of reciprocity rather than imposed on the basis of conquest. From a substantive point of view, they were significant in that they were generally upheld by all parties to the agreement. As one military authority wrote in the mid-1930's after reviewing the effects of the Lausanne demilitarization agreements, "the eastern fringe of the Balkan Peninsula has become during this postwar period one of the more peaceful regions of the world, instead of being, as formerly, a storm-centre of international unrest."²

During the war, regional demilitarization had not been proposed either in the public pronouncements of Allied officials dealing with Turkey or in the various secret treaties dissecting the Ottoman Empire.³ While Point 12 of President Wilson's Fourteen Points dealt with Turkey, it did not introduce demilitarized zones as a means of maintaining postwar peace.⁴ There were proposals for "internationalizing" certain areas, especially during the later phases of the war, but "demilitarization" apparently did not figure in any of the Allied plans for a postwar settlement with Turkey.

In the postwar period, the negotiations leading up to the peace settlement with Turkey were distinctive in five essentials. First, the concept of demilitarization found only gradual acceptance among the Allies. It was not until late 1919, over a year after the armistice with Turkey, that demilitarization began to figure in Allied policy calculations. Second, even after gaining favor during 1920, the concept never became an important part of Allied policy toward Turkey. The Allies were much more concerned with such problems as the territorial dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the creation of a mandate for Armenia, the preservation of financial controls over the Turkish government, and the disposition of oil rights than with the issue of demilitarization. Indeed, demilitarization was seldom analyzed or discussed among the Allies in the negotiations leading up either to the Treaty of Sévres in 1920 or the Treaty of Lausanne. Third, while seldom the focus of diplomatic discussion, the concept gained wide acceptance during the period to the Lausanne conference. Regional demilitarization was accepted (in principle, at least) by all sides. Fourth, though the concept was accepted, policy determination was accompanied by uncertainty. There was initially little understanding among the Allied diplomats

of the theoretical or practical implications of demilitarization; indeed, the term was often used interchangeably--sometimes deliberately, sometimes mistakenly--with the policy of "neutrality" and "neutralization". Fifth, the aim of the Allies in advocating the demilitarization of Turkish territory was initially not so much to promote peace or to reduce tensions as to guarantee control over Turkey in general and the Straits in particular. Later, at Lausanne, demilitarization was proposed as a means of resolving an impasse over rival territorial claims and as a device to assure commercial shipping through the Straits. But even at Lausanne, demilitarization was seldom articulated as a means of promoting international peace and cooperation.

Proposals for Demilitarization. During the first year following the cessation of hostilities no proposals for regional demilitarization were included in any official acts dealing with Turkey. The armistice ending hostilities between the Allies and Turkey, signed at Mudros on October 30, 1918, provided only for the "demobilization" of its forces and compliance with such orders as might subsequently be given regarding the surrender of arms, ammunition and war material.⁵ While the Allied occupation authorities increasingly referred to the necessity of "neutralizing" certain territories, especially after Greek-Turkish hostilities began, throughout the first year the occupation policy remained "demobilization" rather than "demilitarization".⁶

At the Paris Peace Conference the peace treaty with Turkey was seldom the subject of discussion and negotiations were postponed throughout 1919. While various official delegations appeared before the Council of Ten to present their territorial demands on the Ottoman Empire, it appears that during 1919 no one proposed the demilitarization of any of the suggested new frontiers of the defeated Turkish state.⁷ Not until the Anglo-French discussions of mid-December 1919, over a year after the Mudros armistice, did demilitarization begin to figure in the policy calculations of the Allies.

On December 11, 1919, Clemenceau met Lloyd George in London to examine the oft-postponed peace settlement with Turkey. The discussions, however, immediately foundered over the disposition of Constantinople and the Straits. The British wished to take advantage of the Turkish defeat to rid Europe once and for all of Turkish rule. This meant ending their control over Constantinople and the transfer of the Sultan's capital and spiritual headquarters to Asia Minor. It also meant, according to Lloyd George, that the control of

both the Straits and Constantinople should be turned over to "some form of international control".⁸ Clemenceau, while agreeing that the Straits should be placed under international control, felt that the Turks should retain possession of Constantinople. The French Premier noted that "if the Sultan was to govern in our /Allied/ interests," then he must have some political authority. And continued possession of Constantinople would give him that authority.⁹

On December 12, the French advanced a novel scheme advocating the formation of "a small neutralized State" encompassing the area around the Straits and Constantinople, which would be guaranteed by the Great Powers until the formation of the League of Nations. Within this autonomous State, the liberty of the Straits would be "effectively guaranteed" by the "neutralization" of the shores of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.¹⁰ Although no decision was reached on the Straits and Constantinople by the time the Lloyd George-Clemenceau discussions ended on December 13, the French proposal served as the basis for further analysis in the British Foreign Office. The preparation of a reply was turned over to the Political Section of the British Peace Delegation under Robert Vansittart and E. G. Forbes Adam. And it was in the Vansittart-Forbes Adam Comments, circulated on December 18, which marked the first direct reference to the demilitarization of Turkish territory.¹¹ The British commented that "for purposes of defense" it seemed necessary to "demilitarize" an area 15 to 20 miles deep on the Asiatic side of the Straits and "to demolish all fortifications and to ensure permanent rights of landing and inspection for the officers of the zone on the Asiatic shores."

Negotiations on the peace treaty continued in late December at an Anglo-French meeting of ministers attended by Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot.¹² The meeting marked French acceptance of the British recommendation: Berthelot "agreed to the British proposal to demilitarize the Turkish coastline and demolish all fortifications on the south shore of the Sea of Marmora".¹³ In Berthelot's Note of January 11, 1920 which served as the basis for a preliminary draft of the treaty, the French incorporated regional demilitarization in their plan, while again raising the possibility of creating an independent and "neutralized" State of Constantinople and the Straits.¹⁴

The basic draft of the Turkish peace treaty was prepared at the First London Conference (February 12 to April 10, 1920).¹⁵ The finished draft treaty was presented to the San

Remo Conference (April 18-26) where it was accepted by the Allies and presented to the Turks.¹⁶ After an exchange of counter-proposals between the Turkish leaders and the Allies, the Treaty was signed on August 10, 1920 at Sévres, incorporating provisions for the demilitarization of two zones-- a zone surrounding the Straits and a zone in the Aegean comprising five of the larger islands located strategically opposite the mouth of the Dardanelles.¹⁷

Not only was the Treaty of Sevres never ratified, it was obsolete the day it was signed. The Sultan's government, on whom the Allies had imposed the treaty, rapidly lost its authority to the emerging nationalist movement under Kemal Ataturk. When the treaty was made public, the Sultan lost what little prestige he still retained. Moreover, Allied unity had begun to crumble before the peace treaty had been signed. Their difficulties over the Middle East permitted the Kemalists to play off the Allies against each other. Ultimately the Turkish nationalists under Ataturk forced the Allies to reappraise their policies by appealing to and receiving help from Russia. The threat of driving Turkey into the arms of Bolshevik Russia was a consideration in the Allied decision not to enforce the Treaty of Sévres.

The political and military events accompanying the rise of the Kemalist nationalist movement and the effects of the war between the Greeks and the Turks have been frequently and often eloquently recounted.¹⁸ In the context of our analysis, it is merely necessary to note that provisions of demilitarization--although refined and redefined in matters of detail--were preserved in all of the Allied revisions of peace terms offered the Turks up to the renegotiation of the peace treaty at the Lausanne Conference in late 1922.

Development of Demilitarization Concept. Even after gaining favor during 1920, the concept of regional demilitarization never became a critical part of Allied plans for a Turkish settlement. Judging by the number of times an issue was discussed as an agenda item at the First London Conference, it would appear that the most important issues relating to a Turkish settlement were the creation of an autonomous Armenia, the future status of Smyrna, financial and economic questions, mandates and spheres of influence, military questions, the Straits and Constantinople, the protection of minorities, the internal reorganization of the Turkish state and, lastly, frontiers. During the 76 sessions of the conference, regional

demilitarization was discussed on two occasions for no more than a half hour.¹⁹

Although demilitarization was not extensively examined, it was a policy over which there was widespread agreement. While important policy differences arose both between the Allies and within the various governments over numerous aspects of the broader Near East settlement, there was no disagreement over the policy of regional demilitarization among the Allies, within the Allied governments or, as far as can be determined, between Turkey and the Allies in the period prior to the Lausanne Conference.

As noted above, the regional demilitarization of Turkish territories was originally suggested in the Vansittart-Forbes Adam's Comments circulated on December 18, 1919. French acceptance of the policy was given by Berthelot in his meeting with Curzon on December 22-23. The Italians and the Japanese agreed to the policy at the First London Conference, where they were first brought into the negotiations on the Turkish treaty.

Not only did regional demilitarization obtain Allied approval, there is evidence that the Turks themselves accepted the concept, at least in principle. The first type of evidence is indirect: in the Sultan's government reactions and counter-proposals to the Treaty of Sévres no substantive objections were raised to the clauses requiring the demilitarization of the Straits or the Aegean Sea Islands.²⁰ More direct evidence of Turkish acceptance occurred later and reflected the position of the Nationalist forces under Kemal. According to reports in the British Labour press which appeared in late 1922, the British government had suppressed the story of a visit paid to London by a representative of the Nationalists, Fethi Bey, who had come with the proposal that the Dardanelles be demilitarized and neutralized.²¹ If the charge is true (and the Lloyd George government never denied it), then it reveals that both Turkish factions accepted the principle of regional demilitarization prior to the Lausanne Conference.

Though the concept of regional demilitarization was widely accepted, policy determination was accompanied by uncertainty. This stemmed from the fact that demilitarization was never considered by the Allies as an essential part of the peace settlement. In turn this led to a process of decision making in which policy alternatives were never clearly formulated or examined.

In the negotiations on the Turkish peace settlement, decisions on policy implementation went through several stages of equivocation. The original French note of December 12, 1919 referred to the "neutralization" of the shores of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus as well as the creation of an autonomous, "neutralized" State of Constantinople and the Straits. The British Comments of December 18 ignored the notion of "neutralization" and proposed instead "demilitarizing" an area 15 to 20 miles deep on the Asiatic shores of the Straits as well as the demolition of "all fortifications" on the Asiatic side. Whether the French originally advocated "neutralization" on the assumption that it was the same as "demilitarization" or whether they advocated it as a substitute for, or a supplement to, demilitarization is unknown. Whatever the case, at the Anglo-French conference of December 22-23, the French apparently abandoned "neutralization". Then, Berthelot's note of January 11, 1920 while accepting the British proposal for demilitarization and defortification, reintroduced neutralization all over again.²²

At the First London Conference, the implications of demilitarization were still undefined. Therefore, at the first session dealing with the Turkish treaty, February 14, 1920, the political representatives turned over to a military committee the formulation of all policies relating to demilitarization.²³

The Allied Military Committee met under the chairmanship of Marshall Foch on February 16. The Committee proposed that two zones be "disarmed" and all "works, fortification and batteries" be demolished. The zones were, first, the Straits and the Sea of Marmora and, second, several islands located opposite the Dardanelles (Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos and Mitylene) in the Aegean. They recommended that reconstruction of the fortified works in the designated zones be forbidden. Prohibited also was "the construction of roads or railways by which mobile artillery could be rapidly brought up." And existing railways "which could be used for such a purpose" were to be demolished. The designated areas were "not to be used for any military purposes except by the Powers guaranteeing the freedom of the Straits acting in concert." The Military Committee also recommended that an Allied occupation force remain in the demilitarized zone of the Straits "in order to ensure that no action is either taken or prepared which may be detrimental to the freedom of the Straits." In addition to military occupation, there was to be included "supervision from the naval point of view," which was to be carried out by "a guard-ship from each

of the guaranteeing Powers".²⁴

Supplementing these clauses was an additional article of the Draft Treaty which is relevant to the analysis, for it provoked the only discussion on demilitarization among the political representatives to the First London Conference. Paragraph 6 of Part III--Political Clauses for the Area of the Straits--read: "The Turkish coasts of the Sea of Marmora shall be neutralized." When this section came up for discussion at the February 21 session, Curzon finally inquired "what exactly was meant by the term 'neutralized'". He suggested that for the word "neutralized" the words "shall be demilitarized" should be substituted. As no one ventured to define or defend the policy of neutralization, the concept (whatever its original intent) was rejected for the third, and, as it turned out, for the last time.

Italy's Nitti raised at this point the only reference to reciprocity. He noted that "if the Turkish coasts of the Sea of Marmora were demilitarized something ought to be inserted in the draft which would ensure that the Greek coast should also be demilitarized". He proposed that the word "Turkish" be omitted from the article.²⁵ Although Nitti's proposal was not examined and quickly resolved by passing the decision-making responsibility on to the Allied Military Committee,²⁶ in the final draft the Foch Committee did accept this limited reciprocity between the Greek and Turkish coasts on the Sea of Marmora.

On one point, all the Allied negotiators were clear: the demilitarization provisions were not to apply to the Allies. While the treaty would require Turkish disarmament and the destruction of all Turkish "works, fortification and batteries" within the designated zones, these same provisions were not to apply to the Allies in the "demilitarized" areas. Strictly speaking, then, these zones were not demilitarized, for Allied soldiers would remain in occupation and Allied fortifications would remain in operation. As paragraph 3 of the Allied Military Committee recommendations read, the demilitarized zones "were not to be used for any military purposes except by the Powers guaranteeing the freedom of the Straits".

The fate of the Treaty of Sèvres has been frequently recounted²⁷ and need not be retold here. Suffice it to note that while important revisions in the terms of the Treaty were offered the Turkish Nationalists during their increasingly successful fight against the Greeks in 1921 and early 1922, no substantive changes in the demilitarization provisions were

offered by the Allies or demanded by the Turks.

Allied Goals for Demilitarization. The aim of the Allies in advocating the demilitarization of Turkish territories was not so much to promote peace or to reduce tensions, but rather to guarantee control over Turkey in general and the Straits in particular. From their first mention in the British Comments of December 18, 1919, proposals for the demilitarization and the destruction of Turkish fortifications were advanced "with a view to safeguard freedom of navigation through the Straits in peace and war".

That the Straits should be taken from Turkish control, there was no question. That they should be externally controlled, there was also no question. The problem confronting Allied diplomats was how specifically this control was to be exerted. In the course of the negotiations, six policy alternatives were advocated at one time or another, four of which eventually became the amalgam of the Straits settlement prior to Lausanne. The first policy advocated was that one country assume the responsibility for controlling the Straits under a mandate. During the early months of the Paris Peace Conference, the United States was frequently suggested for the role, but this alternative collapsed even before the Senate's rejection of the League. The second policy alternative, suggested by the French, was for the creation of a separate, independent and neutralized State of Constantinople and the Straits, which would be guaranteed under the League of Nations. This alternative, although repeated on several occasions, was eventually abandoned for lack of British support. The third alternative was to demilitarize the area and have the Straits run by an international control commission. At the First London Conference three additional policies of enforcement were settled upon to supplement control through demilitarization--financial control over the Sultan's government, military occupation and the threat of retaliation against Constantinople.

Lloyd George posed the question frankly, if not eloquently, when he asked: "How /are/ we to keep the Straits open? We had a certain control over the Sultan before the war, but directly war broke out he slammed the door in our faces and prolonged the war by at least two years, because he prevented us from getting supplies to Rumania and also to Russia by the shortest way". How were the Allies to prevent this from recurring in the future? It was, he said,

"a military question--that is, how are we to establish physical control". One alternative could be, he noted, the occupation of Gallipoli, Chanak and Constantinople. Curzon seconded this recommendation. What the Allies had to ensure was that Turkey "would not intrigue with, for instance, Germany, or make terms with a revived Russia". How could this be prevented, he asked? "It could only be done by having the Turk at our mercy, and this required that we should hold with military and naval forces a command of the Straits".²⁸

The French and the Italians, however, were inclined toward financial control of the Sultan's government as the most appropriate (and economical) means of guaranteeing the freedom of the Straits. As France's delegate, M. Cambon noted, "control should be exercised as unostentatiously as possible". The Turk, he maintained, "could be guided and controlled so long as this was done in a delicate manner". The best formula would be to establish a commission ostensibly "to control the Turkish finances, although really its powers would be of a much more extended character". Signor Nitti agreed that "the commission should be mainly financial in its character, but...it should in reality supervise the administration generally".²⁹

The third enforcement policy--the threat of retaliation against Constantinople--was seldom clearly formulated, although it was referred to somewhat obliquely on several occasions. For example, at one point in the discussions on the Straits question, Lloyd George pointed to a map and noted that if the Allied Powers held Gallipoli "no very considerable force would be required, as the Turks would be at the mercy of the Allied fleets". He recalled that during the earlier Armenian massacres, "when we remonstrated, the Turks were well aware that our threats were vague, as we had no means of enforcing them". "Today", he continued, "if we held Gallipoli we should have the Turk and his capital at our mercy".³⁰ Later, Churchill frankly acknowledged that in allowing the Turks to retain Constantinople as the government capital the Allies would be better able to control Turkey.³¹

It was in the context of defining the means to keep the Straits open that demilitarization was advanced by the Allies. In Allied planning, demilitarization was to supplement the other three policies adopted for this purpose--military occupation, financial control, and increasing the vulnerability of Constantinople. Judging from the negotiations

and correspondence, no other purpose was contemplated. Thus, demilitarization was conceived less as a means of preserving peace in the area than as a means of preventing the Turks from dominating the Straits.

Lausanne: Negotiation and Agreement

The making of peace with the Ottoman Empire, Temperley has noted, was like the weaving of Penelope's web. The material was unravelled as fast as it was put together. But where Penelope used to weave by day and unweave secretly by night, the Allied governments generally wove their Near Eastern policies in the obscurity of closed conferences, while the contrary process of disintegration, which remorselessly overtook their handiwork, went forward on the fields of battle under the disconcerted gaze of all.³²

During 1920, the Greeks, with the support of Great Britain, France and Italy, made spectacular advances into the Turkish interior. Not content with the Greek occupation zone at Smyrna, King Constantine decided in late 1920 against Allied advice to capture Angora, the stronghold of the nationalist forces. The Turks, under Kemal, forced the Greek army to overextend its supply lines and, in a massive counter-attack launched in September 1921 forced them to retreat. Though the war lasted another year, the tide of battle had been reversed. By September 1922, the Greeks had been driven from their last stronghold in Anatolia.

Flushed with victory, the Nationalist armies turned to the one remaining area of Greek occupation, Thrace, on the European side of the Straits. But to reach Thrace, the Turks would have to pass through the "neutral zone" which the Allies the year before had established around the Straits. For a period, war between Britain and Turkey appeared imminent and was averted only by the calm handling of the crisis on the part of the military leaders in the field. With an impasse reached on the field of battle, a general armistice was negotiated on October 11. The agreement not only provided for a cessation of hostilities, but made one important frontier revision in the earlier peace terms: Greece was deprived of Eastern Thrace, thus permitting the Turks to regain a large portion of their former territory in Europe.³³

The Turkish military victories meant that a new

international conference would have to renegotiate a Turkish peace settlement. Conditions had altered too drastically to permit a mere revision of the Treaty of Sévres. Not only had the military situation changed from that of Turkish defeat in the World War to Turkish victory against Greece, but the political situation had changed in Turkey and in the Allied countries. In England, Lloyd George's Coalition government was overthrown on the eve of the Lausanne Conference. In Italy, the internal situation was no less uncertain. Indeed, just three weeks before the Lausanne Conference was to be convened, the government had been overthrown and the Fascists had taken over power. In Athens, the reaction to the military defeats in Turkey led to revolution during which King Constantine was deposed. A new government was therefore formed just prior to the Lausanne Conference.

In addition to these internal changes, the entente between the Allies had become less cordial. Indeed, the relations between Britain, France and Italy had become strained to the breaking point during 1922. In large part this was due to the differences that had arisen between France and Britain over reparation policy for Germany and those which had arisen at the Washington Conference. But it was also due to the French and Italian efforts to work out separate agreements with the Turkish Nationalists during 1921-22 as well as their refusal to stand by the British during the Anglo-Turkish confrontation at the Straits in September, 1922.

The significance of these changes was clear to all: a peace settlement with Turkey would have to be negotiated rather than imposed; there was neither the will nor the unity on the part of the Allies to enforce a repressive treaty.

The Lausanne Conference convened on November 20, 1922. Having reached a stalemate, the conference was adjourned on February 4 to reconvene with a new group of delegates on April 23. This second stage of the conference completed the negotiations on the peace treaty with Turkey, which was signed on July 24, 1923. Represented at the conference were Great Britain, France and Italy, as the sponsoring Powers, and Greece, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Japan, the United States and Turkey. The Soviet Union was invited to participate in the discussions relating to the Straits.

Lord Curzon led the British delegation to the first stage of the negotiations and was the dominant figure of the conference. Proud, aloof, even arrogant, Curzon possessed in Sir Harold Nicolson's words, "a superb memory, an unequalled power of assimilation, great intellectual curiosity, a genius for lucid exposition, abundant humour, and oratorical capacity of a high order."³⁴ Heading the Turkish delegation was Ismet Pasha, who differed in almost every respect from Curzon. Quiet, unassuming, simple, perhaps even maladroit, Ismet's main qualities were tenacity and stubbornness rather than erudition and finesse. The American delegate, R. Washburn Child, concluded that he was "as good a bargainer as I have ever seen."³⁵ The French delegation was headed by Camille Barrère, an able and experienced diplomat. Then French Ambassador to Rome, M. Barrere was noted more for his intelligence and integrity than for his lucidity and eloquence.³⁶ The Marchese Garroni led the Italian delegation. Formerly Mayor of Genoa and Ambassador to Constantinople, Signor Garroni was referred to as "old and gentle" and not inclined to "carry out Lord Curzon's steam-roller methods."³⁷ Curzon would refer to him as "the turtle" and Nicolson agreed that his resemblance to "a salt water Chelonian was very pronounced."³⁸

Richard Washburn Child, Ambassador to Rome, headed the American delegation, which was also composed of Joseph C. Grew, Minister at Berne, and Rear-Admiral Mark L. Bristol, High Commissioner at Constantinople. Nicolson characterized Child rather disdainfully as "a writer of magazine stories" who was "typically American in his conviction that the whole Lausanne Conference was a plot on the part of the Old Diplomacy to deprive American company promoters of oil concessions." Yet he was "equally American in his friendliness, his desire to help and in his ultimate good sense."³⁹ The Greek delegate, M. Eleutherios Venizelos, was as professional as he was experienced. A skillful negotiator, a polished orator, he gave the personal appearance of reasonableness incarnate. Secretary of State Lansing's impression of him at the Paris Peace Conference was that he appeared to be living in an atmosphere of virtuous thought and kindly purpose.⁴⁰ Nicolson referred to his "self-certainty, his utter-reasonableness, the velocity of his mind."⁴¹

The main issues confronting the conference remained the same as before. The most important problems involved the settlement of the Straits question and frontiers, the

disposition of the oil rich area of Mosul, capitulations, and minorities. In the background, never formally raised, but ever present in the minds of the Allies, was the March, 1921, Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship: would it be expanded into a formal alliance or contracted to merely commercial ties?

In preparing for the conference, Lord Curzon insisted on the formal establishment of a "united front" between England, France and Italy to prevent the Turks from playing off the Allies against each other. Having achieved prior agreements from Poincaré and Mussolini, as a result of patience but at the expense of pride, Curzon then set about the realization of his tactical objectives--that of isolating the Turks and capturing control of the conference. For Curzon, the first objective was to be achieved by the second. By gaining control of the conference, he anticipated so arranging the agenda that the subjects on which the Turks were weakest and the Allies most united could be taken up first. Curzon reasoned that by the time the conference got to the more contentious issues, not only would the unity of the Allies have been demonstrated, but he would better be able to determine the weaknesses of the Turkish delegation.⁴²

The major obstacle confronting Curzon was a preconference agreement with the French that the chairmanship would be rotated. How he got around this agreement not only revealed Curzon's ingenuity, but also his arrogance. Following the opening session of formalities, in which the delegates were greeted by the Swiss President, Curzon announced that the "senior" delegate would preside over the following session to be devoted to organizational preparations. As Poincaré and Mussolini returned to their capitals following the opening formalities, this meant that Curzon, as the ranking cabinet minister, would preside.

Upon assuming the chair for the organization session, Curzon suggested that three committees be formed, first, a territorial committee, with himself as chairman, second, a committee to look into the subject of capitulations and minorities, presided over by Garroni and third, a financial committee to be headed by Barrère. After noting that it would be difficult to hold the committees simultaneously, he suggested that the first committee should begin and the other two be convened after some progress had been achieved on territorial issues.

Nicolson noted that Curzon made his announcement "with such unruffled lucidity, with so innocent an assumption of reasonableness" that it was not until the delegates read the minutes the following morning that they realized that "with a skill which compelled their admiration" he had col-lared the presidency of the conference for himself.⁴³ In-deed, there were no further "plenary" sessions; the confer-ence always met as a committee. And of the committees, the one under Curzon's chairmanship was by far the most impor-tant both in the number of sessions and in the substance of the issues involved. The first sixteen sessions of the con-ference were, in fact, held as the "Territorial Committee"; and of the 37 sessions held during the first phase of the conference, "Curzon's committee" met 26 times, while the Barrère's met only six times and Garroni's but five.

By this "technical adjustment", as Nicolson referred to it, Curzon gained control of the Conference. And it was to carry out his primary objective--that of isolating the Turks and demonstrating the unity of the Allies--that Curzon announced that the conference would first take up the issue of Thrace.

Demilitarization of Thrace. There were three separate issues confronting the conference in connection with Thrace, only one of which according to the Allies was negotiable. The first involved the determination of Turkey's European frontier, which, in the opinion of the Allies, had been "settled" at the Mudania armistice negotiations. The sec-ond issue related to the disposition of Western Thrace, which, according to the Allies, had been "settled" by the peace treaty with Bulgaria. The third and only unresolved issue, according to the Allies, was how to fulfill the pledge made in the Treaty of Neuilly to provide Bulgaria with an access to the Aegean Sea.

On the issue of a Bulgarian access to the sea, there was no problem. However, Turkey refused to acknowledge that either the disposition of Western Thrace or the Euro-pean frontier was settled. And though the Allies hesitated to admit it, Turkey did have a case, for neither issue was as settled as the Allies alledged, by previous treaty or agreement.

Historically, geographically and ethnically Thrace was divided into two areas, referred to as Western Thrace and Eastern Thrace. Both areas were located on the European

side of the Straits, with Western Thrace touching Greece in the south and Bulgaria in the north. The River Maritza, from the point where it passed through Adrianople in the north to its outlet in the Aegean in the south, divided the two areas. Originally Turkey controlled both Western and Eastern Thrace. But as a result of the Balkan Wars, Turkey ceded almost all of Western Thrace to Bulgaria under the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest. When Bulgaria entered the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, Turkey was prevailed upon by Germany to give the remaining part of Western Thrace, the Karagatch-Demotika zone located opposite Adrianople, also to Bulgaria.

Under Article 48 of the Treaty of Neuilly, Western Thrace was ceded to the Principle Allied and Associated Powers. But as this cut off the Bulgarian access to the sea, the article also pledged that in the final disposition of the area, Bulgaria would be provided with a guaranteed route to the Aegean. According to the unratified Treaty of Sévres, Western Thrace (as well as Eastern Thrace) was to be given to Greece. During the Turco-Greek war, the Greeks had occupied Western Thrace and administered it in the name of the Allied Powers. Thus, at the time of the Lausanne Conference, Western Thrace was still legally unsettled, although Greece had a strong moral claim to the area.

Eastern Thrace had been under Turkish sovereignty all through the World War, but under the Treaty of Sévres, the area, along with Western Thrace, was to be ceded to Greece, thus depriving Turkey of all territory on the European side of the Straits. During the Turco-Greek War, the Allies had progressively reduced the size of the area to be given to Greece while offering Turkey an ever larger share of Eastern Thrace as a condition of peace. Finally, under the Mudania armistice, Eastern Thrace up to the river Maritza was taken from Greece and returned to Turkey. Thus, on the eve of the conference, it was agreed that Eastern Thrace would be restored officially to Turkey, while the fate of Western Thrace remained in doubt.

In none of the discussions on Thrace, which date back to the Paris Peace Conference, was demilitarization raised either as an issue or as a condition of settlement. The demilitarization of the Thracian frontier was proposed for the first time at the Lausanne Conference, where the negotiations were characterized by four essentials. First, the purposes of demilitarization were no longer articulated in

terms of control, but rather in terms of promoting peace and enhancing security. Second, there was confusion over the meaning and implications of the concept. Third, demilitarization was accepted by all sides in principle, although important differences arose over the more technical details, especially in the matters of inspection and guarantees. And lastly, the proposals were made on the basis of reciprocity and were negotiated rather than imposed on the Turks.

At the first session of the conference,⁴⁴ on November 22, Lord Curzon asked Ismet Pasha to state the Turkish position on the frontiers of Thrace. Ismet responded that Turkey claimed all of Eastern Thrace up to its 1913 boundaries, which meant that he claimed not only all of Eastern Thrace but that portion of Western Thrace ceded to Bulgaria in 1915, namely Karagatch-Demotika opposite Adrianople. He also asked, somewhat enigmatically, for a plebiscite in Western Thrace. As these points had not figured in the armistice negotiations or in the correspondence relating to the conference, Ismet was unexpectedly raising Turkey's demands. Under the armistice, the Allies had agreed that Turkey should regain Eastern Thrace up to the river Maritza. Now Ismet claimed territory beyond the Maritza, which was located in Western Thrace. Ismet explained that ethnically the area around Adrianople contained a majority of Turks, that the river Maritza divided the city in such a way that to draw the frontier down the river line would artificially divide the geographic, commercial, residential and transportation interdependence of the zone, and lastly that Adrianople could not be defended if it were located on the border of another state.

The Allies questioned the reliability of population figures and noted that Turkey had voluntarily ceded this territory in 1915 to Bulgaria. This did not support the argument, they pointed out, that the area could be considered a vital part of Turkey strategically or commercially. In addition, the plebiscite Ismet asked for in Western Thrace raised the spectre of future revanchism, even if Turkey was not asking for possession of the area. As the Serbian delegate responded, if the Turks desired to establish by means of a plebiscite "an autonomous political organization", then he thought that such a plan "would in no way advance the cause of peace in the Balkans, but rather prepare for future troubles".⁴⁵ The Greeks, the Yugoslavs, the Rumanians, the French, Italians, the English and even Turkey's former ally, Bulgaria, also opposed

Ismet's new demands. In making these claims, the Turks had assisted Curzon in his objective of isolating them.

It was during this initial debate over Turkish demands that the Serbian representative, Nintchitch, proposed the demilitarization of the Thracian frontier. In order to re-establish "a real peace" and "an atmosphere of mutual confidence in the Balkan Peninsula" he suggested that the frontier of Eastern Thrace should be the line of the Maritza and that this line form a "demilitarized zone along the north and west frontiers of Eastern Thrace".⁴⁶ The Rumanian representative who followed agreed that the best way of ensuring the security of Adrianople was not to extend Turkish sovereignty beyond the Maritza, but "to demilitarize a zone from the Black Sea as far as the Aegean".⁴⁷ Ismet responded to these proposals and shifted, through design or through confusion, the meaning of the proposal by referring to the earlier proposals alternately as a "neutral zone" or a "demilitarized neutral zone". By whatever title, he remained non-committal, insisting that "first of all this proposal should be put in a precise form, indicating clearly on whose territory the demilitarized neutral zone was to be established".⁴⁸

Lord Curzon then masterfully summarized the various positions and arguments to this point. In reviewing the suggestions relating to demilitarization, he refused to accept Ismet's interpretation because "neutralization" would involve a commitment on international guarantees. A guarantee of armed support, given Balkan history, could lead to more conflicts than it might prevent. Therefore, Curzon noted that Nintchitch had suggested demilitarization "by which he meant the razing of forts and the exclusion of troops, rather than neutralization".⁴⁹ Acknowledging that the Turkish delegation had "quite properly and reasonably" asked for a precise definition of the area to be demilitarized, he suggested that the idea be examined by the military experts in a sub-commission on which "the Turks would doubtless speak with great authority".

Without openly admitting it, Curzon revealed that the main purpose of demilitarization was to counter Turkish claims to the Karagatch-Demotika area in Western Thrace. The establishment of the frontier along the Maritza did pose a security problem for Adrianople, which several delegations had noted. Yet the Allies were caught in a diplomatic squeeze: they had already made a treaty commitment to the

Greeks that Western Thrace be turned over to them. Demilitarization, therefore, served as a convenient compromise: it would permit Greece to retain the Karagatch-Demotika zone in Western Thrace and it would satisfy (hopefully) Turkey's demand for the security of its European frontier and Adrianople. As Curzon pointed out: "The Turkish delegation /will/ see at once how such a suggestion touched the question of their military security". It was clear, he continued, that "with the demilitarization of Adrianople on the one side, and of Karagatch on the other, the military danger to Adrianople from the forts on the other side of the river would disappear".⁵⁰

The following day, November 23, Ismet responded to the arguments against a plebiscite for Western Thrace and the extension of Turkish control over Karagatch-Demotika. Near the end of the presentation, he intimated acceptance of demilitarization, although he still called it a neutral zone. He "assumed that the institution of a neutral zone would not in any way affect the existing sovereign rights and administration in the district to which that neutrality applied". If this were accepted, he thought that "the question of the neutral zone should first be thoroughly examined by a sub-commission".⁵

This sub-commission, chaired by General Weygand met during the afternoon of November 23 and on the following day submitted its report. It was a concise document, which, though it did not resolve all differences, clearly identified them, thereby providing the basis for a later discussion which was singularly lucid, coherent and germane. The military representatives agreed on the definition of demilitarization, on the armament restrictions to be imposed in the zone, and on the territorial boundaries of the demilitarized zone. They disagreed, however, over guarantees, inspection and the arrangement for reciprocity.

The Committee first defined the term "demilitarized zone". A "demilitarized zone" was to be an extent of territory in which:

- a) No offensive or defensive organization is to exist; that is to say, no fortified work, either permanent or field, no arsenal, depot of munitions or of war material; generally speaking, no establishment with a military object;

- b) There are to be stationed or moved no armed forces beyond the special units necessary to assure internal order and the supervision of the frontiers, such as gendarmerie, police, customs officials and frontier guards, whose numbers and armament shall be limited.⁵²

The Committee agreed that the maximum strength in the demilitarized zone on the Turkish territory be limited to 5,000 men, on Bulgarian territory to 2,500 and on Greek territory to 2,500 men. The armament of these forces was to include only "the revolver, the sword, the rifle and four automatic rifles for every 100 men". All artillery and aviation units were to be forbidden, and military aircraft were to be prohibited from flying over the demilitarized zone. As to the territorial extent of the zone, the members agreed its width should be "greater than one day's march for troops and...the range of medium artillery". These considerations led to the proposal for a demilitarized zone extending "about 30 kilometers on both sides of the frontier".

In the discussion that afternoon, the delegates elaborated the positions taken by the military representatives. Ismet noted that the request that the Turks accept the demilitarization of territory 30 kilometers wide along their European frontier meant that Turkey would "renounce altogether her means for defending a district of vital importance to her". Adrianople, which had been a defensive fortress, "would lose that character, and Turkey would be deprived of the power to defend the line of the Maritza". This sacrifice, Ismet continued, could not be justified "unless the signatory Powers formally guaranteed the inviolability of the zone which it was proposed to deprive of its means of defense."

As for inspection, Ismet stated that Turkey "could not in any way accept the exercise of foreign supervision over any part of her territory". He pledged that Turkey would faithfully fulfill its obligations and pointed out that any penetration by the Turkish army into "the neutral zone" would be immediately known. In addition, fortifications could not be erected secretly at Adrianople within the space of a few days. Therefore, he reasoned, demilitarization did not require the exercise of any surveillance. Instead of a supervisory role, Ismet proposed that the signatory Powers have only a protecting role. The signatory Powers would be called upon to defend the neutrality and inviolability of the demilitarized zone but they could investigate only on

the basis of a complaint.⁵³

While Curzon did not directly oppose the granting of an international guarantee, he ducked the issue by noting that this raised "a very large question which could not be decided at the conference table and would have to be considered by the various Governments concerned". Such a guarantee was "of a very serious and ominous character", and any Government assuming it "must consider most carefully the consequences which it would entail". On the matter of inspection, he was "somewhat surprised" at the Turkish attitude. He could not imagine demilitarization without inspection. It was inconsistent, he pointed out, to ask the Powers to guarantee a demilitarized zone and yet deny them the opportunity of entering it for purposes of supervision. If Turkey approached the Powers in that spirit, he warned, it would find difficulty in getting a guarantee.⁵⁴ With the concurrence of M. Barrère in Curzon's statement, the discussion of the demilitarization of the Thracian frontier was terminated for the day, and, as it turned out, for the duration of the conference.

The final Convention on the frontiers of Thrace, signed by all the delegates except the United States and Soviet delegations, represented a compromise but a compromise, strongly favoring Turkey.⁵⁵ The Turks did not get their international guarantee, but then the Allies did not get the right of inspection and supervision. Investigation was not to be by right, but only on the basis of formal complaint. In the event a "bordering Power" whose territory formed the subject of the treaty had "any complaint to make respecting the observance of the present provisions", this complaint was to be brought by that Power before the League Council. Thus, a complaint could be made only by Turkey, Greece, or Bulgaria.

For the rest, the territorial extent and the armament restrictions to be imposed in the demilitarized zone--as defined by the Weygand Committee--were incorporated into the Convention. The demilitarized zone remained fixed at "about 30 kilometers" on each side of the frontiers and the military forces were restricted to the earlier recommended figure of 5,000 in the Turkish zone, and 2,500 in the Greek and Bulgarian zones. Their armament was limited to revolvers, swords, rifles and four Lewis guns per 100, with the total exclusion of all artillery and military aircraft. All fortifications and field works were to be dismantled and no

new fortifications built. Finally, no armed forces, other than gendarmerie, police, customs officers and frontier guards were to be in the zone.

These demilitarization provisions differed greatly from the provisions proposed by the Allies under the Treaty of Sévres. The earlier Allied plans envisaged the retention not only of troops in the so-called demilitarized zone (Allied occupation troops), but also fortifications (Allied fortifications) and Allied artillery. Where the provisions under the Sévres treaty proposed a one-sided arrangement, the Lausanne Convention imposed genuine demilitarization.

Demilitarization of Aegean Islands. Having isolated the Turks on the Thracian question, Curzon next took up the problem of the Greek islands in the Aegean. The subject was convenient in two respects--it was not highly controversial and the Greeks were in a stronger bargaining position, since they had maintained command of the seas throughout their war with Turkey.⁵⁶ Discussions began on November 25 at the sixth session of Curzon's Territorial and Military Committee. Although there was widespread agreement over demilitarization, the discussion became expectedly contentious because of confusion over the legal status of the islands.

Two groups of islands were involved in the deliberations: the inner islands or "sentinels", as Curzon referred to them, comprising Imbros, Tenedos, Samothrace and Lemnos; and the "central group", made up of Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria. The "sentinels" were strategically located near the mouth of the Dardanelles, while the "central group" was scattered at a distance further removed. These islands had suffered a mixed fate in the prewar period. During the Balkan Wars, Greece had occupied all of these islands and under the Treaty of London (May 30, 1913) Greek possession of the islands was confirmed, with the exception of Imbros and Tenedos which were demilitarized and left to Turkey. The Turkish government rejected the London terms and, as a result, Greece retained Imbros and Tenedos, as well as the other Aegean islands during the war. In the unratified Treaty of Sévres, Greece obtained formal possession of all these Aegean islands, providing they be demilitarized. These provisions were retained in the proposed revisions of the Treaty offered Turkey during 1921 and early 1922. At the Lausanne Conference, then, all of the Aegean islands were in Greek possession.

The main issue was, paradoxically, to decide what issues confronted the conference. The Allies felt that the conference might reexamine the sovereignty of Imbros and Tenedos; the Turks, however, rejected this contention and insisted that the issue had been settled by the 1913 treaty. The Turks felt that since they had never officially recognized Greek sovereignty over the remaining islands, that their future status was still subject to negotiations--a position which the Allies refused to acknowledge.

The process of defining negotiable issues went through a series of narrowing-down stages. Ismet initially advanced four proposals:

- 1) that Imbros and Tenedos be confirmed as Turkish on the basis of the 1913 Treaty of London;
- 2) that Samothrace, ceded to Greece in 1913, be transferred to Turkey since it too commanded the Dardanelles;
- 3) that Lemnos, Mitylene, Chios and Nikaria, which had been given to Greece in 1913, be placed under an international regime providing for their independence and neutrality;
- 4) that all the islands be demilitarized.⁵⁷

Lord Curzon rejected giving any of the islands their independence under a regime of neutrality. This would result, he pointed out, in "great difficulties, both from the point of view of law and right and also as regards practicability". The islands in question were "a lawful Greek possession by treaty" and their populations were "entirely Greek in character". To the Turkish demand for the demilitarization of these islands, Curzon felt that a distinction had to be made between Imbros, Tenedos and Samothrace, which were strategically placed opposite the Dardanelles and the rest of the islands which were further removed from the Straits. Therefore, he suggested:

- 1) that the fate of the three islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Samothrace be examined later in conjunction with the question of the Straits;
- 2) that the suggestion of a constitutional experiment in autonomy--under an international regime--for the other islands be rejected;
- 3) that while detaching the islands from Greek sovereignty could not be contemplated, he was willing that their demilitarization be examined by the military experts.⁵⁸

Venizelos gently corrected Lord Curzon. The sovereignty of Samothrace, which Curzon had stated was to be examined in conjunction with the question of the Straits, could not of course be examined, as this had been settled in 1913. "Only the degree of demilitarization to be effected there", he insisted, "was still under discussion".⁵⁹ There followed a brief period of confusion as the delegates tried to explain which of the islands were to be examined as regards demilitarization and which as regards sovereignty and which as regards both. With the terms of reference finally settled, the matter was turned over to a Military Subcommittee under General Weygand.

During the negotiations in Weygand's military subcommittee and Curzon's Territorial Committee there was little disagreement over the assumption that the islands would be demilitarized. This principle had been established in the 1913 Treaty of London, confirmed in the Treaty of Sevres, and was unchallenged at Lausanne. Thus, while differences arose over the sovereign status of the Aegean islands, the only contentious point involved the question of whether the restrictions were to be equally imposed on all the islands. The Turkish position was that all the islands, Greek or Turkish, should be equally demilitarized. This, indeed, seemed to be the initial conclusion of the Weygand Committee. According to Turkish complaints, however, the Military Subcommittee made an unexpected (and unexplained) about-face in the middle of its deliberations.

During the initial morning session of the Subcommittee, General Weygand argued that the islands of the central group (Mitylene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria) could constitute and had constituted a basis for military operations against Turkish Anatolia. After this report, the necessity of demilitarizing the islands of the central group was accepted by the Subcommittee in principle. The Turks were "astonished", however, to learn that the proposals presented by the Subcommittee in the afternoon session "had no relation to the decisions taken, on purely military grounds, in the course of the morning meeting".⁶⁰ While the Subcommittee recommended the complete demilitarization of the four strategically placed islands (Imbros, Tenedos, Samothrace and Lemnos), they reversed their initial position and recommended only the partial demilitarization of the Greek islands of the "central group" (Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria).

In the discussion on the Military Subcommittee's report

in the Territorial Committee on December 29, the Turks demanded the complete demilitarization of the Greek islands of Mitylene, Samos, Chios and Nikaria--to include prohibitions against artillery, aircraft, and the stationing of all military forces. These demands were countered with a reminder that, if these islands were completely demilitarized, it would necessitate a reciprocal arrangement for the demilitarization of a large portion of the Turkish Anatolian coast in the area. While protesting, the Turks did not press the point.⁶¹

Thus, in the final terms of treaty the inner group of "sentinels", Imbros, Tenedos, Samothrace, and Lemnos, were to be completely demilitarized, while the islands of the "central group", Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria, were only to be partially demilitarized. While these provisions imposed unequal restraints on the islands, the more stringent terms were at least reciprocally applied to both Greece and Turkey. Hence, while the islands awarded Turkey, Imbros and Tenedos, were to be completely demilitarized, so too were the inner islands awarded to Greece, Samothrace and Lemnos.

Throughout this initial discussion of the Aegean islands--the final fate of the islands would not be settled until the Straits problems was resolved later in the conference--there was neither discussed nor proposed any system of inspection or supervision. Perhaps this was natural given the rejection of the idea in the deliberations establishing the demilitarized zone along Turkey's western frontier in Thrace. In addition, there was no discussion of, or provision for, the handling of treaty violations. The Straits Commission, later to be approved, was not to have jurisdiction over the islands nor was it to handle complaints of violations. Presumably, then, the only methods of enforcement of the treaty terms were via diplomatic channels or the League of Nations. Without the right of inspection or supervision, the Allies refused to guarantee the demilitarization of the Aegean islands as they had refused for the Thracian frontier. In the final analysis, the demilitarization provisions were self-enforcing, with the countries restricted by the agreement assuming the responsibilities for the execution of the agreement. In this particular case, self-enforcement worked remarkably well for even without inspection, the terms appear to have been faithfully observed by all sides.

Chapter 10 - Footnotes

¹ Major General J. H. Marshall-Cornwall, Geographic Disarmament (1935), pp. 59-61.

² Ibid., p. 103.

³ Allied policy toward Turkey in general and the secret treaties in particular is reviewed in H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (1924), VI, 1-23; Laura Madge Adkisson, "Great Britain and the Kemalist Movement for Turkish Independence, 1919-1923", unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Texas, 1958), pp. 1-107; Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925 (1934), pp. 82-88; John De Novo, American Interests in the Middle East, 1900-1939 (1963), ch. 4; Harry Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1925 (1931), pp. 143-87; Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (1923), I, passim; David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties (1938), II, passim; Sir Edward Grey, Twenty Five Years, 1892-1916 (1925), II, 180-82.

⁴ Point 12 of Wilson's Fourteen Points reads as follows: "The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees."

⁵ The text of the Mudros Armistic is in Eliot G. Mears, Modern Turkey (1924), pp. 624-26. See also Nicolson, Curzon, pp. 116-17; and Adkisson, "Great Britain and the Kemalist Movement", pp. 76-77.

⁶ See Roderic H. Davidson, "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne", in The Diplomats, 1919-1939, ed. by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (1963), I, 172-209. See also Nicolson, Curzon, pp. 62-118 and Adkisson, "Great Britain and the Kemalist Movement", chs. 2-4.

⁷ See Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, ch. 1, pts. I-II; also David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (1939), passim.

⁸ D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, II, 728-29. For a review of British and French policy at this meeting, see Karl G. Larew, "The Policies of the Western Powers towards the Problem of the Turkish Straits", unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Yale University, 1963), pp. 238-40.

⁹ D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, II, 727-28.

¹⁰ D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, IV, 945-46.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 942-56.

¹² Proceedings of the conference are in Ibid., pp. 938-69.

¹³ Ibid., p. 941.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 1018.

¹⁵ D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, VII is devoted entirely to the proceedings of the conference.

¹⁶ For the proceedings of the San Remo Conference, see D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, VIII, 1-252.

¹⁷ The Treaty of Sèvres was printed as Command Paper 964, Treaty Series No. 11 (1920).

¹⁸ See Harold Armstrong, Grey Wolf: An Intimate Study of a Dictator (1937); Halide Edib, The Turkish Ordeal (1928); Patrick Balfour, Ataturk (1965); Alfred Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, 1918-1922 (1923); General Sir Charles Harington, Tim Harington Looks Back (1940); Clair Price, The Rebirth of Turkey (1923).

¹⁹ The proceedings of the First London Conference are in D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, VII.

²⁰ These two sets of observations were not printed in the British documents, although reference is made to the fact that they were published by the Turkish Peace Delegation under the title Observations générales présentées par la Délégation Ottomane à la Conférence de la Paix; D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, VIII, 413 fn.

²¹ Adkisson, "Great Britain and the Kemalist Movement", p. 419.

- 22 D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, IV, 1018.
- 23 D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, VIII, 42-51.
- 24 D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, VII, 124.
- 25 Ibid., p. 181.
- 26 Ibid.; paragraph 6 was amended to read: "The coasts of the Sea of Marmora shall be demilitarized in conformity with the line of demilitarization fixed by Marshal Foch's Committee". The Treaty of Sèvres defines Greek responsibilities for demilitarization in Article 84.
- 27 Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 35.
- 28 D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, VII, 49.
- 29 Ibid., p. 48.
- 30 Ibid., p. 49.
- 31 Ibid., p. 361.
- 32 Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 41.
- 33 Nicolson, Curzon, pp. 275-76; Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 38-39; Adkisson, "Great Britain and the Kemalist Movement," pp. 418-23; Harington, Tim Harington, pp. 118-20.
- 34 Nicolson, Curzon, p. 17.
- 35 Richard Washburn Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe (1925), pp. 95-96.
- 36 Nicolson, Curzon, p. 285; Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era, A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years (1952), I, 512.
- 37 Grew, Turbulent Era, I, 502.
- 38 Nicolson, Curzon, p. 303.
- 39 Ibid., p. 296.
- 40 Robert Lansing, The Big Four (1921), pp. 143-46.

41 Nicolson, Curzon, p. 96.

42 Nicolson, Curzon, p. 293.

43 Ibid., pp. 292-93.

44 The proceedings of the first stage of the conference (November 20-February 4) are in Lausanne Conference of Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923; Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace (1923), Cmd. 1814. Hereafter cited as Lausanne Conference. There is no official record of the second stage which met from April 23 to the signing of the Treaty on July 24, 1923.

45 Ibid., p. 27.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., p. 28.

48 Ibid., p. 33.

49 Ibid., p. 36.

50 Ibid., p. 37.

51 Ibid., p. 47.

52 Ibid., p. 77.

53 Ibid., pp. 64-65.

54 Ibid., p. 65-67.

55 The Thracian Convention is found in Ibid., pp. 785-90.

56 Nicolson, Curzon, pp. 300-01.

57 Lausanne Conference, pp. 95-98.

58 Ibid., pp. 98-99.

59 Ibid., p. 99.

60 Ibid., pp. 110-11.

61 Ibid., p. 111.

Chapter 11

THE LAUSANNE CONVENTION: THE STRAITS

The Treaty of Lausanne, in addition to providing for the demilitarization of the Thracian frontier and the Aegean islands, also included important military and armament restrictions in the Straits Convention, signed along with the above agreements on July 24, 1923. These restrictions were of two types: first, there were limitations placed on the number and size of warships which could pass through the Dardanelles in peace and war; and second, there were provisions limiting the right of Turkey to set up fortifications in the Straits zone, an area which included both the eastern and western shores of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus in addition to the islands in these waters.

These arms control provisions were in marked contrast to those which the Allies had included in the 1920 Treaty of Sévres. In that treaty, no restrictions had been inserted on the right of transit for either warships or merchantmen, which in effect turned the control of the Straits over to those countries with the largest navies. And while the Straits zone was demilitarized under the Sévres treaty, the affected area was far larger in the earlier arrangement than that ultimately agreed upon at Lausanne.

In the negotiations leading up to the final Straits settlement at Lausanne, several points stand out which are pertinent to an analysis of arms control and demilitarization. First, the negotiators at Lausanne tended to perceive options and decide policy largely in terms of the impact which the earlier Straits settlements had on the security interests of their respective countries. These settlements--for the most part imposed as a result of military action--invariably conferred unequal advantages on the affected parties and often led to important military defeats, even for those states originally benefiting by the arrangement. Thus, Russia was vitally affected--and seriously imperiled--

by the Straits policy in effect during the Crimean War, the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War, while England and France were likewise affected--by the arrangement which permitted Turkey to arm the Straits--during the First World War. The opening of the Straits following World War I--which gave the Allies direct access to Russia's southern flank--was an experience no less threatening to the new rulers of Soviet Russia. In a sense, then, the delegates at Lausanne were still fighting past wars while trying to work out their designs for future policy.

Second, though the Allies were in fundamental agreement over the arms control provisions to be included in the treaty, strong opposition arose from both Turkey and Soviet Russia during the course of the deliberations. But the interests of the two opponents--to Russia's disadvantage--were not entirely the same. Thus, while the Soviet delegates were most apprehensive over the terms relating to transit through the Straits, the Turks were primarily concerned with the effects of demilitarization. In spite of these differences--and to a large extent because of them--the Turkish delegation was able to gain important concessions from the Allies. By skillfully holding out the threat of a Russo-Turkish alliance, and then abandoning Russian interests on the transit terms at the appropriate moment, Turkey was able to achieve substantial revisions in the demilitarization provisions, both on the territorial extent of the affected area and on the level of restrictions to be included.

Third, while the goals of arms control were articulated by the Allies in terms of equity and principle--that of preserving the historic right of equal access to all "international waterways" for commercial shipping--the effects of the provisions, by design or by coincidence, were such as to confer a distinct military advantage to the strongest naval powers. As with so many of the earlier treaties, the arms control provisions at Lausanne appeared to have very little to do with reducing tensions in the area or with preserving peace.

Fourth, in the final terms Turkey was able not only to obtain concessions on the extent and level of arms control restrictions, but also succeeded in excluding from the treaty all supervisory and inspection provisions. Although the Allies had been adamant in their demands for the right to conduct inspection by some international agency, in the final treaty terms these demands were abandoned. The Straits

Commission, the agency originally designed to superintend international control, was in the end limited to essentially auditing functions, with no independent enforcement authority.

Fifth, the one major setback suffered by Turkey was in her demand to have the Straits neutralized as well as demilitarized. Concerned over her inability to militarily defend the Straits zone, Turkey pressed for an international guarantee which would have provided that in event hostilities broke out in the area the signatories to the treaty would be obligated automatically to come to her defense. But while Turkey was concerned with her demilitarized status, the Allies were equally concerned with the effects of giving Turkey a prior commitment to military support. That such a guarantee would promote Turkey's security there was no doubt; but that it might also stimulate Turkey's territorial ambitions there was also little doubt. Therefore, the Allies merely reaffirmed their pledge under the League to take whatever action the Council might decide in event of a threat to the peace.

The Straits in Historical Perspective

Most of the treaties affecting the Straits signed during the 1800's had been imposed following military defeat rather than negotiated on the basis of reciprocity. As a result, these pre-war attempts to work out a "Straits settlement" were designed less to promote peace in the area than to guarantee a military-strategic advantage to the dominant Powers at the moment. Not only had these various arrangements conferred unequal advantages but perhaps more important they had often resulted in serious and costly military losses to the affected parties. And these past experiences had a profound impact on the negotiating stance of the various delegations at Lausanne.¹

At issue throughout the 1800's was one fundamental question: were the Straits to be open or closed? There was never any opposition to the principle that the Straits should be open to the commerce of all nations, although there were differences over how this was to be guaranteed. At issue, rather, was whether warships had a right of transit through the Straits and if so under what conditions.

The issue was complicated by the fact that involved in the determination of policy were basically conflicting national interests. It was to Russia's advantage to have the

Straits closed to all non-littoral warships, thus making the Black Sea a mare clausum. This would not only afford protection against an attack on its southern flank in the Caucasus and Crimea, but also permit the Russians to exert a predominant influence over Turkey. Closing of the Straits would also give the Russian fleet a sanctuary from which to undertake operations in the Aegean and Mediterranean, while denying enemy craft the right of pursuit back to Russia's Black Sea ports.

It was to Turkey's advantage to obtain discretionary control over the Straits: to close them to enemies and open them to friends. This would enable Turkey to call in support to counter-balance Russian influence if need be and to close the Straits against an external attack on Constantinople. For western naval powers, especially England, the main objectives were to keep the Straits open for commercial purposes, to restrain Russian influence in the area and to prevent enemy warships from challenging the Mediterranean route to the Suez canal. These objectives could be achieved by closing the Straits to all warships and by demilitarizing the Straits zone. The former would limit Russia's influence over Turkey and deny the Russian fleet a privileged sanctuary, while the latter would prevent Turkey from unilaterally closing the Straits by military action.

During the 19th century various "solutions" to the Straits problem were attempted, depending in large measure on the fortunes of war and on the state of the European alliance system. In 1833, following Turkey's severe defeat by the Egyptian armies, Russia induced Turkey to sign an agreement, referred to variously as the Treaty of Hunkiar Iskelesi or Unkiar Skelessi, by which Turkey pledged to close the Dardanelles to all foreign warships, with the exception of Russian naval craft. As a result of pressures brought to bear by the western European powers, this one-sided arrangement was supplanted by a Straits Convention signed at London on July 13, 1841. This convention closed the Straits to all warships, Russia's included, when Turkey was at peace. If Turkey, however, became involved in hostilities, it could open the Straits to foreign warships by invitation. This treaty in effect shifted control over the Straits from Russia to Turkey.

The 1856 Treaty of Paris, terminating the Crimean War, not only restricted Russian influence in the area, but limited Turkey's ability to maintain control over the Straits.

To limit Russia's influence over Turkey and to deprive the Russian fleet of operational access to the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, the Straits were closed to all warships. To guarantee the free access of all commercial shipping through the Straits--and perhaps to increase the area's vulnerability to outside attack--both the Russian and Turkish shores of the Black Sea were demilitarized. Deprived of the opportunity of establishing either naval or coastal defense arrangements along its southern flank, Russia became by the terms of the Paris arrangement entirely dependent for its safety on the faithful observation of the treaty terms by Britain and France, a point which both countries skillfully manipulated to inhibit Russian policy ambitions.

Although the Treaty of Paris admirably served British and French foreign policy aims, it was so threatening to Russian national interests that the arrangement was challenged in 1870 with the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian war. Encouraged by the support of Bismarck, Tsar Alexander II unilaterally repudiated the terms of the Treaty of Paris in October, 1870. And though protests were duly made, there was not much that could be done. Ultimately a seven nation conference was held in London, where on March 13, 1871, the so-called Pontus Treaty was signed. Under its terms the Straits were closed to all foreign warships; Russia and Turkey were in addition authorized to fortify their Black Sea coasts and to maintain a fleet of unlimited size in the Black Sea. The only limitation on the Black Sea fleets was they were forbidden the right of egress through the Straits. The restrictive nature of these 1871 provisions was brought home to the Russians during the Russo-Japanese War, when the much needed Black Sea fleet was prevented from taking part in the war as a result of the terms prohibiting its right of egress through the Straits. And while England and France were reasonably content to maintain the status quo, the first World War demonstrated the disadvantages of the 1871 formula to non-littoral powers as well. Entering the war on the side of Germany, Turkey simply closed the Straits to all shipping commercial as well as military. By this action, Turkey was able to block the only maritime supply route to Russia which was not ice-bound a good part of the year. Having fortified the Straits over the years, Turkey was able successfully to repulse Allied efforts to force the Straits open. Indeed, the defeats of the Allies at the Dardanelles and on the Gallipoli peninsula in 1915 were among the most severe setbacks to the Entente in the entire

war. And the continued inability of France and England to adequately provide needed supplies to Russia undoubtedly was a major factor contributing to the ultimate collapse of Russia.²

During the war, Russian policy objectives appeared to have been realized with the signing of the secret Treaty of London in 1915. Under the terms of this agreement, Russia was to obtain possession of the Straits, along with Constantinople, thus resolving the question in a most favorable manner. The treaty, however, was repudiated by the Russians following the 1917 revolution and thus never came into force. From a strictly legal point of view, the 1871 Pontus Treaty presumably remained in effect throughout the war.

While Tsarist Russia had been adversely affected during the war by Turkey's closing of the Straits, Soviet Russia was more directly threatened after the war by the opening of the Straits. According to Article 1 of the Mudros Armistice with Turkey, the Straits and the Bosphorus were to be opened and access provided to the Black Sea. Originally designed to enable the Allies to carry out the occupation and pacification of Turkey, the opening of the Straits also permitted the Allies to come to the aid of the anti-Bolshevik forces operating in the Caucasus and Crimea. In time, it also permitted the Allies to carry out more direct forms of intervention along Russia's southern flank.

In the oft-postponed Treaty of Sévres, signed in August 1920, the Allies sought in a variety of ways to prevent a repetition of the wartime situation. Indeed, all of the arms control measures included in the treaty were designed in one way or another to prevent the Straits from ever again being closed. Thus, the Turkish army was to be reduced to the level of a police force and the navy deprived of all offensive capability; the Straits were to be demilitarized and a permanent Allied occupation established. If these proved inadequate, the Allies were to have the right of military intervention, which was to be supplemented by numerous financial controls over the Turkish government. To guarantee the faithful execution of the terms, the Allies were to have the unlimited right to send control commissions to any part of Turkey at any time.

Negotiations At Lausanne

While the Allies at Lausanne were determined to uphold the principle that the Straits should never again be closed, their task was complicated by the fact that the policy alternatives available to them were far narrower in 1922 than they had been in 1919 and 1920. No longer was there any talk of disarming Turkey and the policy of Allied occupation had, by tacit consent, also been abandoned, as had the policy of direct military intervention. Thus, the Allies had to try to achieve their objectives through the two remaining policies available to them, i.e., through the terms relating to the right of transit and in those provisions affecting the demilitarization of the Straits. Even here the Allies were confronted with grave uncertainties, for there was no assurance that the Turks would accept the policy of demilitarization.

Allied policy had to take into consideration one additional complicating factor--that was the Soviet-Turkish treaty signed in 1921. Not only had the treaty provided for the expansion of trade between the two countries, but it had stated that it was the intention of the signatories to seek a solution to the Straits problem through an arrangement to be worked out by the Black Sea powers alone. While nothing further had been done to effectuate a Straits settlement, the question remained: would Turkey unite with Soviet Russia at Lausanne to keep non-littoral powers out of the Straits or would it seek an accommodation with the West?

The Russian position on the Straits had been made quite clear even prior to the arrival of the Soviet delegation at Lausanne. Although presented in terms more consonant with their revolutionary ideology, Soviet policy was designed principally to keep Britain out of the Black Sea. The intervention in the Caucasus and Crimea were for the Soviets simply harbingers of future Allied policy. Therefore, the Soviet position was quite simple: the Straits could be permanently open to the commerce of all nations, but they must be permanently closed to all foreign warships.³

At Lausanne, debate over the Straits began on December 4, following agreement on the Thracian frontier and the Aegean island, and continued through seven sessions until December 20.⁴ Important as these plenary sessions were in the negotiating process leading up to the final treaty, even more important were the technical discussions carried on between

Allied and Turkish experts. These discussions, ostensibly designed to resolve questions affecting Allied-Turkish relations, had as their consequence if not their purpose the effective isolation of the Russian delegation.

In spite of the support immediately given to the Allied policy recommendations by the American, Bulgarian, Yugoslav, Rumanian and Greek delegations--in direct opposition to the Russian proposals--the deliberations on the Straits proceeded quite slowly. This was mainly due to Ismet's policy of calculated procrastination and his subtle, if somewhat periphrastic efforts to use the fear of a Turkish-Russian alliance to evoke concessions from the Allies. Thus, though Turkey found the Allied proposals on the right of transit generally acceptable, only grudgingly did Ismet reveal his acceptance of demilitarization, a ploy which gained for the Turks extensive concessions.

What emerges as striking in the deliberations over arms control at Lausanne, whether on the right of transit or demilitarization, is that the objectives of the Allies had little to do with reducing tensions or preserving peace. The arms control provisions appeared to have as their main purpose the preservation of an existing military-strategic advantage. This was articulated in terms of a noble principle--that of upholding the equal right of commercial shipping to all "international waterways"--which permitted the Allies to reject charges that they were perpetuating their dominant influence in the area. But demilitarizing the Straits, the waterways would in practice be controlled by the largest sea Powers, and by exposing Constantinople to naval attack, Turkey would be effectively inhibited from making any inappropriate alliances while encouraged to faithfully carry out the treaty terms. That the Allied formula for assuring free access to commercial shipping would also expose Russia's Black Sea coasts to attack, as in 1856 and 1919-1920, was, according to the Allies, only coincidental. Whatever the ultimate purpose--whether to guarantee free access for commercial shipping or to control Turkish foreign and internal policies or to threaten the Soviet Union--the arms control provisions had only a tenuous relationship to policies of peace and conflict resolution.

Involved in the terms dealing with the right of transit was just one question relating to arms control: were warships to have the right of passage through the Straits in peace and war? The demilitarization provisions, by contrast, posed five questions to be resolved. What was to be the

territorial extent of the demilitarized zone? What was to be the coverage of the demilitarization provisions in the zone, as affecting military personnel, armaments, transportation, and communications? What was to be the method of supervising the execution of the terms, if any? How would Turkish security be guaranteed following the demilitarization of the Straits and the loss of her defensive capability? And, finally, was Turkey to be allowed to rearm the Straits in event of attack?

While reserving for later a more detailed examination of negotiations leading up to the final treaty, it might be useful at this point to summarize some aspects of the deliberations.

First, the Turks vigorously opposed the boundaries the Allies originally proposed for the demilitarized zone, which had included both shores of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus, all the islands in these waters and a large expanse of territory on the Asiatic side. During the course of the negotiations, Ismet proposed that the Sea of Marmora be excluded from the demilitarization restrictions and that military units be allowed at Constantinople and on the Gallipoli peninsula. In addition, he opposed extending the demilitarized zone on the Asiatic shores as far as that recommended by the Allies.

In the final terms, the Allies made several concessions, which, while not completely satisfying the Turks, were sufficient to promote agreement. The demand for the exclusion of the Sea of Marmora from the demilitarized zone was rejected by the Allies, but they agreed to release one island in the waters, Emir Ali. To balance this concession the Allies demanded--and the Turks agreed--to add an insignificant group of islands in the Aegean, the Rabbit Islands, to the demilitarized zone. While the demand for a Turkish garrison on Gallipoli was rejected, the Allies accepted a military force at Constantinople. Indeed, the force was revised upward, from 10,000 to 12,000 during the negotiations. Even more important, however, was the Allied agreement to reduce the size of the demilitarized zone on the Asiatic side of the Straits.

Second, the Turks did not challenge the Allied proposals to eliminate all fortifications within the demilitarized zone or to limit the armaments available to the police in the area to hand weapons. Except for their demand to station troops at Constantinople and on the Gallipoli peninsula, the Turks

never questioned the exclusion of all armed forces from the demilitarized zone. But the Turks did press for several amendments: they asked for the right to transport military troops through the demilitarized zone from one side of the Straits to the other, to recruit in the demilitarized zone, to maintain submarines in the Straits, to set up a communication system in the demilitarized zone and, lastly, to carry out aerial inspection of the demilitarization area.

On these points the Allies made extensive concessions; indeed, they granted to Turkey the essence of every demand. The final terms permitted Turkey to transport troops across the demilitarized zone, to recruit for the armed forces from within the zone, to maintain submarines in the Straits, to set up communication facilities in the zone and to survey the zone by balloon and aircraft.

Third, the Allied demand for inspection rights--to guarantee the faithful execution of the demilitarization terms--turned out to be the most contentious issue in the arms control negotiations. The Turks opposed the provision for inspection on practical and theoretical grounds. They maintained that it would be impossible to rearm the Straits clandestinely: the construction required for rearmament would be lengthy and could not go undetected; therefore, inspection was not needed. Equally, inspection was not desirable for it would undermine Turkey's sovereign status. Any curtailment of their sovereignty at that point in the national awakening of the country would conceivably jeopardize, the Turks argued, the acceptability of the treaty by the Turkish people.

The Turkish argument was skillful and, in the end, the Allies agreed. In the final treaty no formal control machinery was set up to supervise the execution of the arms control provisions.

Fourth, having accepted the Allied proposal for the demilitarization of the Straits, the Turks argued that this left the area vulnerable to external attack. Under the circumstance, the Turks maintained that the Allies, having insisted on demilitarization, should guarantee aid to Turkey in event the Straits were attacked. While the Allies recognized the relevance of the argument, they were reluctant to accede to the Turkish request. An Allied guarantee might involve them in an endless series of local conflicts.

Although the Turks persisted in their demand for a direct Allied guarantee, the western representatives resisted to the end. The final provision, therefore, while appearing to offer a concession to the Turks, was in essence nothing more than a restatement of Allied obligations under the League of Nations. Article 18 stated that if the security of the demilitarized zones became imperiled, the Allies would "meet this violation, attack or other act of war or threat of war, by all the means that the Council of the League of Nations may decide for this purpose".

Fifth, the Allies included an escape clause in each draft dealing with the Straits, stating that in case attacked Turkey would have the right to fortify the demilitarized zones. But as this might encourage Turkey to provoke a conflict in the hope of permanently terminating the restrictions, the Allies stipulated that as soon as peace was concluded the demilitarization provisions were to be reapplied. The Turkish delegation persistently sought to have this clause deleted, but to no avail. The final agreement included the escape clause, but it also included, in Article 18, the provision that as soon as the conflict was over, "the regime of the Straits as laid down by the terms of the present Convention shall again be strictly applied".

The First Phase--Turks Side With Russia. At the first session devoted to the Straits question, held on December 4, Lord Curzon, in accordance with established procedure, invited the Turkish delegation to present its position.⁵ Ismet did so briefly, limiting his remarks to a recapitulation of the relevant sections of the National Pact. The National Pact, formulated four years earlier by the Kemalists, included policy proposals on a wide variety of topics. Those points dealing with the Straits, however, had merely called for the "security of Constantinople" and a guarantee that the Sea of Marmora would be "sheltered from any attack". With these points secured, Turkey would "subscribe to any decision which may be taken by common agreement... with a view to insuring the opening of the Straits to world trade and to international communications".

As the Pact contained no reference to the passage of warships through the Straits or to demilitarization, which Ismet made no effort to clarify, Curzon was conspicuously displeased. He noted that the Allied invitation had raised the issue of demilitarization along with the proposal that the Straits be placed under some supervising body, like the

League of Nations. He thought Ismet should furnish his views on these matters.⁶

Unable to prod the Turkish delegation into revealing its position, Curzon turned to the Russian delegate, Chicherin, who displayed no such reluctance. While accepting the principle of free access into the Black Sea for commercial shipping, Chicherin proposed that the Straits be closed to all but Turkish warships and that Turkey be permitted to fortify the Straits zone. "The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus", he maintained, "must be permanently closed both in peace and war to warships, armed vessels and military aircraft of all countries except Turkey". He insisted further that the Turkish Government would "only be in a position to defend the Straits and the Sea of Marmora effectively against all attacks if it received express recognition of its right to fortify and arm its coast, to possess a war fleet and to apply to the defense of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora all the technical accessories of modern warfare". If the Straits were to be opened to foreign warships, this would, he complained, "confer a preponderant position on the strongest sea Power". Chicherin recalled that this arrangement had led, under the armistice provisions, to the Allied occupation of Odessa, Nikoliaef, Kherson, Sebastopol, Batum and other Black Sea ports and had permitted the Allies the facilities to "create" the armies of Denikin and Wrangel in the southern districts of Russia.⁷

The Rumanian delegate proposed a solution to the Straits question diametrically opposed to the formula outlined by Chicherin. Noting that Rumanian trade depended on free access through the Straits, he stated that his government could not agree on an arrangement which left control of the Dardanelles to one power. Therefore he proposed that, first, there should be absolute freedom of passage for both ships of commerce and ships of war, "without any restriction or limit;" second, the Straits zone should be demilitarized; third, the Black Sea should be "disarmed" and lastly, an international regime should be set up to administer the Straits, like that established for the Danube.⁸

The Bulgarian delegate, in presenting his government's position, outlined a third alternative. His formula for a Straits solution repeated the demand for an international administration of the Straits, but would have limited free access to the Black Sea only to merchant ships. He failed to second either the Rumanian proposal for the demilitarization

of the Straits or the disarmament of the Black Sea.⁹

With these several expressions on the record, Curzon summarized the discussion. Three schemes had been put forward; was the Turkish delegation going to adopt any one of these three, or put forward a fourth of its own?¹⁰ Again Ismet refused to give up his bargaining position and replied somewhat enigmatically that of the three proposals, the Russian formula "corresponded" most closely to the general view of the Turkish delegation. Curzon responded with ill-disguised (and perhaps well-rehearsed) anger. The Turkish refusal to commit themselves, he said, really amounted to "trifling with the conference". The refusal of the Turkish delegation to put forward their views was not treating the conference to the confidence and respect to which it was entitled. Therefore, the conference would have to adjourn, he noted, somewhat threateningly, while he and his colleagues "consider the situation and decide what measures to take".¹¹

As Ismet did not take the hint, the session adjourned inconclusively with the Turks holding the high cards. Thus, when the Allies withdrew they must have decided that it would be expedient not to press too hard, for when the conference reconvened the Allied proposals were a model of accommodation--at least as regards Turkish interests. The Rumanian suggestion for the disarmament of the Black Sea was forgotten, as was his demand for the unlimited right of warships to pass through the Straits.

Curzon opened the December 6 session with a detailed reply to the Russian proposals.¹² These proposals, he noted, would reestablish the arrangement as it existed prior to the war, whereby the Straits were closed to all warships. The only modification the Russians suggested in the 1871 treaty terms was that Turkish warships alone would have the right of passage through the Straits. This would give Turkey unrestricted control over the Straits and Russia predominance over the Black Sea. He noted that the Russian delegate had maintained that the opening of the Straits to warships would be to the advantage of the strongest naval power. But, he continued, Chicherin failed to mention that "the closing of the Black Sea would place the other littoral countries at the mercy of the littoral Power possessing the strongest land forces, in other words Russia herself".

Curzon then outlined the Allied plan which was set forth in two draft conventions, one dealing with the right of transit and the other dealing with the demilitarization of the Straits zone.¹³ The formula which the Allies advanced for control of warships passing through the Straits consisted of four main propositions, none of which were to be significantly altered during the remainder of the conference despite Russian opposition. 1) The total force any one power could send through the Straits was not to be greater than that of the most powerful of the Black Sea littoral powers. 2) In event the Black Sea littoral powers agreed to demilitarize the Black Sea, the non-littoral powers could send into the waters a force of three ships, "not more than one of which could be a vessel exceeding 10,000 tons". 3) If war broke out in the area and Turkey was a neutral, the above restrictions were not to apply for "these limitations will not be applicable to any belligerent Power to the prejudice of its belligerent rights in the Black Sea". 4) If Turkey were a belligerent, only neutral warships would have the right of free passage; that is, Turkey could close the Straits only to enemy craft and only if engaged in hostilities.

In the Allied draft on demilitarization the affected zone was precisely delineated, the level of demilitarization was exactly defined, a military force at Constantinople was formally accepted for 10,000 men and the escape clause was duly included, as was the provision for a return to the status quo ante bellum as soon as peace was concluded.

Though no provision for inspection or supervision was embodied in this first draft, Curzon announced that this would be contained in the provisions for an international commission which would administer the Straits. This international commission would, Curzon said, "supervise and inspect the demilitarization of the land zones" as well as assume the responsibilities for carrying out the technical services associated with keeping the Straits open. As for a guarantee, Curzon announced that he was "ready to examine /the proposal/ with the Turkish jurists". Whether he sincerely contemplated a guarantee to Turkey or was merely baiting the hook is difficult to say. Once, however, Turkey broke with Russia and accepted the Allied demilitarization Curzon suddenly lost his enthusiasm for the idea.

By way of indicating Allied solidarity, Curzon's long statement was followed by a brief pronouncement from Barrere indicating French adherence to the draft proposal and a

similar statement from the Italian delegate. They were supported by the United States observer, Childs. As this was one of the few times that the American position was advanced in detail at the conference, it might be useful to analyze it, for he presented a rather novel argument implying at the same time support of both naval disarmament and armament.

Childs' first premise was that "the freedom of the Black Sea is to be gained only by disarmament". His second was that this did not mean that warships should be excluded from the Black Sea; quite the contrary, it meant that warships should not be excluded. "We...in common with every commercial nation", he noted, "wish access to every free body of water in the world, and we will not be satisfied if our ships of war may not pursue their peaceful errands wherever our citizens and ships may go". Thus the Black Sea should be disarmed but at the same time open to all warships. That Childs found nothing inconsistent in this stemmed from his view of warships in general. "Ships of war", he maintained, "are not necessarily agents of destruction; on the contrary they may be agents of preservation and serve good and peaceful ends in the prevention of disorder and the maintenance of peace." While the United States stood for naval disarmament, he acknowledged that it also favored naval armament for peaceful purposes. "No nation has gone farther than the United States in policies of naval disarmament;" but, he pointed out, "no nation would be more ready to uphold the good sense of maintaining sufficient naval force to act as police of the free seas, to protect its citizens and their ships wherever they might be, to suppress piracy and other menaces, and to act at times for the public good and to give relief to suffering."

All eyes now turned to Ismet Pasha. But again he refused to commit himself. In order to "express a considered opinion" on the various proposals made, he stated that he required time to study them. Chicherin needed no such time and demonstrated that the subtle art of irony was not monopolized by the senior British delegate. The Russian proposal, Chicherin reminded Curzon, was actually "in the best tradition of British conservatism." That tradition, as the senior British diplomat surely recalled, sought historically to establish a partition between the Russian and British spheres of influence: "this is what we now propose to do--laying the foundations of this wall on the

freedom and sovereignty of the Turkish people." To the American delegate, he announced his support of the Washington Conference, "to which, unfortunately, /Russia/ was not invited." But the Allied proposals would mean "the complete collapse of the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty." By opening the Straits to permit military access to the Black Sea, Russia would be forced, he concluded, to "arm, arm, arm."

Given the Turkish desire for time, the conference adjourned--again rather inconclusively--for two days. Although almost all of the delegates had endorsed the Allied draft, the Turks were still in a good bargaining position. The threat of an alliance with Russia was still present and no commitments had been made.

The Second Phase--Turks Side With Allies. When the conference next convened, on December 8, the Turks were ready to negotiate.¹⁴ In announcing his provisional acceptance of the Allied proposals, Ismet revealed that the Turks were ready to abandon Russia--provided that certain conditions were met. These conditions were advanced on two levels, the first dealt with general principles and the second with specific proposals for change in the Allied draft. Of the general principles there was only one contentious issue, that related to the Turkish demand for "a guarantee securing the Straits, Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora against any surprise attack by land or sea."

Turkish insistence on a security guarantee stemmed from their appraisal of demilitarization. Not only would demilitarization expose their capital, Constantinople, to attack but, they argued, it would actually increase the prospects of war rather than reduce them. "The non-fortification of the Straits," Ismet noted, "amounts to leaving the most vulnerable and important districts of Turkey defenseless and at the mercy of a sudden attack." No other power was deprived of the right to defend its capital, yet Turkey would be "constantly exposed to the danger of her capital being suddenly destroyed by a foreign fleet or occupied by foreign troops."

Even more important was Ismet's novel argument that the demilitarization of the Straits would increase the chances of war. "The strategic importance of the Straits is so great," he stated, "that any Mediterranean or Black Sea Power which conquered them would secure an overwhelming advantage as soon as war broke out." It would therefore be

"only natural" that as soon as the threat of war arose between a Black Sea and Mediterranean state, "each side would try to obtain possession of the Straits as quickly as possible." The first result of this would be "to provoke a sudden war over a dispute which might have been settled without recourse to war." And Turkey would inevitably be drawn into all of these conflicts as a result of having her territory attacked. "These considerations," Ismet concluded, "show that the state of things created by demilitarizing the Straits would render peace illusory between the Black Sea and Mediterranean States on the one hand and Turkey on the other." Unless, of course, the Straits were guaranteed directly by the Allies.

Having outlined his general objections, Ismet turned to the two draft conventions which the Allies had presented at the previous session and enumerated seven specific recommendations for change. Focusing on the arms control provisions of the draft conventions, these points were summarized by Ismet as follows:

- 1) The term 'Straits' which is employed in the Allied proposal must not comprise the Sea of Marmora, since defensive preparations on the shores of that sea though exercising no influence on the freedom of passage for ships, are necessary for the defenses of Anatolia and Thrace.
- 2) As the railway line constitutes an important means of connection between Anatolia and Thrace, and as Constantinople possesses a garrison, it is useless to have a demilitarized zone around the Bosphorus. It will be sufficient to indicate that there should be no land or sea fortifications on either shore.
- 3) It is proposed to prohibit movements of troops in the demilitarized zones; but these movements must be allowed, because the zones in question connect the two parts of the country.
- 4) With a view to defending the shores of the Sea of Marmora by means of a fleet, Turkey needs to maintain arsenals and other naval establishments at Constantinople and in the Straits.
- 5) The area of the demilitarized zones is too extensive.

6) As regards the four islands situated near the Straits, Turkish sovereignty must be recognized and affirmed over Imbros, Tenedos, and Samothrace, and Lemnos should be declared autonomous.

7) A minimum means of defense should be permitted on the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to protect it against a surprise attack.

Ismet's observations were followed by a new statement from Chicherin. Against the claim that international control and demilitarization were necessary to freedom of passage through the Straits, he pointed out that neither the Panama nor the Suez canal was demilitarized or controlled by an international control commission. To Allied insistence on the right of passage for warships, Chicherin responded that "You do not consolidate peace by piling up armed forces; this was a reproach frequently levelled against Bismarck by the statesmen of the inviting Powers of today. Peace is consolidated by the separation of conflicting forces." The Allied proposal that the forces maintained by each Power in the Black Sea would not exceed that of the strongest fleet of the littoral states meant that "the combined forces of the inviting Powers will...therefore be three times as strong as that of any one Black Sea Power," and was, consequently, a new indication that the Allies really aimed at creating a system which would "tie Russia's hands and organize war in the Straits."

Chicherin's statement evoked an immediate response from Curzon, who quickly elicited the support of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece for the Allied proposals. He then adjourned the meeting in order to have time to study the Turkish conditions. Adjournment seemed all the more desirable, he remarked with glee, "since M. Chicherin's speech showed that the Turkish statement was as great a surprise to the Russian delegation as to everyone else."

Following a short adjournment, the conference met again.¹⁵ Its first order of business was the Allied response to the Turkish proposals. Undertaken by Curzon, this reply was addressed first to the general conditions advanced by Ismet. With regard to the proposed guarantee against surprise attack, Curzon hedged, saying merely that the question was "one well worthy of examination." Turning to the specific Turkish recommendations, Curzon announced that the Allied refused to exclude the Sea of Marmora from the Straits, but added that "it ought to be quite possible

to arrange for the defense within certain limits--that would constitute no menace to the right of free passage--of the ports or railroads referred to, and this is a matter which our experts will be quite willing to discuss with the Turkish experts." He insisted on the demilitarized zone at the Bosphorus, but thought "it may be possible to make certain modifications in the case of Constantinople." He had no objection to the transit of troops in the demilitarized zones. He believed that the question of arsenals was "well worthy of attention," while that of the extent of the demilitarized zones was "a matter for legitimate discussion". The four islands mentioned by the Turks should, he felt, "be demilitarized" but he would not question the sovereignty of Lemnos and Samothrace. Since the Allied experts did not know exactly what the Turks had meant by "a minimum means of defense" on Gallipoli, he thought that this should "be discussed between them in a friendly spirit".

To resolve these points of difference it was proposed that the Allies and the Turks meet separately and then report back to the full commission. Sensing an effort to isolate the Russian delegation, Chicherin demanded that they take part in the entire discussion of the Straits and the Black Sea. Curzon answered that he "certainly had no desire to exclude" them, but that many of the questions "concerned Turkey alone, and Russia had nothing whatever to do with them". Assured that the discussions between the experts were not to result in the drafting of treaty clauses, Chicherin did not insist and the meeting was adjourned.

The Commission as a whole did not meet again for ten days. The examination of the Straits problem by Turkish and Allied experts was, however, pursued during the interim. Indeed, it became apparent that Turkey and the Allies were, through their "technical" discussions, drafting the final result, and then undertook his own discussions with the Turks. The Russians hoped to obtain Turkish support for an amendment to the Allied formula on the right of transit whereby the passage of warships would be limited to one-third that of the strongest Black Sea power. Ismet refused to commit himself, saying that concessions had to be made toward the Allies.¹⁶

When the commission reconvened again on December 18 it was primarily for the purpose of discussing a new Allied draft.¹⁷ More accurately, the Allies had prepared four separate

draft conventions dealing with a) the right of transit, b) demilitarization of the Straits, c) a Straits Commission and d) a guarantee for the military security of the Straits and Constantinople.¹⁸

In presenting the new Allied drafts, Curzon outlined the changes which had been introduced since the first drafts were submitted on December 6. On the right of transit, Curzon noted that the Allies had accepted a modification "to the advantage of the Black Sea Powers". Although he did not elaborate, he was referring to the modification regulating the right of nonlittoral powers to send warships into the Black Sea. The original draft provided that the maximum force any one power could send through the Straits was not to exceed that of the most powerful Black Sea power, but that in event the Black Sea powers all disarmed the non-littoral powers still had a right to send three warships into the Straits only one of which could be more than 10,000 tons. In the revised draft the original formula was retained, as was the right to send three warships into the Black Sea "at all times and under all circumstances," but the Allies agreed that none of the ships was to be more than 10,000 tons.

Referring to the changes in the demilitarization provisions, Curzon noted that the Allies had reduced the demilitarization zone in several places and had released Emir Ali from the demilitarization provisions, while adding Rabbitt Island to the demilitarization zone. The Allies permitted the transit of troops across the demilitarization zone and accepted Turkey's request for a system of observation and communication in the zone. The Turkish fleet obtained the right to navigate and anchor in the waters of the Straits and the garrison at Constantinople was increased from 10,000 to 12,000.

The proposed constitution of the Straits Commission had only one controversial feature--it was given, under the Allied draft, the duty "to see that the provisions relating to freedom of passage and the special measures prescribed in articles (limitation and demilitarization of warships) are duly carried out." While the reference to "demilitarization of warships" was ambiguous, the intent was clear: the Straits Commission was to have the right of supervision and inspection.

The Allied proposal for a guarantee, though falling short of the original Turkish request, was a concession--one which would be withdrawn before the final treaty. The Allies agreed that if the security of the Straits or the demilitarized zone were imperiled, they would "at once apply, either individually or in combination, to the Council of the League of Nations, in order to obtain a decision as to the measures to be taken". They agreed that the Straits Commission was also to have the right to bring a complaint before the Council. While these obligations were a re-statement of existing responsibilities under the League, the article stated that if unanimity was not reached on the Council, "each of the high contracting parties will be entitled to take individually such measures as a two-thirds majority of the council may approve". This was only a permissive arrangement but it did take into account the possibility that the Council might be unable to reach a unanimous decision--a distinction which was not to be made in the final draft.

Despite the many concessions, Ismet was still not satisfied and repeated his demand for the two amendments which the Allies had not supported. The term "Straits", he again insisted, must not include the sea of Marmora, which would have meant that the demilitarization provisions were not to apply between the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. He repeated his opposition to the transfer of Samothrace, Imbros and Tenedos to Greece. These islands, he noted, were "an integral part of the Dardanelles, /and/ could not on any account be placed under the sovereignty of a foreign Power". Turning to the proposals dealing with the Straits Commission, Ismet opposed giving the Commission any power to supervise the demilitarization clauses. "The Commission should concern itself", he maintained, "solely with the question of transit through the Straits, and abstain from trespassing on matters within the province of the sovereignty of the Turkish State". And his impression of the guarantee was negative; it was necessary for the Powers themselves to pledge support.

The Turks had other objections to the Allied drafts, which they submitted under the heading "Modifications Proposed by the Turkish Delegation".¹⁹ They raised two issues in this document, one old and one new. The older issue concerned the garrison on the Gallipoli peninsula which Ismet had proposed and the Allies had rejected. Their written request of December 18, was more specific: they

asked that the Turkish government be permitted to "maintain in the Gallipoli Peninsula a force of 5,000 men for the defense of the Aegean littoral". The new issue referred to the escape clause with its status quo ante bellum reservation. Although the Turks had raised no objection to this provision before, their proposed modification requested that the entire clause be eliminated. The effect, if not the purpose, of this modification would have enabled Turkey to rearm the Straits in a war in which the Straits were threatened, no matter how the war started. Of a more technical nature, the Turks asked permission to set up searchlights in the demilitarized zone and to employ airplanes and balloons to survey the zone. They also proposed that the term "submarine engines of war," proscribed under the Allied proposals, not be taken to mean submarines.

Chicherin, while giving a nod to the Turkish objections, was now more concerned with defending the Russian position. The new Allied draft revealed, he stated, "no effort whatever to reconcile the proposals with Russia's vital interests"; on the contrary, they confirmed the impression that the scheme was primarily "directed against Russia". Having been deprived of the opportunity to take part in the drafting of the treaty terms, the only way left open to the Russian delegation, he stated, was to present a counter-proposal.

The counter-proposal contained few surprises. In general, it sought to establish the principle of a mare clausum for all warships at all times. Only Turkey--within whose boundaries the Straits were located--could send warships through the Dardanelles; and only Turkey could authorize exceptions to this rule. Thus, the Russian draft provided for freedom of passage to all merchant ships and stipulated that the Straits were to be "closed to the war vessels, including submarines, of all fleets, except that of Turkey." It set the same prohibition for military aircraft: only the Turkish air force could fly over the Straits. Turkey would be given some discretionary power, but under quite narrowly circumscribed conditions. "In very exceptional cases", the draft read, "and for special definite purposes", the Turkish government could authorize passage through the Straits in both directions by light warships, excluding submarines, of any flag, "but on no account with a military object".

The Russian draft contained the same restrictions for wartime, whether Turkey was neutral or belligerent. It stipulated that in time of war, Turkey being neutral, commercial ships would have free access, but the waters would remain closed to the warships and military aircraft of all belligerents and neutrals. No changes in this general principle were provided in case Turkey became involved in a war. On the problem of guarantees, the only provision included in the Russian draft was that authorizing the right of self-defense. Thus, it stipulated that Turkey could take "all the necessary measures" to safeguard her sovereignty and "to enforce the principle of closure of the Straits to warships and military aircraft". This included the right to fortify the Straits, "free from any restrictions", lay mines, construct military roads and railways, maintain military, naval and airbases, with an unlimited force assigned to these facilities. While the Russians provided for an international Straits commission in their draft, its jurisdiction was to be limited to that of providing "for the needs of commercial shipping". No supervisory or control machinery of any kind was included.²⁰

Curzon's rebuttal to the Turkish and Russian declarations was a model of controlled exasperation.²¹ The Russian draft he summarily and categorically rejected. "It was impossible", he said "to accept it, to reconcile it with the Allied scheme, or to find in it a point of contact between the two; the Allied Powers had therefore no alternative but to reject it." Turning to the Turkish "proposed modifications", Curzon noted that they "contained much more than modifications of the Allied scheme, and that, if ...accepted, the Allied proposals would be almost completely destroyed". The continuing effort to remove the Sea of Marmora from the Straits had no geographic or historic meaning; it was inadmissible. "The Allies had reached the limit of concession in this respect", he stated.

The same fate greeted most of the other Turkish proposals, all of which, Curzon pointed out several times, had been repeatedly discussed by experts on both sides. Thus, the demand for searchlights in the demilitarized zone was rejected as was the request to maintain a force of 5,000 on the Gallipoli peninsula. The Turkish opposition to the transfer of Samothrace and Lemnos to Greek possession was not supported by the Allies and the attempt to eliminate the article with the escape clause was rebuffed as well. Curzon noted that this article had to be maintained "because a case might arise in which Turkey, having picked a quarrel

or got involved in some petty war, might take advantage of the situation to modify the state of demilitarization".

The Allies did accept two of the modifications. The first dealt with the expression "submarine engines of war" and the second involved the right of overflight and surveyance in the demilitarized area. Curzon announced that the Allies agreed that the forbidding of "submarine engines of war" was not to mean that submarines were to be forbidden access in the Straits. And he indicated that the Turks could survey by air the demilitarized waters and land areas.

Turning to the question of the Straits Commission, Curzon noted that he could merely repeat that the Allies attached "such great importance" to its having the right of inspection "that they could not give way in the matter". As for the security guarantee, he announced that the Allies had all consulted their respective Governments several times on the matter, and that "no stronger or further guarantee could possibly be given by them".

In responding to Curzon, Ismet challenged the Allied plan to give the Straits Commission inspection and supervisory functions. He stated that there was "no occasion to place the demilitarization of the Straits under the supervision of the commission, since any actions which may take place in contravention of these undertakings must necessarily be performed in the Straits and under observation by air and by sea, and cannot therefore in any circumstances pass unnoticed". Further, the supervision of the demilitarization clauses "by a commission set up in or near Constantinople would be incompatible with the sovereignty of Turkey".

With regard to the guarantee, he repeated that the pledge "would be far more efficacious if the guaranteeing Powers undertook individually and collectively to secure that the inviolability of the regions in question should be respected". He noted that under the Allied plan the response to an attack would involve "formalities entailing a more or less prolonged delay", and there was always the risk of the decision "being rendered nugatory by one of the Powers represented on the council refusing its consent--in which case the contracting parties would be released from any obligation whatever". In this case, "the Powers would have an entirely optional right to take individually such measures as might be decided only by a two-thirds majority, a majority, moreover, which might not come into existence at all". He therefore concluded that the Allied arrangement was

"not altogether calculated to furnish an adequate guarantee".

Ismet's statement was followed by a lengthy speech by Chicherin, which repeated the objections he had raised in earlier sessions. He found no support for his position, however, as the delegates from Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria favored the Allied proposal. Utilizing this cushion, Curzon reiterated that "the Allies had reached the limit of concession and that further discussion would be fruitless". He was, therefore, "disposed to consider any further meeting unnecessary". Out of consideration for the Turkish delegation, however, he did agree to one more meeting to be held the following afternoon.

At this session, Ismet abandoned some of his claims of the previous days, but clung to others.²² He repeated his demand for a garrison on Gallipoli and rejected the Allied plan to authorize the Straits Commission to carry out supervisory functions, but abandoned the claim to the Aegean islands and the elimination of the escape clause.

Curzon responded to these claims in turn. On the question of the Gallipoli garrison he was unyielding on principle but flexible in practice: having accepted demilitarization of Gallipoli in principle it would be inconsistent to permit a military force there. "Surely Ismet Pasha would recognize the fundamental contradiction between the conception of a demilitarized zone and the existence of a large force inside it." But in practice, the Turks should not forget that they were permitted to maintain a gendarmerie force on the peninsula. "The difference between troops and gendarmerie was that...the former had a full equipment of guns, which would be a menace to the freedom of the Straits, and the latter had not." Since the Turkish gendarmerie included both cavalry and infantry, Curzon stressed that the gendarmerie could be considered as "practically the same as troops without heavy guns."

On the question of supervision, Curzon was willing to admit that there "might well be some force? in the Turkish contention. Possibly the commission was being asked to undertake "functions outside its proper sphere." He noted that the Allies had been reexamining the question and that they "might be able to put before the Turkish delegation some suggestions later on which would meet the difficulty and enable them to maintain the principle without impugning the sovereignty or wounding the feelings of the Turkish

Government." As a matter of fact, the Allies were unable to find a solution which would do all these things, and ended up by simply abandoning the policy of supervision and inspection.

The final draft of the Straits Convention was presented to the commission a little over five weeks later, on February 1, 1923.²³ Ismet accepted it, although he was still unhappy over the failure to include a force of 5,000 men for Gallipoli. Chicherin, on the other hand, bitterly opposed it and threatened not to sign the document, a threat which he eventually carried out at the final ceremonies.

Chapter 11 -- Footnotes

¹ For a review of the Lausanne Conference, see Harold Nicholson, Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925 (1939), especially chapter X-XI; Joseph Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 2 vols. (1952), chapters XVIII-XX; Richard Washburn Child, A Diplomat Looks at Europe (1925), especially chapters IX; John A. De Novo American Interests and Policies in the Middle East (1963) Chapters 4-5; H.W.V. Temperley (ed), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, 6 vols. (1920-1924), VI, Pt. I; Karl G. Larew, "The Policies of the Western Powers Towards the Problem of the Turkish Straits," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Yale University, 1963), chapter X; Harry Howard, The Partition of Turkey, a Diplomatic History (1931); Laura Madge Adkisson, "Great Britain and the Kemalist Movement for Turkish Independence," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Texas, 1958); Altemur Kilic, Turkey and the World (1959); P.H. Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne," in G.A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, The Diplomats, 1919-1939 (1953); Joseph Grew, "The Peace Conference of Lausanne, 1922-1923," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society (February, 1954); Philip Brown, "From Sevres to Lausanne," American Journal of International Law (January, 1924); Edgar Turlington, "The Settlement of Lausanne," American Journal of International Law (October, 1924).

² David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (1939), II, 807.

³ See Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (1951-1953), I, 345; and X.J. Eudin and H.H. Fisher, Soviet Union and the West, 1920-1927 (1957), pp. 141-142.

⁴ Proceedings of the conference can be found in Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923, Records of Proceeding and Draft Terms of Peace (1923), Cmd. 1814; hereafter cited as Lausanne Conference.

⁵ Reference to the December 4 session are from Ibid, pp. 125-136.

⁶ Ibid., p. 128.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 128-31.

- 8 Ibid., p. 131.
- 9 Ibid., p. 132.
- 10 Ibid., pp. 133-134.
- 11 Ibid., p. 135.
- 12 The references to the December 6 sessions are from Ibid., pp. 136-150.
- 13 The first draft of these conventions is in Ibid., pp. 151, 154.
- 14 The references to the December 8 session are from Ibid., pp. 154-165.
- 15 Ibid., pp. 167-173.
- 16 Howard, The Partition of Turkey, pp. 288-289.
- 17 References to the December 18 session are from Lausanne Conference, pp. 228-243.
- 18 These draft conventions are found, respectively, in Ibid., pp. 243-246; 246-248; 248-249; 249-250.
- 19 Ibid., pp. 253-260.
- 20 Ibid., pp. 253-260.
- 21 References to the December 19 session are from Ibid., pp. 260-277.
- 22 References to the December 20 session are from Ibid., pp. 278-288.
- 23 Ibid., pp. 249-257; the final draft of the Straits Convention is in Ibid., pp. 772-785.

Chapter 12

FROM LAUSANNE TO MONTREUX, 1923-1936

The various conventions which made up the Treaty of Lausanne were signed--without Soviet participation--on July 24, 1923, although they did not enter into force for another year.¹ Indeed, it was not until the fall of 1924 that the final ratification was deposited. As a result, the treaty did not become legally binding until August 6, 1924.

Negotiated as they were in late 1922, in the aftermath of important Turkish military victories, the arms control provisions included in the Lausanne agreements differed markedly not only from those set forth in the unratified Treaty of Peace signed in 1920 at Sévres, but also from the terms included in the earlier peace treaties with Germany, Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria. Not only did the Turkish delegation succeed at Lausanne in reducing the number of arms control provisions included in the peace settlement from what they had been at Sévres, but perhaps more important the Turks were able to gain acceptance of the principle that the restrictions were to be reciprocally binding on all parties to the agreement and not, as before, to be unilaterally imposed on Turkey alone.

In its final form, the Treaty of Lausanne contained six important concessions in its arms control provisions:

1) No disarmament provisions were included in the Lausanne agreement. Unlike the earlier peace settlements with Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, the Treaty of Lausanne did not contain any terms relating to the size of the Turkish army, the number of ships permitted the Turkish navy or the number and calibre of weapons allowed the military forces. This was also in striking contrast to the Treaty of Sévres, which--patterned as it was after the earlier settlements--had included detailed disarmament provisions

in its military sections. These terms called for the reduction of the Turkish army to a force not to exceed 50,000 officers and men and the establishment of a navy limited to seven sloops and six torpedo boats. No military or naval aircraft was to be permitted and the only weapons authorized for the Turkish army were to be small arms, with artillery specifically prohibited. Although the Allies repeatedly indicated during the war that Turkish militarism was to be suppressed like Prussian militarism and had included disarmament provisions in all of their peace offers during 1921 and early 1922, at the Lausanne conference all references to Turkish disarmament were quietly forgotten.

2) In the 1923 provisions relating to the demilitarization of the Straits, the zone affected was smaller in size and the restrictions were fewer in number than in the earlier unratified treaty. The Treaty of Sévres had defined the demilitarized zone as including the Gallipoli peninsula, both shores of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus and all the islands located in the Sea of Marmora. The western boundary extended to the Chatalja line, which included the entire area of that small piece of Thrace left to Turkey on the western shores of the Dardanelles; the zone on the Asiatic side extended down to the Smyrna district. In the final terms agreed upon at Lausanne, one of the islands in the Sea of Marmora, Emir Ali, was excluded from the demilitarization provisions and the zone on the Asiatic side was considerably reduced.

But more important than the modifications in the size of the demilitarized zone were the changes in the various arms control provisions. Under the Treaty of Sévres, not only were all Turkish troops to be prohibited access to the demilitarized zone and all fortifications destroyed, but all railways and roads suitable for bringing up mobile artillery were to be broken up. In addition, the Turks were to be deprived of the right to erect wireless telegraph stations within the demilitarized zone. The terms of the Lausanne agreement, in contrast, were limited mainly to defortification and restrictions on the stationing of military personnel in the demilitarized zone. Thus, Article 6 of the Straits Convention stated that "there shall exist, in the demilitarized zones and islands no fortifications, no permanent artillery organization, no submarine engines of war, other than submarine vessels, no military aerial organization and no naval base." The second paragraph notes that

"no armed forces shall be stationed in the demilitarized zones and islands except the police and gendarmerie forces necessary for the maintenance of order; the armament of the forces will be composed only of revolvers, swords, rifles and four Lewis guns per hundred men, and will exclude any artillery."

While these provisions were not unlike those previously set forth in the Treaty of Sevres, the Lausanne agreement did not require the destruction of railways or roads in the area and specifically authorized Turkey to erect in the demilitarized zones "any system of observation and communications, both telegraphic, telephonic and visual." In addition, Turkey obtained the right "to transport her armed forces through the demilitarized zones and the islands of Turkish territory, as well as through their territorial waters, where the Turkish fleet will have the right to anchor." Under the Lausanne terms Turkey obtained control over those police and gendarmerie forces permitted in the demilitarized zones. By the terms of the Sevres treaty, these police forces were to be placed under the jurisdiction of the commander of the Allied forces in the area.

The demilitarization terms were further modified by granting to Turkey "the right to observe by means of aeroplanes or balloons both the surface and the bottom of the sea." And Turkish airplanes were "always to be able to fly over the waters of the Straits and the demilitarized zones of Turkish territory," and were to have "full freedom to alight therein either on land or on sea."

Of minor importance, but a modification nonetheless, was the right granted to Turkey to take conscripts from the demilitarized zones and to transport the recruits outside the zone for training purposes. More important was the provision giving Turkey the right to keep submarines in the demilitarized waters.² The agreement contained one final concession of great psychological, if not actual military importance--that authorizing Turkey to maintain a garrison of 12,000 men at Constantinople, which was located within the demilitarized zone.

3) Under the terms of the Lausanne treaty, the demilitarization restrictions were to be reciprocally binding on all parties. This policy differed not only from the arrangement established at Sevres, but also from the demilitarization provisions in the Versailles treaty. In both of these

earlier treaties--the one dealing with the Rhineland and the other with the Straits zone--demilitarization was imposed as a unilateral restriction, not binding on the Allies. Thus, in the terms relating to the Rhineland, the Germans were prohibited from maintaining any military forces in the area, but the Allies were not equally inhibited by the same provision, at least for the fifteen years of the Allied occupation.

The Treaty of Sévres also established the right of Allied occupation within the "demilitarized" zone, which differed from the Rhineland provisions only in that no time limit was set. Thus, while the Turks were to be prohibited from stationing military forces in or transporting them through the demilitarized zones, the Allies reserved for themselves all occupation rights. These included not only the right to station military personnel in the area, with unlimited quantities of armaments, but also the right to construct wireless stations and other communication networks, a right which had been denied to the Turks. At Lausanne, however, these unilateral rights associated with occupation were left out of the agreement. By excluding all reference to Allied occupation, the demilitarization provisions of the Lausanne treaty imposed for the first time reciprocal restraints on all parties to the agreement.

4) The Lausanne agreement excluded all right of Allied military intervention. This general right had been included in both the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Sévres as part of their enforcement arrangements. In the treaty with Germany, the Allies were to have the right of military intervention, even after the Allied occupation forces had been withdrawn, if Germany failed to fulfill on time a wide variety of financial and military obligations. In the Treaty of Sévres, the Straits Commission could call in Allied forces if in its judgment the treaty terms were violated by Turkey or threatened by any outside power.

Under the Lausanne agreement, however, enforcement of treaty violations was not to be carried out by the Allies acting on their own but by the League Council. Thus, Article 18 of the Straits Convention stated that if the freedom of navigation of the Straits or the security of the demilitarized zones should be imperilled by a violation of the provisions of the treaty, this violation would be met "by all the means that the Council of the League of Nations may decide for this purpose."

5) No provision for inspection or supervision of treaty terms was included in the Lausanne settlement. This was in marked contrast to the earlier peace treaties which established external control machinery to supervise the execution of the disarmament and demilitarization terms. Thus, in the Versailles treaty Inter-Allied Commissions of Control were established to supervise the military, naval and aerial terms and a High Commission was given the responsibility for supervising the execution of the demilitarization provisions in the Rhineland. A similar Commission was set up in the Saar and Control Commissions were likewise established to supervise the military clauses in the treaties with Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria. Under the terms of the Treaty of Sévres, the Allies were granted the right to send Control Commissions to any part of the Ottoman Empire as part of their responsibilities for assuring the faithful execution of the disarmament and demilitarizations terms of the treaty.

The Lausanne treaty retained the provision for the Straits Commission, but deprived it of its one military function--that of calling for Allied military intervention if in its judgment the security of the Straits was threatened. But more significant was the fact that Turkey succeeded at Lausanne in blocking all attempts to reinsert control provisions in the final peace settlement. Thus, under the completed terms of the treaty no agency was set up to supervise the execution of the demilitarization provisions.

6) The Lausanne settlement placed a limited restriction on the right of warships to pass through the Straits. Although the limitation was slight, and subject to sufficient reservations so as to permit the Allies to maintain naval supremacy in the Black Sea, it did mark a shift from the position taken in the earlier unratified peace treaty. Under the Sévres treaty, no restrictions were placed on the number of warships which could pass through the Straits. This principle--calling for the complete opening of the Straits--was set forth in Article 37, which provided that "The navigation of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, shall in future be open both in peace and war to every vessel of commerce or of war and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag. These waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any belligerent right be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within them, unless in

pursuance of a decision of the Council of the League of Nations."

This right of free passage to warships was amended at Lausanne to read that the maximum force any one Power could send through the Straits into the Black Sea was not to be greater than that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral powers. This formula meant in practice that each of the Allies could send into the Black Sea a force equal to that of Russia and guarantee naval supremacy in that area. Several additional reservations were inserted in the final agreement. One reservation was added to take into account the possible contingency that all the Black Sea powers might disarm their naval forces in the Black Sea or simply not station any naval craft in the waters. Under the original formula this would mean that the non-littoral powers - i.e. the Allies would not be able to send any warships into the Black Sea, or only that amount maintained by the strongest Black Sea power. To get around this contingency, the treaty provided that the non-littoral powers reserved to themselves "the right to send into the Black Sea, at all times and under all circumstances, a force of not more than three ships, of which no individual ship shall exceed 10,000 tons." In effect, then, each of the Allied Powers could send a naval force of 30,000 tons into the Black Sea even if Russia totally disarmed her Black Sea fleet. A second reservation stated that if any of the Allies became engaged in hostilities not involving Turkey, e.g., in a war with Russia, there would be no restrictions on the number of warships which they could send through the Straits. This was defined more diplomatically by stating that none of the above limitations would be applicable "to any belligerent Power to the prejudice of its belligerent rights in the Black Sea."

Implementation of the Lausanne Treaty

As no permanent enforcement machinery had been set up for the supervision of the demilitarization terms, the implementation of the Lausanne arms control provisions required only a limited number of technical arrangements. Indeed, only two preconditions had been established for the effectuation of the demilitarization provisions--that of defining the precise boundaries of the demilitarized zones and the verification of the destruction of existing fortifications within the defined zones. Once these conditions had been established and verified, the demilitarization terms

were to be self-enforcing, that is, the countries affected--Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria--were to supervise their own actions and their own continued fulfillment of the terms. In the provisions limiting the right of warships to pass through the Straits, the only precondition to be settled, aside from the setting up of a Straits Commission, was of an informational nature, i.e., the size of the largest Black Sea fleet had to be determined. This information was to serve, according to the Straits Convention, as the basis for setting the naval tonnage limits of the non-littoral powers.

To carry out the first set of obligations, a Commission of four was established which consisted of representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Turkey. According to the treaty, this Commission was to meet within fifteen days of the coming into force of the treaty "to determine on the spot the boundaries of the demilitarized zones."³ Convened in the fall of 1924, the Commission was immediately hampered by internal dissension. Although no official complaints were ever presented, in January 1925, the Turkish press reported a rumor to the effect that the Commission was so internally divided that it was planning to submit its differences to the League of Nations.⁴ The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs attempted to scotch this story by announcing that the existing differences reduced themselves "to a simple difficulty stemming from cartographical errors."⁵ Whether this was, in fact, the substance of the disagreement is unknown, for the Commission's activities were never officially reported or published. But whatever the differences, they were ultimately not serious enough to prevent agreement on a final report, although it did take the Commission over a year to fulfill its obligations. Thus, it was not until November 16, 1925 that the Commission's report was turned over to the League, verifying that the de-fortification terms had been carried out and delineating the precise boundaries of the demilitarized zones.

The Straits Commission was charged with carrying out the main precondition for the implementation of the arms control provisions of the transit terms, that of determining the size of the Russian Black Sea fleet.⁶ The task, however, proved initially frustrating, for the Soviet authorities refused at first to cooperate with the Commission. Thus, when the Straits Commission asked the Soviet representative at Ankara on November 29, 1924 for the size of the Russian

Black Sea fleet, no response was received. When the request was repeated later, it too remained unanswered. The Commission, as a result, began to draw up its own figures on the Russian fleet from information taken from other sources. At this point, the Soviet representative at Ankara became cooperative. The Commissar of Foreign Affairs decided to provide the requested information, for in the absence of such data the Straits Commission might have established a figure greater than the actual strength of the Russian Black Sea fleet, thus permitting the Allies to send a larger naval force through the Straits than would have been possible with more accurate information.⁷

While the implementation of the arms control provisions of the treaty encountered some temporary difficulties, the necessary preconditions were met during 1925 and the arms control restrictions affecting demilitarization and transit could be said to be fully operative by early 1926. The question remained, however, whether once implemented the terms would be adhered to by all parties. Given the effect of the demilitarization terms on Turkey's military defense capacity, the adherence of Ankara to the restrictions was especially uncertain.

Fulfillment of Treaty Terms. The Lausanne agreements remained in effect until their revision at the Montreux conference in 1936. During this period, the execution of the treaty terms can be summarized by the following points: first, while rumors were occasionally circulated that Turkey was clandestinely remilitarizing its demilitarized zones, there is no reliable evidence that any important or systematic violations took place; second, the treaty was adhered to by all other Powers with only minor and relatively insignificant infractions; third, while violations of the treaty were few and unimportant, serious differences did arise between the Straits Commission and the Turkish Government over the interpretation of the treaty.

There was during this period one fairly clear violation of the treaty terms, although even here it was more a violation of the spirit than the letter of the treaty. The event took place in 1929 when some thirty-four Italian sea-planes flew into the Black Sea. Twenty-one of them followed the Bosphorus to that goal, while the remaining thirteen arrived there by a different route. The commander had broken his squadron into two parts so as to conform to the

Convention's restrictions, the USSR then possessing some twenty-one hydroplanes in its Black Sea fleet. The Straits Commission, however, pointed out that the result, after all, was the simultaneous presence of thirty-four Italian aircraft and thus, a derangement of the Black Sea equilibrium. The matter was reported to the League, but apparently no further action was taken.⁸

The following year an incident of a slightly different sort took place. This was provoked by the passage of two Soviet warships of the Baltic fleet through the Straits to join the Russian Black Sea fleet. Their movement created a considerable furor and nowhere more so than in the British Parliament. Indeed, the First Lord of the British Admiralty had to explain to that body that the Straits Commission had no authority to intervene in the matter of movements in or out of the Black Sea by littoral fleets.⁹ He was, of course, perfectly correct and, in fact, that was the substance of the Straits Commission report to the League. It simply noted the additions to the Soviet Black Sea fleet, indicating that this conformed "to the disposition of the Convention concerning the Regime of the Straits."¹⁰

While the transit terms encountered one minor infraction by the Italians, there were not, as far as can be determined from the available evidence, any important violations of the demilitarization provisions of the treaty.¹¹ Rumors periodically appeared in the press charging or implying that the Turks were clandestinely remilitarizing their demilitarized zones, but none of these rumors were substantiated or confirmed. By 1935, however, they were sufficiently widespread to prompt the American Ambassador in Turkey, Robert P. Skinner, to report to Washington that there had "appeared in the press and elsewhere many statements to the general effect that Turkey has already violated the demilitarization provisions of the Straits Convention;" they also led him to undertake a detailed examination of the charges which he summarized in a series of dispatches to the State Department during the months of May-July 1935.¹²

In mid-May, 1935, he reported on the military preparations being undertaken by the Turks in the Straits area, pointing out that "Mobile land defenses exist, and, I am told, there are numerous craft in readiness, in Ismet /Ismid/ Bay in the Marmora, to be towed where needed, and utilized to close the channel."¹³ Later that same month he submitted

a report on what he had observed on an inspection trip to Izmir (formerly Smyrna) during which he "passed over the road from Chanakele very near the mouth of the Straits to the site of ancient Troy, during two-thirds of the way on the main military road which connects with the railway." His observations were as follows:¹⁴

This road has a hard surface and is now being re-bridged in about eight different places which I was obliged to make detours, the bridges at the moment being down. According to my inexperienced observation, these bridges are being renewed with much stronger structures than those they are intended to replace. Furthermore, a military encampment actually at the mouth of the Straits on the Asiatic shore was pointed out to me, this encampment having been set up within the preceding ten days. It was said that the General in command had about 250 men under him, and the presumption seemed to be either that they were engineers making studies for permanent fortifications or perhaps were actually engaged in erecting fortifications.

In a dispatch dated July 3, 1925, Ambassador Skinner made a detailed report of the disposition of the Turkish forces, noting the recent shift of many men from the east to the proximity of the Straits.¹⁵ He also commented on the Turkish navy, which he thought generally ineffective, and concluded by stating that in his opinion, the Turks had not violated the Straits Convention. There was "no proof", he wrote, to warrant the rumors that Turkey had violated the demilitarization clauses of the Lausanne Treaty. And this conclusion was shared by the military attaches in Ankara: "in the opinion of the foreign Military Attaches in Turkey," he reported, "they /the rumors/ are false."¹⁶

While there were no important violations of the arms control provisions of the Lausanne treaty, serious disagreement did arise between the Straits Commission and the Turkish Government over treaty interpretation. This disagreement was prompted by the Turkish policy of establishing "forbidden zones" in areas of jurisdictional uncertainty. The first such "forbidden zone" was established in September, 1925, which involved the introduction of a set of regulations governing aerial flights over Turkish territory.¹⁷ In so doing, the Turkish Government specified several areas where such flights were forbidden. Two of these, the zone

of Chatalja and that of Ismid included within them some of the waters of the Sea of Marmora and were, thus, in the area of the Straits, although both were outside the boundaries of the demilitarized zone then being established.

In view of their location, the Straits Commission maintained that the establishment of these forbidden zones contradicted the Lausanne agreements and brought this to the attention of the Turkish Government. The Turkish Government, however, did not agree with the Commission's interpretation, arguing that the affected waters of the Marmora were "territorial" and thus subject entirely to Turkish jurisdiction. As the Straits Commission had no enforcement authority, the only alternative open was to report the incident to the League for appropriate action. The League, however, never made an official protest or placed the matter on the agenda, implying through its inaction that no violation of the Lausanne treaty had taken place.

In 1927 the Turks issued a second set of regulations affecting the Gulf of Ismid. As of May 31 of that year, the Turks required that all merchant shipping wishing to enter the Gulf obtain approval twenty-four hours in advance and take on a pilot for navigational purposes. Later, the Turks declared the western part of the Gulf to be a fortified zone and forbade all foreign warships the right of entry.¹⁸ The Straits Commission again protested that these actions contravened the terms of the Lausanne treaty but the Turks insisted that the designated waters were "territorial" and thus not subject to control by the Straits Commission. Again the matter was reported to the League, which accepted the Turkish policies without protest.

The Montreux Conference: Remilitarization

The demilitarization provisions of the Lausanne Treaty were based on two assumptions: first, that the League of Nations--as the guarantor of Turkish security--would become an effective instrument for the preservation of peace; second, that general disarmament would be achieved throughout the world, thus reducing the strategic vulnerability implied in the demilitarization terms. Both of these assumptions, however, proved increasingly illusory as the nineteen thirties unfolded. Beginning in the early 1930's therefore the Turks began to raise the question of a revision of the demilitarization terms. Their questions became with time outright

demands for treaty revision and the demands became in turn veiled threats of unilateral action.

With the example of Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland before them, the Lausanne signatories agreed in 1936--some reluctantly, some enthusiastically--to convene a new conference for the purpose of revising the Lausanne demilitarization provisions. Somewhat unexpectedly, the conference was also confronted with a demand, prompted mainly by Russian pressures, for a revision of the terms relating to the right of naval transit through the Straits. In the end, the Montreux conference agreed to terminate all of the demilitarization provisions set forth in the Lausanne conventions and to fundamentally revise the restrictions imposed on warships passing through the Straits. Montreux was, on balance, a triumph for Turkey, a qualified success for Soviet Russia and an important setback for Great Britain.

Pressures for Treaty Revision. The Turkish Government first began to raise the question of revision of the Lausanne agreements in 1932. On July 9, 1932, for example, when Ankara accepted the League's invitation to membership, reference was made to Turkey's "special position" arising from the demilitarization obligations. And during the next three years the Turkish representatives at Geneva could be depended upon to raise the issue at every possible occasion. Hitler's rise to power, however, caused an initial stiffening of the anti-revisionist front, with the result that the Turkish demands for treaty revision were rejected throughout 1933 and 1934.

When Hitler unilaterally violated the Versailles Treaty by restoring conscription on March 16, 1935, however, the Western powers became somewhat more receptive to the idea of revisionism by common consent and the Stresa Conference, held the following month, prepared the ground for both treaty revision and remilitarization by passing a resolution which took "into consideration the desire expressed by the States, whose military status was respectively determined by the Treaties of Saint-Germain, Trianon and Neuilly, to obtain the revision of this status."¹⁹ Although the arms control clauses of the Lausanne conventions were not among those listed for revision, the Turks held that the moment was propitious and pressed their claims once again. Somewhat reluctantly the Allies agreed to include Turkey's demand on the agenda of the Rome Conference, scheduled to meet later in 1935 to

redefine, among other things, the arms control terms of the post-war treaties. While the Rome Conference was never convened, the Turks had made an important breach in the anti-revisionist front.²⁰

The invasion of Ethiopia intervened in October 1935 to shift the attention of the western powers away from treaty revision to the problem of defining a response to Italy's expansionist policy. Turkey's demands, along with those of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, had therefore to be postponed. But in March 1936, the European security system suffered two staggering blows in quick succession. On March 5, the Italian armies scored a major military victory in Ethiopia, forcefully demonstrating the weakness of the League in general and of the collective security arrangement in particular. Then on March 7, Hitler marched into the Rhineland in open violation of the Versailles Treaty and Locarno pact, demonstrating the weakness and indecisiveness of the western Allies.

These actions posed several questions of the greatest urgency for Turkey: what would happen if Italy, once victorious in Ethiopia, revived her wartime claims to a sphere of interest in Anatolia? Would the Allies come to the aid of Turkey when they had not responded to a more direct threat to their immediate security interests?

During March 1936, the Turkish General Staff urged the government to follow the German example and unilaterally undertake the remilitarization of the Straits. But the government resisted and decided to make one last attempt at a negotiated revision of the arms control restrictions.²¹ Accordingly, on April 10, the Turkish Government sent a note to all the Powers which had taken part in the Straits negotiations at Lausanne inviting them to convene a new conference for the purpose of revising the Lausanne conventions.²²

The Turkish Note of April 10, reiterated the points and claims that the Turkish Government had been advancing with ever greater urgency since 1933: general disarmament and the League, the preconditions of Turkish security, had collapsed--or were in the process of doing so. In view of the changed circumstances since 1923, the Turkish Government could not, "without being guilty of serious negligence, expose the whole country to an irreparable coup de main." With a veiled hint of unilateral action if the requested conference were not convened, the note concluded:

As the issue at stake is the existence of Turkey herself and the security of her whole territory, the Government of the Republic may be led to take before the nation the responsibility incumbent upon it by adopting measures dictated by the imperious necessity of circumstances.

All of the powers agreed except Italy, which held out in the hope of obtaining as a quid pro quo for her participation in the projected conference the lifting of League sanctions. The Soviet Union, which had vociferously opposed the Lausanne conference in 1923--and had found no reason to change its position in the interim--was most enthusiastic in its agreement to participate, while the British and French were somewhat less effusive in their replies of acceptance. Of the Balkan powers, only Rumania was reluctant to support the Turkish proposal, as the government was apprehensive--as it had been at Lausanne--over the strategic implications of converting the Black Sea into a Turco-Soviet lake. She was ultimately persuaded to participate, however, leaving Italy the only country of the original signatories which refused to attend. The United States, which had not signed the Lausanne conventions but had sent an unofficial delegation to the conference as "observers" was also not represented.

The Montreux Conference. The Montreux conference opened on June 22, 1936 and lasted almost a month.²³ There was never any opposition to the notion that the demilitarization provisions of the Lausanne conventions would be terminated nor was there any question that Turkey would be permitted to remilitarize the Straits, the Thracian frontier and the Aegean Islands. Indeed, the issue of remilitarization was never really debated at Montreux; its acceptance was assumed and the only point of the conference, it was widely believed, was simply to legitimize this change--a process which was expected to take but a few days.

But somewhat unexpectedly the Turks demanded at Montreux not only the elimination of the demilitarization terms but a fundamental revision of the provisions relating to transit through the Straits. These clauses had not been the subject of prior debate nor had their revision been demanded by Turkey. But on the second day of the conference, the Turkish delegation presented the draft of a proposed revision which contained a complete rewriting of the transit terms.

The Turkish draft bore the unmistakable imprint of Soviet counsel. In general, it sought to impose greater restrictions on non-littoral powers while giving greater freedom to the Black Sea powers. In particular, it proposed the following provisions as part of its formula for the Straits regime:

1) In time of peace non-littoral powers would have the right to send into the Black Sea a fleet of no more than 28,000 tons. The maximum any one power could send in would be half that amount, of 14,000 tons. This was in marked contrast to the Lausanne provisions which authorized each non-littoral power to send through the Straits a fleet equal to that of the strongest Black Sea naval force or a force of 30,000 tons, whichever figure was larger.

2) In time of peace, non-littoral warships would be forbidden to remain more than fifteen days in the Black Sea. There was no such time restriction in the Lausanne agreement.

3) In time of war, Turkey being neutral, non-littoral powers would not have the "right of belligerency," i.e., the 28,000 ton limitation on aggregate tonnage and the 14,000 ton limitation for individual powers would still apply. In the Lausanne treaty, the non-littoral powers were to have the right of belligerency, which meant that none of the arms control restrictions were to apply in event a war broke out between a Black Sea power and a non-Black Sea power and Turkey remained neutral.

4) If Turkey were to become involved in a war--or were even threatened with attack--she would have unrestricted discretionary power over the passage of warships through the Straits. She could open the Straits to any power for the passage of a naval force of any size without any further consultation or approval. This differed from the Lausanne agreements in a number of respects. First, the Lausanne agreement did not give Turkey any belligerent rights when merely "threatened" with attack; second, under the Lausanne agreement, Turkey was required to grant freedom of passage to all neutral warships and aircraft.

5) In time of peace, civilian and military aircraft would not have the right to fly over the Straits. According to the Turkish draft, the entire Straits area would become a forbidden zone; air traffic between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea would be restricted to those routes designated by the Turkish Government which would be located outside the Straits area.

While the Turkish draft would have restricted the naval force which the non-littoral powers could send into the Black Sea, it would have placed no limits on the naval force which the Black Sea powers could send into the Mediterranean. The only limit imposed on the right of egress through the Straits was in terms of the size and number which could pass through at any one time. There was no limit placed on total or aggregate tonnage. The Turkish draft then would have given the Soviet fleet the right to enter the Mediterranean without restraint or restriction while drastically curtailing the right of the English or French fleets to enter the Black Sea. In effect, this would have given the Soviet fleet the opportunity to attack a hostile fleet in the Mediterranean and then retreat to the safe sanctuary of the Black Sea without risk of effective pursuit.

While not closing the Black Sea entirely to non-littoral powers--as had been the historic objective of Russia--the Turkish draft would have closely approached that goal, much too closely, according to the British. As a result, the major conflict of interests at Montreux, as at Lausanne, was between Britain and Russia. But where Russia had been isolated at Lausanne, Britain found herself fighting a lonely battle at Montreux. The French were willing to see Soviet influence augmented in the Mediterranean, as this would add greater weight to the Franco-Soviet pact signed the year before in May 1935. The members of the Balkan Entente were also not opposed, for the most part, to an increase in Soviet power in the area nor to a tightening of restrictions on the right of non-littoral powers to send warships through the Straits. Thus, the only sure support Britain could count on in resisting Soviet demands at Montreux came from Japan. And this placed the British in the unenviable position of appearing at times to champion the rights of the Axis over the interests of the littoral powers.

The British were concerned, of course, not only with the advantages the Turkish draft would give the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, but also with its possible effect on the Anglo-German naval convention of June 1935. A Straits convention on the line of the Turkish draft would, it was anticipated, encourage Russian naval building in Black Sea yards, as these yards would be largely immune from foreign attack. If this took place, there existed the very real

danger that Germany would invoke the escape clause of the 1935 naval convention and promote a general race in naval armaments. Indeed, it has been suggested that British policy was preoccupied more with Germany at Montreux than with the more immediate problem of the Straits.²⁴

During the first three days, the delegates considered those provisions of the Turkish draft which dealt with the passage of commercial shipping through the Straits and no serious problems were encountered. The conference was then adjourned for a few days to permit the delegates to return to Geneva for an important session of the League, at which it was decided to lift the sanctions against Italy. During the recess, the British delegation hurriedly prepared a counterdraft to the Turkish proposals, which it submitted at Montreux on July 6.

The British draft, which became the basis for discussions, tried to salvage some of the points contained in the Lausanne agreements, with, however, only moderate success. It sought to retain the Straits Commission, though accepted a curtailment of its responsibilities to that of gathering statistics on naval traffic through the Straits and on the tonnage of Black Sea fleets. And it retained the provision giving the non-littoral powers the rights of belligerency. While accepting the principle that Turkey, if engaged or even threatened with war, had discretionary powers over access to the Straits, it sought to add one restriction: that any measure Turkey might take would be terminated if the Council of the League by a two-thirds majority decided that the action was unjustified. The British accepted Turkey's right to establish forbidden zones to aircraft in the Straits area provided only that some safeguard be included for civilian flights between Europe and Asia and between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

Seeing no alternative, the British accepted the premise that Soviet Russia was to have peacetime naval superiority in the Black Sea. But the British draft sought to limit that superiority quantitatively and to peacetime. Quantitatively, the British recommended that the aggregate strength of non-littoral powers be increased from the 28,000 tons provided in the Turkish draft to 30,000 tons, and the amount any one power could send into the Straits be increased from one-half the total to three-fourths. In addition, these ships would be allowed to stay one month instead of fifteen days. An escalator clause was also included to permit an increase

above these limits should the Black Sea powers increase the size of their naval forces in these water: if the strongest littoral power was to increase its naval force in the Black Sea by ten per cent above the level established at the signature of the convention, then the non-Black Sea powers could increase their total forces proportionally up to a total of 45,000 aggregate tons.

The attempt to limit Russia superiority to peacetime was to be achieved through the reintroduction of the principle of belligerent rights. According to this provision non-littoral powers would be permitted to send a fleet of unlimited size into the Black Sea in event of war, provided only that Turkey remain neutral. Another possibility was in a rather innocuous clause stipulating that Turkey could invite foreign fleets into the Straits above and beyond the limits set in the convention, ostensibly for courtesy visits. Though not elaborated, the strategic implications were clear--especially if Turkey could be weaned away from Russia. And the British included one additional modification which sought to give non-littoral powers greater influence in the Black Sea. In this clause, a non-littoral power could send a naval force of 10,000 tons into the Black Sea, regardless of the tonnage limits, "for humanitarian purposes." Only Turkish permission would be required, according to the British draft, for these supplemental forces to have access to the Black Sea. In effect, this would mean that instead of a 28,000 or 30,000 aggregate tonnage limitation, an alliance of four or five or six countries could send with Turkish permission a total of 40,000, 50,000 or 60,000 tons into the Black Sea--"for humanitarian purposes."

After two weeks of negotiation, the final terms were agreed upon.²⁵ And while the British were able to gain acceptance of several points of their draft, the final treaty represented a substantial victory for Turkey and a qualified success for the Soviet Union. Thus, the main provisions of the final treaty were:

- 1) If Turkey were to become engaged in war or were threatened with attack, she would have discretionary authority over the passage of warships through the Straits. The British attempt to qualify this by adding that any action could be rescinded by a two-thirds vote of the League Council was further amended by adding that this had to be approved as well by a majority of the signatories of the Montreux convention. The possibility that sufficient

agreement could be reached in both the League Council and among the signatories to reject a Turkish act was at that time and in the foreseeable future rather remote. The qualification, in effect, became more of a statement of principle than a practical limitation.

2) The Straits Commission would be abolished and the functions of the Commission transferred to the Turkish Government. The British attempt to preserve the Commission failed.

3) Non-Littoral powers could maintain an aggregate force of 30,000 tons in the Black Sea and that if the strongest Black Sea fleet were increased by 10,000 tons, the other powers could match the increase up to a maximum of 45,000 tons. The British position was accepted, with slight change, although it amounted to a minor modification.

4) No one non-littoral power could send into the Black Sea more than two-thirds of the total tonnage allowed. The British amendment requesting three-fourths was amended in turn, providing for a compromise between the original Turkish provision of one-half and the British counter-proposal.

5) Non-littoral ships could not remain in the Black Sea for more than twenty-one days. This was again a compromise between the original Turkish proposal limiting the stay to fifteen days and the British counter-proposal of one month.

6) Any power could supplement its force already in the Black Sea up to 8,000 tons, regardless of total tonnage limit, "for humanitarian purposes," provided that permission be obtained from Turkey and all other Black Sea powers. These ships also had to leave within twenty-one days. The British request for 10,000 was reduced and, more important, the potential strategic importance of the clause was totally undermined with the qualification that permission had to be obtained not only from Turkey but from all Black Sea powers, Soviet Russia included.

7) The passage of civil aircraft over the Straits was provided, in routes to be set by the Turkish Government. Military aircraft were still forbidden to fly over the Straits.

8) The right to send a fleet of unlimited size into the Straits upon the invitation of Turkey was approved, but this was qualified by adding that such "courtesy visits" would be permitted to stop only in Turkey's ports in the Straits, including Constantinople, but not in her Black Sea ports.

The most contentious issue was that involving "belligerent rights." The Soviet position was that in time of war the Straits should be open to the fleets of the belligerent Black Sea power but closed to the navies of other belligerent powers. This provision would have made the Black Sea a privileged sanctuary for the Soviet navy and was therefore strenuously resisted by the British delegation. The British maintained that, on the basis of reciprocity, the Straits should be equally open or equally closed to all belligerents. Faced with this choice, the Soviets preferred the Straits to be closed to all belligerents rather than wide open and the final treaty stipulated that "warships belonging to belligerent powers shall not pass the Straits." The Soviet fleet would not have access to the Mediterranean, but more important, from the Soviet point of view, the non-littoral powers would not have access to the Black Sea.

The Montreux convention was signed on July 20, 1936 with one quite unusual provision--part of the agreement, pertaining to the remilitarization of the Straits--was to go into effect immediately, even before final ratification. The Turks had demanded the immediate termination of the Lausanne restrictions with the signature of the Montreux document and though rather unusual the other delegates finally acquiesced. Thus, a special protocol was signed stating that "at the moment of signing the Convention bearing this day's date... Turkey may immediately remilitarize the zone of the Straits as defined in the Preamble to the said Convention."

The remaining portions of the convention, terminating the Straits Commission and introducing the new transit regulations, went into force on the date of final ratification three and a half months later, on November 9, 1936. And Italy eventually adhered to the convention in May 1938.

Although the Turks sought authorization to initiate the remilitarization of the Straits immediately, actual progress on the construction of fortifications proceeded rather slowly.²⁶ This was due less to lack of interest or policy differences among the Turks than to a lack of funds. Indeed, it was not until Turkey rejected German overtures in the spring of 1939 that sufficient funds became available for the completion of the Straits fortification program. In May 1939, England made a loan to Turkey of £20,000,000 for military procurements in return for Turkish assurance that any fortification on the Straits would not be used to close these waterways to the British fleet.²⁷

As things turned out, Turkey did not use her fortifications against anyone. Although subjected to great pressures during the war from both sides, Turkey managed to maintain her neutrality until 1945, when she finally joined the Allies in time to insure her participation in the formation of the United Nations' Organization.²⁸ Though the Germans assembled a surface and submarine fleet of considerable proportions in the Black Sea during the war, none of these ships reached their destination by way of the Straits. By raising sunken ships, by sending others on overland routes and by temporarily using the captured Russian shipyard at Nikolayev, the Germans were able to achieve their objectives without violating the Montreux convention. Even at the end of the war no attempt was made to evacuate the fleet through the Straits and the ships were scuttled.²⁹ Several efforts were made following the war to revise the terms of the Montreux treaty, mainly by the Soviet Union, but no agreement was ever reached.³⁰ Thus, the Montreux convention remains in effect to this day.

Chapter 12 - Footnotes

¹ The Soviet envoy to Rome signed the agreement on behalf of the Soviet republics on August 14, 1923, but the government failed to ratify it, see Louis Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs (1951), I, 410.

² Article 6 stated that "in the territorial waters of the demilitarized zones and islands, there shall exist no submarine engines of war, other than submarine vessels."

³ Article 5 of the Straits Convention.

⁴ Bulletin de la presse turque (Paris), No. 38, p. 6.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ For a review of the activities of the Straits Commission, see Willis B. Hazleton, "The International Administration of the Turkish Straits, 1924-1936," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Stanford University, 1951).

⁷ See Louis Fischer, Soviets in World Affairs, I, 412.

⁸ See Rapport de la Commission des Détroits à la Société des Nations (Année 1929) (1930), pp. 7-8; hereafter referred to as Rapport.

⁹ See P.P. Graves, The Question of the Straits (1931), pp. 196-97.

¹⁰ Rapport for 1930, p. 7.

¹¹ The following sources were reviewed for indications of treaty violations: the annual Reports (Rapports) of the Straits Commission to the League of Nations; British and American diplomatic papers as collected in Documents on British Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations of the United States; the secondary works referred to in the footnotes found in this and the previous chapter; the New York Times and the London Times for the years 1925-1936.

¹² F.R., 1935, I, 1038.

¹³ Ibid., p. 1028.

- 14 Ibid., pp. 1028-29.
- 15 Ibid., pp. 1034-49.
- 16 Ibid., p. 1038.
- 17 Rapport for 1926, pp. 18-19.
- 18 Rapport for 1927, pp. 12, 55.
- 19 See "Joint Resolution of the Stresa Conference: April 14, 1935," D.I.A., 1935, I, 81-82.
- 20 See Gerald Laval Campagna, "The Foreign Relations of the Turkish Republic," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Boston University, 1952), p. 146.
- 21 Ibid., p. 147.
- 22 The April 10 note is in D.I.A., 1936, pp. 645-48.
- 23 For the Montreux Conference, consult Routh's section in Survey of International Affairs, 1936; Campagna, "The Foreign Relations of the Turkish Republic;" Eric Bruel, International Straits (1947); James T. Shotwell and Francis Deak, Turkey at the Straits (1940); M. Ambrosini, The Regime of the Straits (1941); Harry Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits (1947); Howard, "The Straits after the Montreux Conference," Foreign Affairs, (1936-1937); Michael Sokolnicki, The Turkish Straits (1950). The official transcript of the conference is Actes de la conférence de Montreux (1936).
- 24 Howard, "Straits after Montreux," p. 201.
- 25 The final treaty can be found in "Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits with Annexes and Protocol, League of Nations Treaty Series (1936), pp. 213-241. Also Turkey No. 1 (1936) Convention regarding the regime of the Straits, with correspondence relating thereto. Montreux, July 20, 1936, Cmd. 5249.
- 26 S.I.A., 1937, pp. 339-52.
- 27 Bruel, International Straits, p. 402, fn 1.
- 28 On this entire period, see Kilic, Turkey and the World

chapter II, Campagna, Foreign Relations of Turkish Republic," part IV, Sokolnicki, The Turkish Straits, chapter 6.

²⁹ See Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Der Seekrieg (1957) pp. 289-90; also Wolfgang Frank, The Sea Wolves (1955) pp. 140-42.

³⁰ On these activities, see Howard, The Problem of the Turkish Straits, pp. 36-38.